Chronicle Editor
Pathisa Nyathi, Feature
IT can hardly be believed that the arrival of Edgar Lockwood in Zambia in October 1978 four days after the Rhodesian bombings of Zapu/ZPRA facilities was fortuitous. Four days later the Rhodesian Air Force had conducted sustained and devastating bombings on Zapu/ZPRA camps in Zambia.
The attacks exposed Zambia’s incapability to stand against the Rhodesians defence forces and therefore, no capacity to defend Zapu/ZPRA installations in that country. The leader of the Rhodesian Squadron, code-named Green Leader communicated directly with the Lusaka control tower at the airport advising it of forthcoming attacks on the camps in Lusaka area, and instructing the controller to ground all planes. The controller complied.
Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda’s response was that Zambia was being realistic in the circumstances. It was acknowledgement that Zambia could not carry on a war with Rhodesia. “I will defend my people politically.” His defence forces were not sufficiently equipped and trained to stand against the Rhodesians with a variety of fighter bombers from the United Kingdom and France and other Western countries.
The Rhodesians apparently exaggerated their success story, claiming to have hit 12 camps when in actual fact they had hit three major camp areas and certain facilities.
The attacked camps were at Mkushi, 90 miles north of Lusaka, at Rufunsa 100 miles east, and at FC camp just outside the capital. Satellite camps that were hit included Mboroma and Wonder Gorge. The former was hit in order to release the Rhodesian spy agents kept in underground pits by Zapu’s NSO. In a statement Zapu leader Joshua Nkomo indicated that Mkushi contained 1 633 persons of whom all but thirty were young girls who were being trained for customs and immigration officials, medical service officers or for welfare work.
The only military training that they had received was in small arms, but only 42 semi-automatic rifles, 2 bazookas and a Light Machine Gun(LMG) had been available for self defence, indicated the Zapu leader.
The Rhodesians arrived at 11 in the morning with three or four bombers and eight helicopters while the girls were having a meal. Apparently the Rhodesians possessed sound intelligence. Food at Mkushi was being transported by trucks from Lusaka. During this particular period there had been no food deliveries for an extended time making the girls vulnerable as getting food on this day meant there was likely to be some degree of stampede.
The inmates were at their most vulnerable during gatherings. It was at that point that the Rhodesians demanded that a girl instructor call her group by means of a whistle, which she did. Eight or ten Rhodesian soldiers demanded that she shoot the gathered girls. She refused and the Rhodesians opened fire and shot all of them.
A further 30 were killed when a hand grenade was thrown into a shelter where some girls were hiding. Some of the wounded had napalm burns. Nkomo said a 100 girls had been killed and a further 192 were unaccounted for.
Edgar Lockwood reported that FC camp was primarily a refugee camp. According to a Reuters report 226 persons died at FC. Lockwood reported that he thought the camp was also referred to as Chikumbi.
The attack took place at 8.30 in the morning by Canberras, Mirages and helicopters. This means the attack on Mkushi came after an earlier attack on FC camp. In fact some people at Mkushi had got information regarding what was going on at FC camp. Citing a source in a relief agency, Lockwood indicated that Zapu lost $400 000 worth of material at the refugee camp.
Lockwood was without doubt sniffing around for intelligence information regarding the attacks and their likely outcome and effect on Zapu/ZPRA military operations.
Further, he was soliciting information from sources in the relief sector. These were a legion and were in the habit of availing their services to the liberation movements. Indeed, they played a critical role in relief work particularly after the October 1978 attacks. These were Western relief agencies and knew how much material had been destroyed as they were the ones that sourced and supplied the materials to Zapu/ZPRA.
Their strategic position in relation to the ongoing struggle for independence enabled them to have intelligence which they passed on to colleagues such as Edgar Lockwood who in turn passed it on to Washington and London, among other Western capital towns. At independence some of these relief organizations followed the liberation movements who were returning to Zimbabwe. Economic dependence was extended beyond independence.
Zambian health facilities could hardly cope with Zapu injured who required hospitalisation. On October 27 the Times of Zambia had reported that 629 Zapu persons attended hospitals in light of their injuries. The same newspaper listed a total of 337 dead Zimbabweans along with 11 Zambian police and Alick Nkhata of Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBC). He was killed in an auto convoy.
“The total dead is probably in excess of 1 000 but no one is certain yet. Nor is anyone certain of how much Zapu was hurt militarily. Rufunsa and Wonder Gorge were apparently military targets. The Rufunsa had an airstrip that the Rhodesians continued to use. On Friday the day after the initial attack, they flew in a planeload of journalists who were then helicoptered to various camps to see and photograph the results of the attacks. Besides the humiliation, there may have been losses of military equipment although this is not certain.”
Interest in military matters is quite clear. It is possible too that Lockwood knew how much military hardware had been destroyed. It was this military hardware which they sought to incapacitate in view of ZPRA’s Turning Point Strategy (TPS). At that point it was ZPRA which mattered the most and the nationalist/civilian leadership depended on it for the implementation of the TPS.
An assessment of ZPRA’s military capability had to be known and that information was collected and collated from various sources including personnel within the relief agencies, infiltrated Rhodesian spy agents both within the military and the civilian components. Some media organizations and their journalists were no exception either.
Information so gathered was used to provide analysis and interpretation of the likely outcomes from the obtaining situation. For example, Lockwood used the information he collected to explain why Zapu/ZPRA were attacked at that particular time. A number of theories were afloat all seeking to offer answers to the timing of the attacks. The attack at this point was likely to nullify the possibility of a Patriotic Front acceptance of the all-parties conference which Smith had just announced in Washington that he was prepared to accept.
Another explanation of the offensive was that it was a pre-emptive strike against Zapu to disrupt a possible rainy-season offensive. In fact, there was a planned offensive but for the rainy-season of 1979-80. The whites were keen to demonstrate that the downing of the Viscount would not be allowed to go unavenged.
The other consideration was to break Nkomo’s will to resist the lure of a deal by crushing the morale of the Zapu army which had been clamouring for more military action. There was a desire to demonstrate to Zambian President Dr Kenneth Kaunda Rhodesia’s military dominance at a point when there were right wing elements pushing for some form of accommodation with the Rhodesian state.
The same right-wing element was keen to see Zambia terminate support for and aid to Zapu’s army There was the possibility that the forthcoming vote in December was likely to be influenced by a humiliating raid just two months before.
There was also the possibility of vengeance-taking by Bishop Abel Muzorewa who did not countenance the inclusion of Zapu leader in the internal settlement arrangement. In October, the month during which raids were conducted, Muzorewa was the chairman of the Executive Council.
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