Saxon Zvina
The observation that America‑once‑the undisputed global‑power benchmark‑is now closely watching China’s performance means more than shifting rhetorical tone. It signals deep‑seated psychological change within the international system.
New Power Distribution and Africa’s Strategic Call
President Donald Trump’s remark that President Xi Jinping only visits countries he respects offers revealing insight. It frames diplomacy as a ledger of mutual recognition: respect can no longer simply be demanded from Washington. In an increasingly multipolar world, respect must be negotiated.
For Africa and the Global‑South, this is more than diplomatic theatre to observe from afar. It constitutes a strategic summons.
Canadian politician Mark Carney put the stakes in vivid terms: nations risk ending up either “at the table” or “on the menu”. For Africa, this metaphor carries fresh urgency. The question is no longer whether Africa possesses resources coveted by major powers — the continent unquestionably does. The real question is whether Africa will deploy those resources to build domestic productive capacity, or keep supplying raw materials from which other societies generate prosperity.
The Shifting Global Hierarchy
For decades after 1945, the global power hierarchy appeared comparatively clear‑cut. The United States dominated global finance, the dollar underpinned international commerce, and American military, technological and cultural influence shaped large parts of the global order.
That long‑standing certainty is eroding.
China’s rise as an industrial, technological and financial heavy‑weight has complicated the old unipolar order. This is not merely a bilateral contest between Washington and Beijing. A broader transition toward a more contested multipolar system is unfolding, opening greater room for countries to diversify international partnerships.
Yet geopolitical openings do NOT automatically translate into tangible development gains.
Even within a multipolar world, Africa can remain an object of great‑power rivalry if it lacks productive capacity to negotiate from a position of strength.
The Persistent Structural Trap Rooted in History
This vulnerability has deep historical origins.
Walter Rodney’s classic work “How Europe Underdeveloped Africa” laid bare how colonial‑era economies were organised around resource extraction and external markets instead of diversified domestic production. Frantz Fanon likewise analysed the psychological dimensions: colonised societies were socialised to aspire to take part in a game whose rules had already been written by external actors.
Colonial legacies form one critical historical root. Today’s global‑economic configuration arises from layers of interacting historical and contemporary forces and cannot be reduced solely to colonial‑era mechanisms.
Decades after formal political independence, many of those inherited economic patterns endure.
According to UNCTAD data, 46 out of Africa’s 54 nations remain commodity‑dependent. Africa contributes less than 2 % of global manufacturing output and accounts for roughly 1.4 % of worldwide manufactured‑goods exports.
The core difficulty is not resource scarcity. Too large a share of value‑creation linked to African resources takes place outside African borders.
Africa holds critical minerals indispensable for global energy transition. Even so, exporting cobalt, lithium, copper or platinum concentrates while importing finished batteries, electric vehicles and sophisticated industrial equipment locks Africa into the weakest segment of global value chains.
Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni described this paradox plainly: Africa ships raw materials overseas for processing, then imports back finished goods manufactured from those very same resources.
That is the economic reality of being “on the menu”.
True Modernisation Means Building Productive Capacity
Genuine modernisation ought not be confused with copying Western‑style consumption patterns. Its real essence lies elsewhere: industrial capability, technological mastery, agricultural productivity, reliable infrastructure, energy security, human‑capital development and domestic value‑adding capacity.
The African Continental Free Trade Area supplies a potential institutional vehicle to merge 54 fragmented national markets into a continent‑wide production ecosystem. Agenda 2063 furnishes the over‑arching strategic vision.
But policy frameworks alone cannot construct factories.
China‑Africa economic engagement illustrates both promise and inherent challenges. Chinese‑funded construction contracts across Africa reached substantial scale in 2025, and decades‑long FOCAC commitments have supported major infrastructure build‑outs.
Infrastructure matters profoundly. Still, infrastructure yields transformative socioeconomic impact only when it serves industrialisation goals.
It should also be emphasised that infrastructure constitutes hardware; capital, reliable power supply, targeted industrial policy and skilled labour remain essential prerequisites. Railways and ports cannot generate industrial clusters by themselves.
A railway carrying unprocessed mineral ore straight toward a seaport can reinforce extractive economic structures. That very same railway, linking mines to local refineries, industrial zones, manufacturing facilities and African consumer markets, can become the spinal column of continental industrialisation.
The dividing‑line boils down to African agency.
Collective Bargaining as Continental Strategy
The emerging multipolar landscape gives African governments expanded partnership choices. Those options will remain hollow if individual states negotiate separately from positions of relative weakness.
Collective bargaining must therefore move to the centre of African strategic thinking.
AfCFTA is far more than a conventional trade accord. If fully implemented, it can become an instrument for building cross‑border value chains and lifting Africa’s collective bargaining leverage vis‑à‑vis external partners.
The same logic applies to critical‑mineral governance.
The global green‑energy transition opens a historic window for Africa. Simply exporting raw lithium, cobalt or rare‑earth minerals will replicate old commodity‑dependent patterns under a new “green‑transition” label.
The objective needs to be unambiguous: move beyond pure extraction toward domestic processing, manufacturing, technological innovation, and gradually secure African ownership of increasingly sophisticated value‑chain segments.
The Lithium Industrialisation Corridor bringing together Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa exemplifies this kind of regional‑scale strategic thinking. Realising its potential will demand solving cross‑border regulatory divergences and competing national interests alongside securing investment, infrastructure, technology transfer and policies favouring local value addition.
Moving Past the Forced China‑US Binary
Africa must reject the temptation to frame its strategic decisions as a simple binary choice between the United States and China.
The continent’s aim is neither permanent alignment with Washington nor heavy‑reliance upon Beijing. Its overriding priority ought to be expanding African productive capacity and defending strategic autonomy.
China, the United States, Europe, India, Russia, Gulf nations and other external actors all possess capital, technology, market access or expertise that African countries may leverage.
The key evaluative question should always be: what tangible benefits does Africa obtain?
Does a given partnership deliver new factories, skills development, technology know‑how, upgraded infrastructure, higher agricultural productivity and African‑owned enterprises? Does it integrate local domestic suppliers? Does it strengthen indigenous national capabilities?
These questions carry greater weight than whatever geopolitical label gets attached to the cooperation project.
Identical reasoning applies to debt questions. Africa’s financial vulnerabilities cannot be blamed on any single creditor nation. The continent requires financing instruments designed to back long‑term productive investment, rather than forcing governments into costly borrowing while industrial and infrastructure projects struggle to attract capital.
From Object of Rivalry to Subject of Global Order
The world is shifting. The old assumption that Washington unilaterally sets global‑economic and‑political terms faces push‑back driven by China’s rise and broader global power diffusion.
Even so, Africa must not mistake great‑power competition for genuine development assistance.
Africa will not automatically earn “a seat at the table” merely because China and the United States compete for influence. That seat is won through harder‑to‑ignore strengths: productive industrial capacity, technological competence, integrated continental markets and unified collective‑negotiating clout.
Respect within international relations ultimately flows from tangible power — and modern‑day power increasingly originates from production capacity, innovation and bargaining strength.
Africa thus faces a historically consequential choice. It can remain a commodity supplier feeding other nations’ industrial revolutions, or harness its mineral wealth, large combined markets and youthful population to construct its own productive future.
“The menu” is not pre‑written and fixed in advance.
Neither is “the table”.
Africa must build its own way there.
About the Author:
Saxon Zvina is Principal Consultant at Skyworld Consultancy Services. As an independent analyst and commentator, he contributes opinion pieces to multiple media platforms. His writing focuses on African strategic autonomy, global-south development, Africa-China-US geopolitics and decolonising international policy debates.
Email: [email protected] & X: saxonzvina2
