Online Reporter
THOMAS TUCHEL’s England made history when they beat Albania 2-0 to make it a flawless eight wins from eight in their World Cup Qualifiers.
The Three Lions endured a shaky start and some close calls in Tirana, but two goals from captain Harry Kane pushed them over the line.
But it was one surprising tactical decision along the way that not only made the win possible, but threw up several questions about the future of Tuchel’s team selection.
The German was adamant in the build-up to the game that he could not start all of England‘s talented creative midfielders in the ten, and that they would have to fight for their position.
He even specifically declared that he could not play Phil Foden, Jude Bellingham and Kane on the same pitch, due to their tendency to occupy the same areas.
Other options who excel in the No10 position include Cole Palmer, Morgan Gibbs-White and Morgan Rogers, leaving the boss with quite the selection headache.
But it seems Tuchel has found a genius workaround to the issue: Just play the entire team at No10!
The average positions map for the match makes for surprising reading, with the majority of the team bunched up in a narrow formation surrounding the edge of the opposition’s defensive third.
Winger Jarrod Bowen was the furthest forward attacker on average, with striker Kane and midfielder Adam Wharton taking up almost the same position in the midfield.
Full-back Nico O’Reilly, making his first start in an England shirt, is even positioned inside the opponents’ side of the pitch despite playing in what would rationally be expected to be a wide and defensive role.
In fact, only central defenders Dan Burn and John Stones had an average position inside their own half, and even that margin was narrow.
It is to be expected that dominant teams will play further up the pitch, especially when facing a defence that likes to drop back and sit narrow like Albania did on Sunday.
But the lack of width in the England squad is a sign that there were deliberate tactical intentions behind the unusual map.
Some teams elect to commit more players into wide areas against a low block, in an attempt to swing a cross in or break their way into the box from the sides before cutting the ball back.
But England kept a relatively narrow shape in the face of the wall of defenders, choosing to approach the tricky situation in a different way.
For example, while trying to break down the block, a white shirt may drop into the space a 10 would occupy in order to receive the ball from a teammate.
If an Albania defender stepped out of their defensive line to engage that player, the attacker could begin to peel off towards a wider area, forcing the defender to make a decision.
The defender could ignore the run and hold their place in the defensive line, which would risk leaving the attacker free to link up with any players lurking in wide areas and create overloads on the edge of the box.
Or the defender could stick with the England player, leaving their position and creating a gap in the defensive line.
Tuchel’s willingness to allow his stars to rotate into aggressive central areas meant that any number of players could then charge into the space.
This means almost every attacker, midfielder or full-back is an option to exploit the extra space left behind by the defender, or if that man didn’t get drawn out of position, to link up with the now spare man floating between the defenders.
This approach only works if you are willing to commit men forward in large numbers.
If a central attacker shifts wide and nobody fills the space in the middle, then the nearest defender can track the run at no cost to their defensive structure as a whole.
But if you always have another option arriving, then you can force a defender to choose between two bad options, and therefore create the opportunity to have a free player in or around the opponents’ box.
This is part of why Tuchel reversed his promise not to play Kane, Bellingham and Foden together when he introduced the latter from the bench in the second half -Sun.
