Online Reporter
Last week, CDE SIMON MTETWA detailed his journey to Mozambique, the rigours of military training and his eventual deployment back to Zimbabwe. In this week’s instalment, Cde Mtetwa, who used the Chimurenga name Same Order Maguerilla, continues sharing with our Society Editor PRINCE MUSHAWEVATO how their deployment and shift in combat tactics gave them the upper hand against Rhodesians on the battlefield.
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Q: In our discussion, you recounted how you were saved from the enemy by an elderly woman, who pretended that you were a herdboy. What happened after that close shave?
A: From that moment onwards, I knew I had to be vigilant at all times. I realised that death could visit at any moment; it was not limited to the battlefield. At the same time, the incident made me realise that there were people who had good hearts and genuinely supported our efforts to liberate the country.
I have great respect for the lady whose actions that day contributed significantly to me being alive today. It was through such kind gestures that freedom fighters successfully fought and dislodged the colonial government. Support from civilians was important. When the Rhodesian soldiers left the compound, I hung around for a while before I left to join my colleagues.
Q: You earlier indicated that you were involved in a fierce battle immediately after this incident. Can you tell us more about it?
A: As we went through our routine operations, we bumped into Rhodesian fighters on our way back from Mozambique in the Ngundu area, close to Beitbridge. A fierce battle ensued, resulting in some of our colleagues being seriously injured. Fortunately, no lives were lost in that encounter. However, the battle that followed — perhaps the biggest one I was involved in — took place in 1978, around winter. We attacked the district assistant (DA)’s offices in Chibi (now Chivi). All detachments in the province — Gaza, which covered Chibi, Shabanie and Shurugwi — were summoned for a sustained attack on those offices.
Q: What was the objective behind this attack?
A: The district assistants were primarily black people who were working with the colonial regime. During the war, they operated as a paramilitary force that was also fighting us. Thus, our leaders made a conscious decision that their offices and operations had to be neutralised as part of a broader strategy to win the war. In this case, those offices served as their headquarters in the area; destroying them was going to give us the upper hand in the long run. After putting everything in place, we advanced and initiated the assault.
Q: What was the enemy’s reaction?
A: We caught them off-guard, so they focused more on defending their territory. We had the upper hand from the start. The attack began at sunrise and lasted until the end of the day. A good number of our comrades were injured in this battle, but the enemy suffered more casualties. One of the comrades I was with, Cde Rovamusha, was injured in both legs. He survived the war but passed away two or three years ago, I believe around 2023.
Overall, however, we succeeded in our mission, which boosted our morale. It signalled that we were moving in the right direction and that the possibility of winning the war against the Rhodesians was high.
Q: With morale high in your camp, what followed?
A: We continued on the offensive path, keeping the enemy on their toes with a series of assaults. One notable attack involved our ambush of a Rhodesian convoy that was en route to South Africa. The comrades involved in this mission included Makasha, who had arrived from training in Romania. He directed the attack, but this particular battle proved to be problematic for us.
We lost some comrades, while others were seriously wounded. I, and other comrades, survived due to our experience and familiarity with the terrain. The area had several depressions that made it difficult to execute the mission once we initiated the attack. The Rhodesians used a powerful weapon — the NATO — mounted on their armoured cars. The challenge was that some of our comrades tried to apply guerrilla warfare as if it were regular, conventional combat, which proved to be a fatal blunder. The strategy for this ambush was to hit and run, but some decided to engage in full, direct combat, exchanging sustained gunfire with the enemy. Every one of our colleagues who opted for the latter did not leave the place alive; they all died.
Q: What was the motivation for attacking this convoy?
A: We had intelligence that they were transporting goods, including weapons, from Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) to colonial South Africa. They were supporting the apartheid regime, and we wanted to stop that as a way of asserting our authority as the rightful owners of the country.
Q: Can you elaborate on the different fighting styles you touched upon?
A: My group trained in Mozambique and we specialised in guerrilla warfare — the hit-and-run type of war. In some instances, circumstances would permit you to try regular warfare, but not all the time; you had to think on your feet. I personally never adopted a new style after coming to the front.
However, some of our colleagues, including those who trained in other countries, mastered regular warfare and mechanised combat. They developed the skills to use heavy artillery, recoilless rifles and armoured vehicles, which was crucial in matching and surpassing the enemy’s firepower.
Next week, in the final part of this series, Cde Mtetwa reveals how the integration of diverse fighting styles became the key to outmanoeuvring the Rhodesian Security Forces. He also shares his reflections on the final days of the struggle and transition into post-independence Zimbabwe.
