Cracking the first shots (Part 3)

Ambassador Professor Simbi Mubako
The Herald today publishes Part 3 of the exclusive excerpts from the forthcoming book, The Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1960-1980, a comprehensive work by Ambassador Prof Simbi Mubako, who was an active participant in the liberation movement and served as Minister of Justice in the first Cabinet of independent Zimbabwe.

Ian Smith, the leader of the Rhodesian Front and prime minister of Southern Rhodesia, once said that his Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), announced on November 11 1965, would be a three-day wonder, meaning that no one would make a fuss after that.

With all the internal opposition silenced, and Britain having publicly renounced the use of force to quell the threatened rebellion, it is understandable that the settlers believed they could survive as a privileged ruling white minority.

The newly independent Zambia to the north was wholly dependent on Rhodesia’s coal, railways, power and oil, and Rhodesia was surrounded and buttressed by the powerful white regimes of Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and apartheid South Africa.

In the eyes of white Rhodesians, the African parties in exile and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which backed them were notable more for their bark than for their bite.

Addressing an emergency Commonwealth conference on Rhodesia in January 1966 in Nigeria, Britain’s Prime Minister Harold Wilson made another prophecy —that the illegal regime in Salisbury would be toppled by United Nations economic sanctions in “weeks rather than months”.

Not many people could believe that statement, but it was even more difficult to believe that people and organisations in Zimbabwe could muster a force that would pose a serious threat to the might of the Rhodesian armed forces. These were the federal armed forces equipped by Britain and inherited by Rhodesia at the breakup of the Central African Federation, notably the air force, yet it was in the shadow of those heavy odds against them that Zimbabwe freedom fighters fired their first shots.

Sabotage attempts in 1964 had resulted in the arrest and execution of some of the first trained ZANU cadres, including others they had trained inside the country.

Numbering less than a dozen and commanded by Emmerson Mnangagwa, their assignment was sabotage, to blow up a few targets, mainly small infrastructure, and by doing so, to attract the attention of the Rhodesian and British authorities to the grievances of the black majority, and show African leaders in the OAU that they were active.

Before they were reported to the Rhodesian authorities and arrested, they managed to train a small group of local cadres known as the Crocodile Commando, who carried out the first attack on a Rhodesian security officer since the 1890s.

Soon after the UDI was declared in November 1965, ZANU in exile formed a Revolutionary Council for the purpose of directing the armed struggle, with headquarters in Dar es Salaam where its chairman, Herbert Chitepo, was the director of Public Prosecutions for the United Republic of Tanzania.

In spite of the enormous difficulties of transport and logistics, ZANU registered the first armed encounter with the Rhodesian army only six months after UDI, and ZAPU got into battle just a few months later.

Early in April 1966, a part of the original sabotage group and some trained recruits reached the Chinhoyi Mountains and sought to make contact with party officials in Chinhoyi for support. The supporters were arrested and a combined force of the army and police using dogs and spotter planes combed the Chinhoyi Mountains for two days in search of the guerrillas.

The Battle of Sinoia (Chinhoyi) was fought on April 28 1966 by seven freedom fighters armed with sub machine guns and hand grenades, against 30 to 40 Rhodesian ground forces with air cover.

The guerrillas were outnumbered and outgunned but they refused to surrender.

The battle which was dominated by aerial bombing and the sound and sight of gunfire heard and seen by the local inhabitants, raged for over 12 hours in broad daylight.

The freedom fighters were eventually overwhelmed but they denied the enemy the pleasure of taking any of them alive.

The Rhodesian security forces were surprised by the strength of the resistance they encountered and shocked by the casualties they sustained.

The Zambian and Tanzanian press gave the incident wide coverage as the opening of the offensive against the Rhodesian regime which the world had been waiting for.

The Chinhoyi Seven had shown justification of support received from the OAU and Tanzania, and represented an important landmark that has now become a legend.

ZAPU too responded with military attacks on the Rhodesian regime, committing several groups of cadres into the battle from August 1966 to the middle of 1968.

In 1964, ZAPU had assigned a member of its Liberation War Council, JZ Moyo, with four other members of the National Executive to conduct the armed struggle from outside the country.

The newly independent Zambia received them and within a few years he had become the leader of the External Wing and Chairman of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Council.

These battles were more serious than any the Rhodesian forces had fought; the ZAPU units reinforced by those of the South African ANC were bigger, comprising up to 200 men, better armed, and within shorter distance of their supply bases across the Zambezi border with Zambia.

The Rhodesian account of these battles shows that the regime’s armed forces suffered significant losses in 1967 and 1968.

The biggest military encounters were at Tjolotjo, Hwange, and Victoria Falls.

On July 31 1967 a force of eighty ZPRA was joined by the ANC’s Luthuli detachment, crossing the Zambezi River upstream of Victoria Falls and entering the Hwange Game Reserve.

They were well trained and heavily armed.

Intercepted by Rhodesian security forces, the guerrillas fought a number of engagements without retreating. They fought bravely in classic positional warfare, but they were defeated by the enemy’s air power and mobility.

The Rhodesian regime admitted that their forces suffered 30 casualties, and claimed to have killed 30 guerrillas and captured 20.

There were several other encounters with casualties on both sides, but when the news of the joint battles was reported to the South African government, Prime Minister Johannes Vorster immediately dispatched a detachment of police and helicopters to the Rhodesian border with Zambia, pulling South Africa into the Rhodesian war.

The ZPRA army fought bravely and with strategic intent over a period of time, but if the casualty figures are accurate, they also indicate heavy losses for the guerrilla movement confronted by superior force.

There can be no doubt however, that these battles were an inexhaustible source of inspiration for the thousands of young men and women who came after, and who have borne arms to liberate Zimbabwe.

Looked at in its proper perspective, they had a tremendous significance in psychological and political terms, but the gallant effort displayed by the vanguard bands of freedom fighters could not be sustained and was not sustained until four years later.

The Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1960-1980 is well-illustrated with pictures of the period and will be published soon by African Publishing Group. [email protected]