Online Reporter
In 1966, the African African National Congress (ANC) and its armed wing, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK), approached us for a logical working alliance that would allow us to operate together and with common purpose and understanding whenever MK might wish to deploy their guerrilla units through Rhodesia.
The first contact was between MK commander Joe Modise and Akim Ndlovu of ZAPU’s military wing. After Akim had presented his brief for discussion within the military command, a decision was made to second the Chief of Intelligence to attend subsequent meetings. Modise also seconded his Chief of Intelligence, Chris Hani.
“…we could not imagine MK finding their way solo through Rhodesia, fighting both the Rhodesian Army and South African border patrols…If we said ‘no’, they would go it alone”
The ANC–MK had immense pressure from trained, itching, ready cadres sitting impatiently in the camps, who wanted to be deployed to battle in South Africa.
Attempts to use Botswana were frustrating, as they always backfired and the operatives were under strict instruction not to fight back but to surrender, go through the courts system, and eventually get deported back to Zambia, back to square one. The fact that Rhodesia was not free meant that they could fight their way to South Africa, and an alliance with ZAPU therefore made perfect sense to facilitate their passage to their enemy fronts.
At this time, we had barely started our operations with small units to pave the way and get to know how the Rhodesian forces operated. The negotiations with MK were very difficult and tempting for us, being cognisant of the arguments we went through in mapping out our strategy in 1964, when we established the military wing of ZAPU.
On the other hand, we could not imagine MK finding their way solo through Rhodesia, fighting both the Rhodesian Army and South African border patrols in their attempts just to cross towards the Limpopo and get into their destination for insurgent guerrilla activity. If we said ‘no’, they would go it alone.
Finally, after the intervention of O.R. Tambo, leading the ANC, and J.R.D. Chikerema, leading ZAPU, we reached a consensus and agreed on preparations which would lead to the Hwange and Sipolilo (ZAPU military wing–ANC-MK) operations.
In spite of all the criticisms expressed from different quarters within the joint MK/ZAPU military-wing operations, there were important experiences and lessons learnt. Some referred back to the arguments raised in the initial stages, when ZAPU’s military wing was formed.
Both we and MK followed the events of the battles: we monitored the reports of our captured fighters and the survivors who withdrew to Botswana. The intelligence received most of the reports from established contacts, especially in the Hwange region. Those in Sinoia covered the Sipolilo sector. This went on until the end of 1968.
At this time, a number of volunteers came through Botswana, and the party in Lusaka had also gone through a massive recruitment exercise. Many recruits were sent overseas for training again in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Algeria, and a training camp was opened in Tanzania.
Our new operations strategy was to revert to our initial position – that is, to deploy small groups of only a section’s strength into the country to carry out further investigations on the plight of the
Hwange/Sipolilo battle survivors, as well as to recruit and carry out basic training where possible.
They were also to use their discretion to determine whether it was possible to carry out some limited sabotage activities. The majority of these units comprised mainly those who had trained in military intelligence. One important event during this period was the vital information received from the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), who informed us that they had come across survivors of the Sipolilo operation in the Mkumbura areas.
They informed us that they were still anxious to continue with the fighting but had run out of ammunition. A pact was formed with Frelimo, in which we would assist them in opening the Tete front. In return, they would endeavour to make contact with the survivors of the Sipolilo operations.
Rebuilding after a split
Chikerema and Nyandoro formed the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (Frolizi), together with Nathan Shamuyarira. After consultations, J.Z. Moyo, who was now acting leader of the party, convened a conference of all fighters at this new camp to discuss the split and to map out a way forward. It was decided at this conference that the new external leadership of the party would be the ZAPU Revolutionary Council, to be headed by J.Z. Moyo.
The Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) became its new military wing, under the command of Nikita Mangena. I was then appointed Head of Intelligence to oversee military and civil operations, and went on to establish the National Security Organ (NSO) of the party.
“ZPRA confidently declared the border as no-go areas for the Rhodesian forces…”
The military wing, now ZPRA, was completely transformed as its new commander and his men plotted the new strategy. During this crisis, Robson Manyika, who had been Akim’s chief of staff, defected to ZANU, and so did Rex Nhongo. Later, when Nkomo took over from J.Z. Moyo, who was assassinated by a parcel bomb in 1977, he established another organ under the Revolutionary
Council named the War Council, where he was the Commander-in-Chief, deputised by Samuel Munodawafa. I became the Secretary. Other members of the War Council were the ZPRA Commander Mangena, his deputy, chief of staff and commissar.
ZPRA’s initial thrust was to deny the Rhodesian forces free patrols along the Zambezi border. Both anti-personnel and anti-armoured-vehicle land mines were planted, and ambushes were carried out at random once the Rhodesian security forces were spotted.
The Rhodesians learnt a lesson after suffering heavy casualties from these operations. ZPRA confidently declared the border as no-go areas for the Rhodesian forces except for aircraft. While taking control of the border zones, ZPRA also randomly deployed some small units into the interior of the country to carry out offensives against enemy camps and infrastructure.
n Extracted from “Relations between ZAPU and the USSR, 1960s–1970s: A Personal View” by Dumiso Dabengwa, published in The Journal of African Studies, 2015.
