
SADC diplomacy has contained a potential threat to peace and security in Lesotho.
The small mountain kingdom held a parliamentary election on February 28 to end a dispute in the then ruling coalition led by Prime Minister Thomas Thabane of the All Basotho Convention (ABC) that saw the military intervene on the side of his deputy, Mothetjoa Metsing of the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD).
On Wednesday last week, Democratic Congress (DC) leader Pakalitha Mosisili and Metsing announced a unity government.
Thabane’s ABC lost the elections after the allocation of seats by proportional representation although it equalled the opposition in the number of constituencies. The DC won 47 seats, followed by ABC with 46, while LCD won 12 seats.
As there was no clear winner, the DC and LCD signed an agreement to form a coalition with five other parties. The union has at least 61 seats in the 120-member parliament. Mosisili returned as Prime Minister after his 1998-2012 reign; with Metsing deputising him.
Thabane and Metsing had disagreed in June last year and the latter threatened to cause the collapse of their alliance by mobilising parliament to pass a vote of no confidence in the former. In response, Thabane suspended parliament to prevent it from sitting and possibly passing the vote of no confidence in him. The conflict extended to the security sector where the police sided with Thabane and the army, with Metsing. In August the army sought to neutralise the police by seizing police stations in Maseru. Fearful of a coup and concerned about his personal security, Thabane fled to South Africa on August 30.
Sadc was alarmed so had to get involved to ensure that Lesotho’s long history of military coups — four since 1986 — does not recur. Thabane ran away about twelve days after Sadc had installed President Robert Mugabe as chairman. The regional bloc tasked South Africa deputy president, Cyril Ramaphosa to mediate, a process that led to elections being held two years ahead of schedule and the new government taking over.
We hope that coalition government will create lasting stability in that country. But we have guarded hope because of three fundamental structural factors that remain untouched and could cause future instability.
As we have already pointed out, we are concerned that Lesotho has a history of conflict involving the military and the civilian administrations, which have always seen the former taking over with no consequences whatsoever to the putschists. Sadc and the Basotho people themselves, expect a new culture where the military stays away from politics and concentrates on their more conventional role of defending Lesotho’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
To achieve this, Lesotho should urgently undertake institutional and constitutional reforms to clearly articulate the role of the security forces in a democracy. That is point number one.
Secondly, there is a need for the Lesotho constitution to express the role and obligations of the opposition. There appears to be a bit of a challenge in Lesotho of the opposition always seeking to take over power at any time through unconstitutional means. We are not saying the opposition must not keep the government on its toes, but there is a difference between that and courting the support of the army as Metsing did last year when he was, indeed theoretically in government, but in practice conducting himself as an opposition politician.
Thabane himself stands accused of working to collapse Mosisili’s government between 2006 and 2012. In June 2007, Thabane survived an assassination attempt that was allegedly staged by Mosisili’s loyalists. Thabane then threatened street protests against Mosisili. In April 2009, there was an attempt on Mosisili’s life and the alleged mastermind was Thabane’s bodyguard, a retired soldier, Makotoko Lerotholi. Lerotholi, like Tlali Kamoli the army chief who sent Thabane fleeing in August, suffered no punishment for his actions.
Metsing himself is a notoriously unfaithful coalition partner. He dumped Mosisili in 2012 to help Thabane win that year’s election. This year, he ditched Thabane to help Mosisili return to power again.
The foregoing must be enough to highlight the general hunger for power and indiscipline that characterises the Basotho political and security systems. We implore the Basotho, guided by their national constitution and moral rectitude to behave more responsibly if peace and stability is to hold in their country.
Thirdly, we see a weakness in a situation whereby coalitions are always governing Lesotho. As history has shown not only in that country but elsewhere as well, coalitions are inherently unstable. We hope for a situation whereby one political party has a clear electoral mandate to govern alone. We aren’t saying such a government is immune to external attacks or collapse but Basotho have tried coalitions a few times already, with little success.
Sadc expects lasting political stability there, where the military keeps its place in the barracks, the opposition in parliament not on the streets, the government in power and where, most fundamentally, the constitution and discipline are supreme.



