adminLovemore Ranga Mataire
THE assassination of Herbert Wiltshire Tapfumaneyi Chitepo by a car bomb on the morning of March 18, 1975 in Lusaka’s Chilenje suburb remains one of the most emotive issues surrounding Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle.
At the time of his death, Chitepo was ZANU National Chairman and head of the Dare ReChimurenga, the War Council.
Given Chitepo’s stature as the first black barrister in Rhodesia and his international exposure, the Zambian government could not treat his death as any other war tragedy.
In their attempt to unravel the motive and perpetrators behind this dastardly act, David Martin and Phyllis Johnson – in their book “The Chitepo Assassination” (1985) – meticulously sieved through and pieced together details leading to Chitepo’s murder.
Three aspects yearn for serious examination.
First, the way the Zambian government handled its investigations looked like an attempt to absolve itself of any direct or indirect involvement.
Second, the attempt by the Zambian government to systematically structure investigations appeared to indicate a predetermined notion that the murder was a result of power struggles between the Manyika and the Karanga in ZANU.
Third, it was clear the Zambian government was frantic to absolve the Ian Smith regime of any involvement in fear of jeopardising secret political deals he was negotiating with John Vorster of South Africa and Smith himself.
The assertion by Martin and Phyllis that the Zambian government used the commission to absolve itself of any blame is also based on earlier Press reports that came out in Zambia’s Daily Mail that “warned political leaders from Zimbabwe who are against unity”.
According to Martin and Johnson, it became convenient to accuse Chitepo’s comrades of killing him, initiating the arrest of more than 57 influential members of ZANU for more than 20 months.
The effect of locking them up for more than 20 months benefited only the Rhodesians and brought the war to a virtual standstill.
Although there were apparent fissures within the ZANU liberation movement following the Nhari/Badza rebellion, it was fatuous for the Zambians to argue that the Karanga had seized power from the Manyika at the 1973 Dare ReChimurenga conference as this is not supported by any facts.
The Karanga and the Manyika both increased their representation from three to four and with the election of Tongogara as the secretary for defence, the military had direct representation in the War Council for the first time in 1973.
From prison, on April 10, 1976, arrested members of the Dare ReChimurenga, the ZANLA High Command and some 1 300 ZANU cadres issued a 11-point response to the findings of the Special International Commission on the Assassination of Chitepo.
They accused the Zambian authorities of systematic and brutal torture to coerce them to give evidence incriminating the ZANU leadership, and some actually died at the hands of the Zambian police as a result of alleged torture.
The arrested members dismissed the commission as a façade in that its chairman, secretary and chief inquisitor were all Zambians whose apparent hatred of ZANU was legendary as they preferred Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU, which was viewed as moderate.
They also raised concern over the fact that all the evidence implicating them was collected from mainly ZANU rebels – Mukono, Nhari, Mutambanengwe, Mataure and Sanyanga – and denied them a chance to be cross-examined.
They also said the first witnesses to be called by the commission had nothing to do with ZANU, like Chikerema and Muzorewa who applauded the Zambian government for arresting them.
The commission only interviewed 11 of 57, but managed to interview 30 witnesses generally known as ZANU’s adversaries.
The statement also stated that the commission was naïve in thinking that the only possible motive for Chitepo’s death was tribalist.
The comrades pointed out that Cde Chitepo was not a tribalist but a beloved leader of ZANU who at the time was endeared to the Karanga, Ndau, Korekore, Zezuru, Ndebele and Manyika.
The most bizarre act of omission by the commission was their total disregard of all the evidence pointing to the direct involvement of the Ian Smith regime through their agents, Hugh Hind and Ian Robert Bruce Sutherland.
Why was it so necessary for Zambian authorities not to consider the evidence that Chitepo had been a prime target of the Rhodesian CIO who as early as 1969 had identified him as the brains behind the review of military strategy and conduct of guerilla war? Why was it necessary for the Zambian authorities not to consider the existence of a bounty of US$7 500 for anyone who brought Chitepo to them dead or alive?
The Zambians knew Hind as an explosives expert on the CIO payroll. He was born on October 23, 1940 in England and had come to Rhodesia through Zambia after being part of a contingent of Watchguard International.
On the other hand, Sutherland was a farmer who had been doing reconnaissance for CIO for about six years using his farm house as a base for his operations.
Hind, who later moved to Rhodesia, and Sutherland who stayed in Zambia, were the two architects of the murder of Chitepo and this is corroborated by several top former CIO bosses now living in South Africa and England.
Online Reporter