Online Reporter
Hebert Zharare-Day Editor
Across Tanzania, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Uganda, Vitol is moving beyond fuel supply into the position of energy gatekeeper. The mechanisms differ, but the direction is the same: procurement is centralised, competition is weakened, local oil companies lose autonomy, and one private trader gains leverage over an essential national commodity.
Africa does not lack suppliers. The market is deep. Trafigura, Gunvor, Glencore and national oil companies have the ships and networks to compete. The real shortage is of governments willing to preserve competition when fuel procurement becomes sensitive.
Vitol can deliver. That is not in dispute. The harder question is why governments make Vitol difficult to challenge, benchmark and remove.
In Tanzania, the most serious allegations concern the May 2026 Bulk Procurement System.
Tanzania Political Review alleges that an open tender covering eleven cargoes of gasoil, petrol and jet fuel was cancelled shortly before final allocation, with the cargoes instead channelled through TPDC and Vitol acting as the underlying supplier.
It further alleges that the premiums charged were far above what a completed tender could have produced.
Those claims require independent verification.
Tanzania can settle the matter by publishing the bids, pricing benchmarks, evaluation report and ministerial authority. It has not done so. Silence does not prove wrongdoing, but it protects the opacity in which such allegations survive.
The publication raises questions about Namaro Energy and an alleged force majeure declaration on an awarded gasoil cargo after the original pricing period had closed. It claims that an addendum repriced the cargo at a higher rate, benefiting Namaro and, indirectly, Vitol. The contracts should determine the truth. Government holds them.
Mozambique is building a different, but equally dangerous structure. The government is replacing IMOPETRO with ENAPP, a State enterprise that will hold exclusive authority over petroleum procurement for the domestic market. The July 2026 rationale says ENAPP will give the State control over the import chain and improve security of supply.
The criticism of IMOPETRO may be justified. Its structure reportedly excluded new entrants and protected incumbents. But replacing a private bottleneck with a state monopoly does not restore competition. It concentrates supplier selection, volume allocation, pricing and emergency authority inside one institution. Club of Mozambique reported that ENAPP will plan, contract, coordinate and monitor domestic fuel procurement.
Vitol has not been publicly appointed by ENAPP. That distinction matters. But the structure creates the chokepoint a dominant trader would want. Instead of competing for many buyers, it would need to secure one relationship.
Namibia shows how quickly emergency procurement can dismantle competition safeguards. The Namibian reported that government appointed Vitol as the country’s single fuel supplier for July to September 2026. Beforehand, the Namibian Competition Commission had prohibited Nasan Energies from sourcing fuel from Vitol for five years after Nasan acquired stations linked to Vivo Energy. The energy minister later suspended those conditions.
Government, therefore, appointed Vitol as sole supplier, then weakened a safeguard designed to prevent Vitol from reconnecting wholesale supply with downstream retail. That is concentration by ministerial action.
Zambia’s vulnerability lies in infrastructure. As a landlocked economy, it depends on corridors such as the Tazama pipeline. Where one trader secures privileged pipeline access, formal market entry means little. Competitors may hold licences but remain unable to move fuel through the cheapest route. The International Monetary Fund has urged Zambia to restore open access and publish emergency fuel terms.
Uganda has gone further by reorganising national imports through the Uganda National Oil Company and an exclusive arrangement with a Vitol unit. Reuters reported that the policy sought to reduce dependence on Kenyan import channels. That objective is legitimate. Replacing regional dependence with dependence on one private trader is not sovereignty.
Across these markets, the architecture converges. State entities become sole buyers. Distributors become passive recipients. Emergency powers weaken tendering. Infrastructure access narrows. Pricing remains confidential. One decision point is created and Vitol is positioned to capture it.
Vitol’s scale explains why. It trades cargoes, arranges shipping, finances transactions and holds interests in storage, terminals, retail and power. Storage reveals inventories. Retail networks reveal demand. Shipping positions reveal shortages. Financing relationships reveal government liquidity pressure.
That information advantage is commercially powerful. The regulatory failure is allowing it to operate without resistance.
Security of supply cannot become a permanent exemption from competition. Exclusive contracts must be short, reviewable and independently justified. Full landed costs, including benchmarks, premiums, freight, financing, storage and demurrage, must be auditable. Ownership links and intermediaries must be disclosed. Pipelines, terminals and storage must remain open to rivals.
Africa needs fuel partners. It does not need a private company sitting between entire economies and the energy they cannot function without.
Vitol is doing what a sophisticated trader is designed to do: secure access, protect margins and deepen control.
The challenge is that African governments keep helping it.
