daniel chigunwe
Stanford Chiwanga
Zimpapers Politics Hub
IN the wake of the 2024 South African elections, the African National Congress (ANC) finds itself in a position not dissimilar to that of Zanu PF following the 2008 elections in Zimbabwe.
The ANC, a party that has been at the forefront of South Africa’s political landscape since the end of apartheid, has seen its parliamentary majority slip away.
This shift signals a pivotal moment for the ANC, one that could either lead to a period of reflection and reinvention or to a continued decline.
Zanu PF’s experience offers a compelling case study.
After losing its majority in 2008, the ruling party Zanu PF managed to regain power in the 2013 elections and from then on it never looked back.
The party got stronger and the opposition got weaker.
Today there is no strong opposition to talk about in Zimbabwe.
The question now is — can the ANC learn from Zanu PF’s playbook and use this election disappointment as motivation to bounce back?
Zanu PF’s response to its 2008 defeat was multifaceted.
It involved a strategic reassessment of its policies and a concerted effort to re-connect with its base.
The ANC could take a leaf out of this book by engaging in a thorough analysis of the election results to understand the root causes of its decline in support.
This introspection could lead to policy shifts that more closely align with the electorate’s current needs and concerns. The black majority South Africans need land and are economically disempowered as long as the land and all its natural resources are controlled by a few whites.
After the 2008 elections, Zanu PF embarked on an intensive campaign strategy that was both comprehensive and adaptive.
The party’s approach was characterised by a mix of persuasion and black empowerment efforts.
These tactics were deployed differently across various constituencies, with a focus on maximising votes and voter turnout for Zanu PF.
Zanu PF’s overarching strategy was to mitigate the risk of losing power and legitimacy.
This involved adapting its strategies over time to preserve power and enhance its legitimacy.
The ruling party also shifted its focus from mobilising core constituents in 2008 to chasing more independent voters in 2013.
This strategic pivot was crucial in Zanu PF’s successful campaign to regain majority rule.
Between 2009 and 2013, Zanu PF was part of a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations. This period allowed Zanu PF to re-assert its influence and prepare for the 2013 elections.
One of Zanu PF’s strengths has been its ability to mobilise at the grassroots level.
The ANC could revitalise its grassroots structures, ensuring that it remains in touch with the people’s aspirations and grievances.
By doing so, the ANC could rebuild trust and demonstrate its commitment to addressing the issues that matter most to South Africans.
The ANC’s loss of its parliamentary majority marks a pivotal moment in South Africa’s political history, signalling a potential shift towards a more coalition-based system of governance.
This development could necessitate the ANC to adopt a more collaborative approach, drawing lessons from Zanu PF’s strategic alliances of 2009 to 2013.
The difference here is that the ANC may need to explore forming coalitions with parties that share its vision, particularly on policies aimed at empowering the landless majority. Such parties could include the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), which align with the ANC’s stance on land reform.
However, the prospect of a coalition with the Democratic Alliance (DA) presents a complex challenge.
The DA, perceived by many as a protector of minority interests, could be seen as an incompatible partner for the ANC, which has historically positioned itself as the champion of the majority’s rights.
An alliance with the DA may be viewed with scepticism by the ANC’s traditional support base, potentially eroding the party’s standing and leading to significant political repercussions.
In navigating this new terrain, the ANC’s strategic decisions will be crucial.
It must carefully weigh the implications of potential partnerships, ensuring that any coalition formed is in line with its core principles and the expectations of its electorate.
The party’s ability to adapt to these changes while maintaining its ideological integrity will be key to its survival and continued relevance in South Africa’s evolving political landscape.
Zanu PF’s challenges post-2008 were significant, but the party managed to present a united front in subsequent elections. The ANC finds itself in the same boat.
Unity and a clear vision are essential for the ANC to regain the confidence of the electorate.
Finally, Zanu PF’s ability to adapt to changing political dynamics was crucial to its comeback.
The ANC must be willing to embrace change, whether it is in policy direction, or party structure. Stagnation is not an option if the ANC wishes to reclaim its position as South Africa’s leading political force.
The ANC can learn from Zanu PF’s multifaceted campaign strategies, which combined strategic reassessment and grassroots mobilisation. By adopting a similar approach, the ANC could potentially use the lessons from the 2024 elections to stage a political comeback and regain majority rule in future elections.
While the ANC’s current situation may seem daunting, the lessons from Zanu PF’s experience post-2008 show that a political comeback is possible.
It will require a sincere commitment to change, a willingness to engage with the electorate, and a strategic approach to the challenges ahead. If the ANC can learn from its regional counterpart’s playbook, it may well use this election as a springboard to bounce back into majority rule.
Online Reporter