Nikolay Golovko
The Russia-Africa Summit taking place in Moscow today will be the third of its kind, and relations have undergone a great transformation since the first summit.
Over the past seven years, permanent frameworks have been established, diplomatic presence has expanded, and trade turnover has grown.
This year’s summit will provide an opportunity to evaluate the results of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum Action Plan, which was adopted at the second summit.
It contains 181 points covering politics and security, trade, investment, agriculture, energy, industry, transport, digitalisation, science, education, and humanitarian cooperation.
Prior to 2022, expert discussions focused mainly on Africa’s place among Moscow’s foreign policy priorities.
However, in the past four years, the practical importance of Russia’s relationship with the continent has surged.
African nations have become a higher priority for Russia in terms of diplomacy, business, foreign trade, and international coordination. Today, the primary focus is on the quality of cooperation.
From summits to permanent mechanisms
The first Russia-Africa Summit, held in Sochi in October 2019, brought together all 54 African nations, including more than 40 heads of state and government.
Its most significant outcome was the establishment of a pan-African approach in Russian foreign policy. This set a framework for regular summits, the ongoing work of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum, and cooperation with the African Union.
The second summit took place in St. Petersburg in July 2023 and was attended by delegations from 49 African states, 17 of which were led by heads of state.
A three-year Action Plan adopted there featured key topics such as financial settlements, banking ties, logistics, investments, information technology, industry, and transport.
Cooperation has since become multi-dimensional. In November 2024, the first Ministerial Conference of the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum took place in Sochi, followed by a second such conference in Cairo in December 2025.
Russia’s diplomatic network has also expanded. There are currently 45 Russian embassies physically operating in Africa. Since 2023, embassies have resumed operations in Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, and Sierra Leone, and a new Russian embassy was opened in South Sudan. The opening of embassies in the Gambia, Liberia, Togo, and the Comoros are next on the agenda.
Politics outpaces economics so far
Russia’s political presence in Africa has been expanding faster than economic ties. At the same time, tangible progress has been made in commerce: trade turnover between Russia and Africa grew from $16,8 billion in 2019, when the first summit was held, to $27,1 billion in 2025.
However, a pronounced imbalance persists: in 2025, Russian exports accounted for $22,7 billion, while imports amounted to only about $4,4 billion.
Much of the growth seen in recent years is linked to shifts in the external environment and the redirection of trade flows. Establishing a sustainable presence, however, requires direct supply channels, infrastructure, local partners, and financing.
The geography of economic ties is also uneven, with about 70 percent of total trade turnover still concentrated in North African countries. Food, fertilisers, fuel, and metals account for a significant portion of trade turnover.
Moscow’s policy currently commands fewer financial resources. To make its presence in Africa more effective, Russia is focusing on the sectors where it possesses the necessary technologies and expertise, and where demand is stable.
Food, fertilisers, energy, and education
Russia maintains a strong position in the food and fertiliser sectors. Following the 2023 summit, a pledge to provide free shipments of wheat to six African countries was fulfilled.
In 2024, Russia delivered 200 000 tonnes of grain (valued at approximately US$60 million) to Mali, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Eritrea, Somalia, and the Central African Republic.
The next phase of cooperation could focus on developing production capacities in African nations. The African Union’s agenda prioritises fertiliser production, the storage and processing of agricultural products, mechanisation, seed production, transport infrastructure, and enhancing local added value.
Talks between Russia and the African union in July 2026 addressed industrialisation, the expansion of trade within the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and food security.
This approach aligns with the objectives of Agenda 2063 – the African Union’s development blueprint – which calls for the strengthening of national economies, fostering domestic production, creating jobs, and reducing reliance on external supplies. The AfCFTA, designed to dismantle trade barriers between the nations of the region and establish a unified market, supports these same goals. Within this framework, fertiliser production, raw material processing, the establishment of service centres, the assembly of machinery, and the training of local specialists help build a sustainable presence in markets.
Cooperation in the field of nuclear energy also offers long-term benefits. The construction of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in Egypt is Russia’s largest infrastructure project on the African continent, generating long-term demand for technical support, fuel, personnel training, and maintenance services. In the humanitarian sphere, education plays a comparable role: tens of thousands of students from Africa are currently enrolled in Russian universities. Value is further amplified when educational programs are linked to specific economic projects.
African demand
The context for cooperation with Africa has also evolved. One of the most notable shifts has been the development of the AfCFTA. By 2026, 50 of the 54 signatory countries had ratified the agreement.
The primary challenge now is to ensure that free trade becomes a practical reality. Participants have agreed to phase out tariffs on 90 percent of product categories – a process set to take five years for more developed economies and 10 years for the least developed nations.
Concurrently, the African union has taken a more active role in coordinating relations with external partners. African governments are cultivating ties with China, the EU, the US, India, Türkiye, the Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and other countries.
Such diversification has become standard foreign policy practice. For several nations, most notably those in the Sahel, Russia has emerged as a high-priority foreign policy partner.
The summit in St. Petersburg in 2023 demonstrated the autonomy of African diplomacy. Prior to the meeting, an African peace delegation visited Kiev and St. Petersburg, presenting their own proposals for resolving the conflict.
African leaders raised concerns with the Russian leadership regarding food security and the impact of the hostilities on the continent’s economy. For Moscow, this may signal a need to engage with partners who maintain a broad range of foreign policy options.
The number of leaders attending the summit in fact only offers a limited perspective on the state of relations.
What are instruments of sovereignty?
There are 54 countries in Africa, and all are very different.
Russia’s experience in recent years highlights the value of stable regional powers with large economies and well-developed external ties – such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, South Africa, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and several others. Entering these markets, however, requires more thorough preparation and a solid understanding of local conditions. At the same time, the scale of these economies opens up opportunities for long-term projects. Such ventures can serve not only the market of a single country, but may also supply neighbouring states, gradually expanding the presence of Russian companies throughout the region.
Another promising direction is the exchange of experience in the field of technologies that expand the practical capabilities of the nation in management – generally referred to as “instruments of sovereignty.” In the agricultural sector, these are food reserve systems, the forecasting of climate risks and the storage and processing of products.
In the digital sphere, it is data localisation, government information systems, satellite communications and fibre optic infrastructure. In the extractive industry, it is geological exploration, personnel training, and regulatory instruments that stimulate the processing of raw materials in the country.
This approach is giving practical meaning to Russia’s rhetoric about sovereignty. Results can be measured by an increase in new capacities, trained specialists, a reduction in import dependence and an increase in the tax base.
What will the Moscow summit show?
The practical results of the summit may be assessed according to five parameters. First, the public assessment of the implementation of the 2023-2026 Action Plan (including by the African side) will reveal functioning aspects, delayed initiatives, and projects that require revision. Then comes the new 2027-2029 Action Plan: Its measurable objectives and realistic timelines will facilitate the work of relevant departments. Third is financial infrastructure: export lending, risk insurance, banking support, and working settlement mechanisms are important for business.
Another important point is deepening the economic presence: developing projects, service centres, processing, energy and digital infrastructure. Lastly there is country prioritisation, which means that limited resources necessitate that projects be chosen with a clear economic or political effect.
Why Russia needs an independent Africa
The 2026 summit will essentially serve as an evaluation of Russia’s policy in Africa over the past seven years. This period allows us to separate functioning projects from initiatives that exist mainly as part of the public agenda.
The next three-year cycle will show to what extent Russia can play to its strengths and build sustainable mechanisms for financing, trade, local production, personnel training, and constant interaction with African institutions.
Nikolay Golovko is a leading expert of the Centre for African Studies at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics (HSE)
