Chronicle Editor
Pathisa Nyathi
The article below illuminates some few issues that were emerging by late 1978 at the height of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. It points to the role of the West working in cahoots with the United States of America (USA) at the time when Jimmy Carter was incumbent President.
Their interest in disentangling the Rhodesian constitutional impasse is made abundantly clear-the furtherance of their own economic interests.
There is doubt that the internal settlement arrangement is not holding when the Patriotic Front is left in the cold.
The strategies being crafted seek the move to a new position which may produce a new hybrid and sanitised political arrangement where some component of the Patriotic Front is brought on board to bolster and give some semblance of credibility to the internal settlement in which their economic interests may not be jeopardised.
The strategy sought to exclude perceived political radicalism within the Patriotic Front.
The Frontline States are themselves divided in the process in a manner that leaves out those amongst them that portray a radical stance. Conservative opinion within the US Senate is being assuaged by extending to Ian Smith and government a visa to visit the United States of America.
The rich International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used in a facilitatory role to extend economic relief packages to Zambia to solicit her support. Zambia had had her border with Rhodesia sealed for quite a while and her economy was tottering on the brink of near collapse.
Tanzania on the other hand was on the losing end as Zambia was using her wagons on the TAZARA line and retaining them without due payment.
Whereas all along both the United Kingdom and the United States of America placed a condition of arranging elections prior to independence, this time they were pushing for independence before elections. It was an arrangement that sought to sanctify and sanitize Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole’s internal settlement which excluded the PF.
In the long term these were political maneuverings that worked towards driving a wedge into the Patriotic Front body politic as pointed out by Mtshana Ncube.
That the Patriotic Front did not fight the 1980 elections as one united body worked against the long term political and economic interests of Zimbabwe in particular with regard to political stability and cohesion. The one other aspect that emerges quite clearly then and remains so to this day is that political and military intelligence about the African situation is stronger outside of Africa than inside of it.
The world powers have a clearer and more comprehensive picture of the political dynamics in African countries. For example, there are Africa desks whose sole roles are to seek, through intelligence gathering and sharing how political intervention strategies may be crafted and implemented to drive events in the direction of their countries’ choice.
The person from whom I draw these conclusions acknowledged that fact.
“Seeing events happen in Africa from an African perspective has been the most important product of my trip. It’s not that I have returned with a lot of information that nobody in the United States has. In fact, I am persuaded that the factual intelligence available here (USA) is far greater than it is in Africa. But what counts for me is the different feel I have gained on the site of important struggles.” The writer is Edgar Lockwood who undertook a trip to the Frontline States, London and Geneva from October 3 to November 10 1978.
The man was coming from the Washington Office on Africa, 110 Maryland Avenue., N.E. Washington D.C. 20002.
Lockwood tried to synthesize what information he had into some tentative reflections. He started with the Struggle for Zimbabwe and wrote on his observations during a visit to Mozambique where ZANU’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) was based.
“I arrived in Mozambique on the heels of news that after weeks of indecision Carter had granted a visa to Smith and his government. When I left the States, I was persuaded that if this happened it would be because Carter wanted to get the right wing in the Senate off his back and because the issue of fair play and first amendment rights made liberals uneasy about denying Smith a chance to put his case.”
However, both the Mozambican leader Samora Machel and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) did not see it that way. The rationales being advanced, which they already were au fait with from the USA, did not wash.
They saw all this as a double game the USA and the UK had been playing recently. The two nations told the Frontline States and the Patriotic Front that Smith would be willing to come notwithstanding the disapproval of Sithole and Muzorewa. All that remained was for the site to be selected and was going to be either Zambia or Botswana.
At that time, it became clear that the UK and USA were involved in some secret political maneuvering, with the assistance of Zambia, and Nigeria. On August 14 Nkomo (Joshua) and the former Nigerian Foreign Minister Commissioner Garba, had met, without the knowledge of Robert Mugabe, to discuss the possibility of a settlement on the basis of bringing the Patriotic Front into the internal settlement.
Soon thereafter the Americans and the British were circulating what was described as Option B as an alternative to Option A which had been the basis of previous conversations. Options A and B were circulated to the Patriotic Front in late August and September, 1978 by Ambassador Lowe and John Graham, the British-American team.
“In effect, the provision for elections before independence, which had been a prominent part of the Anglo-American plan, was scrapped. Instead, a transitional government blending the Patriotic Front and the internal settlement leaders would rule under the chairmanship of Nkomo.”
There was a feeling that the granting of a visa to Smith was a tipping of scales of power too far toward the liberation movement. By strengthening the weak pole of the dialectical process, the West hoped to ensure a middle solution, a blending that would eliminate extremes, and secure its economic and security interests.
ZANU did not mince their words regarding the developments. They saw the entire scheme as duplicity. The West had kept on talking about democracy and elections as the proper basis for settlement in order to determine what the people of Zimbabwe really wanted.
Lockwood conceded that by July it had become clear that ZANU was in control of a large portion of the country, that it would win any fair election process and that Muzorewa and Sithole had destroyed their popular following by participating in the internal settlement government and its savage brutalities.
The West changed its tune and now sought a military dictatorship. Nkomo, from the viewpoint of ZANU, was seen as the man who was going to remove their chestnuts out of the fire, by leading an improved internal settlement. This is, according to Lockwood, how ZANU saw it.
-To be continued
Online Reporter