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Continued from last week
MS: So what happened?
Cde Tshawe: What happened was that the HQ used to be guarded properly and at night our officers would move and take guard positions about 800 metres away where there was a school. So on that fateful day, when our guys withdrew from their guard positions at around 5am, the enemy moved and took positions around that area where there were some fields. Their helicopter with Zambian colours landed there and those guys actually spoke to the schoolchildren, they were very friendly to them so I heard. They were Selous Scouts, then other aircrafts arrived and the attack began. Our guys could not withstand the heavy fire as they were armed with AK-47s mainly, but there was no choice, they had to do what they had do under those conditions. We lost quite a number of our officers, but the Rhodesians were also harmed as their captain was killed there. One of our officers, Bester was killed after being found in a room where there were our files, but we had an underground office where we kept more of the sensitive files and it was sealed. Wawungasoze ukubone unless told, so that is how our files survived. When the enemy left they threw flyers, but what was surprising was that the Zambian security forces did not lift a finger. The Zambian Airforce just let them leave after an attack deep in their capital, it was disappointing. But before then we had spoken about the heavy deployment of weapons, but besala. Even some of the commanders from our side had spoken against the deployment of big weapons saying we were going to inflict damage on the civilians. So what happened was that we smuggled machine guns, one of them being a detactarov, igroonov and a PK, we covered them with a blanket.
MS: But were those two machine guns of any assistance under such a heavy attack?
Cde Tshawe: To a certain extent yes, one of our officers, Phekeyakhe saved NSO directors, Victor Mlambo and Gordon Butshe from being captured. The two had driven to the HQ and when they got there the Rhodesians were about to pounce on them, they wanted to capture. It was at that point that Phekeyakhe from his cover position opened fire using the detactarov kwaquphuka izitina. Our guys hit a vehicle belonging to the Selous Scouts, iMirror Fiora LS32, an Italian made car. The engine seized and they abandoned their car. I should also point it out that the attack on Dr Joshua Nkomo’s house, intelligence was spot on that there was a pending danger, that is why Dr Nkomo was evacuated from his residence. When the Rhodesians raided his house they found him gone, all that points out to brilliant intelligence gathering.
MS: Were some of your officers deployed to the front and other dangerous missions?
Cde Tshawe: Intelligence officers were deployed to the front to detect the movement of the enemy and all their activities. As for dangerous operations, I will give you the example of Cde Canaan Ncube, unfortunately he is not feeling well at the moment. Canaan was a teacher before he left the country to join the armed struggle. He was given one of the toughest assignments, that of keeping surveillance on Thornhill Air Base in Gweru. He would find ways of even getting into those premises. His assignment was to provide information about the activities of the Rhodesian Airforce, if you have heard from other ex-combatants that before a bombing could take place they would be warned about the pending raid, it was through people like Canaan. His task was a tricky one. Anyone in doubt can approach him for more information. However, he was later sold out and had to flee, leaving behind his suitcase at a house where he was renting in Mkoba. He crossed the border into Botswana where he was arrested because he was found armed with an AK-47 rifle. However, he was later released and returned to Zambia.
MS: Then let us come to your deployment in Botswana, that is the southern front.
Cde Tshawe: I was deployed to Botswana as the chief of intelligence in the southern front, I went to Botswana together with Cawula, uColonel Adonis Ndlovu, ukhona uhlala eWoodlands lapha. First of all Botswana was a tricky place, that is where intelligence chief, Ethan Dube was captured, so was Makepesi, another intelligence officer, uMnyamana uBlack Swine also met the same fate. However, uBlack Swine survived and died years after independence and was buried at the Plumtree Heroes Acre, a funeral which was attended by the current ZDF commander, uP V Sibanda. Intelligence officers who had been there before me, Ndlovu uMayisa and Major Mpofu whom we had trained together had problems with a Botswana Cabinet Minister, I think he was Minister of Lands, uKwelahube. I am not sure what really were the problems, the two were deported, it should have been about the issue of refugees. So I moved there to take over.
MS: How was the situation in Botswana?
Cde Tshawe: Botswana proved to be tricky, in other words Zambia was better. Comrades were being abducted in Botswana, it was an in and out situation for the Rhodesian security forces. My children were staying in Selibe-Phikwe while I had a sister in Francistown whom I spoke about earlier when we started these conversations. Because of the tense situation I was not even putting up in their houses, we were sleeping in the bush, ezindlini zomdaka le eShashi siloVela, imota siyitshiya lapho esasiyitshiya khona. I then set up a network and started working with Mswelaboya from Nkayi and was in Francistown, Reuben Mpabanga in Selibe-Phikwe, Robert Nsingo in Selibe-Phikwe and others, Vumbu Ncube who was working for the railways in Botswana. The move was to forestall the enemy and gather as much intelligence as possible. I also built the network with security officers in the Botswana government system, there was a man called Major Mwatse from the Botswana Defence Forces, he is the one I moved closer to together with Mangoye who was the officer commanding Francistown that time, Paul Marate who was in Selibe-Phikwe, Mlotshwa the officer commanding Mahalapye and of course other security details. I devised a method of working closely with these guys, we had to win them to be on our side and I succeeded. To avoid being detected by the Rhodesians at times my officers and I would use the Batswana security vehicles, all that was through setting up that network. That was an arrangement we made as individuals, it was not from the Zapu leadership and the Botswana government, it was our own pact. At times I would dress in police uniform or army camouflage depending on who I was with. For your own information one day we found Rhodesians deployed near Madinara on our way to Phikwe, Major Mwatse and I were in the front vehicle. Major Mwatse is still around in Botswana and he became a councillor upon his retirement. We spoke in SeTswana and said these are Rhodesians and behind us there were other cars that were following us, two troop carriers. Major Mwatse asked what we should do, I said to him let us not alert them, just ignore them at the moment. When we reached Phikwe we told the BDF and they raided and killed them, we wanted to give them a false sense of security.
There were Kalanga guys from areas such as Mabudzane along the border who were very supportive of the armed struggle. I would visit camps between Francistown and Dukwe, Phikwe.
MS: Okay, that is interesting.
Cde Tshawe: In 1979 when Smith threatened to gun down planes we had a Benz called 111 that used to bring weapons from Zambia via Kazungula using this bridge that is being developed now, coming to Botswana and they would be quickly moved out of Botswana to the front because Seretse Khama did not want weapons of war on his territory. One day this 111 had a breakdown in Botsabelo close to Phikwe, but a senior officer tipped us off and we towed it to the bush where it was hidden and later on fixed. Besides the ammunition and weapons there were 38 guerillas on board. That is how as the intelligence we had worked things around. We also recruited more, Mpabanga and Nsingo. Mpabanga was the headmaster of Tebuho Primary School while Nsingo was a businessman, they were all from Gwanda. Using Mpabanga as the cover and while pretending to be teacher at his school we would reach places frequented by the whites, whites who knew the movement of the Rhodesian troops and would let that very crucial information slip through when drunk. Our network even extended to Rhodesia.
MS: Tell us more about that.
Cde Tshawe: Many people don’t know how intelligence works, the intelligence lays the groundwork for the military. We had built a network, here at CABS Building, my brother-in-law, remember Nani Moyo, Mlotshwa and Ndebele, okaFront, uDube lowo, those were the guys who sat in meetings and I had known them before, because the war was hotting up many people even in the Rhodesian security sector were shifting positions. So I sent my sister to be in contact with them. So in their meetings all the information discussed there I did not look for it, yayingilanda. They would use milk to write on pieces of paper, you know codes and ciphers. I would decipher the information. Jimmy Moyo whom I worked with had communication systems to pass over to Zambia. We were getting information on a weekly basis. At first we did not trust them, so our meetings were held under the cover of darkness, but we realised that they were genuine. So all kidnappings of freedom fighters in Botswana came to halt. Even it was not easy for the Rhodesians to cross over, they were being hit before getting into Botswana. That was intelligence at work. We also worked well with senior frontal commanders, George Chavunduka laboBaberton, uMajor Sibona, who recently published a book about the armed struggle and is based in the United Kingdom. However, before I end, it pains me to read and hear some people saying Zipra forces were on a picnic during the armed struggle. I think it is an insult that we were not doing any fighting.
derick.khumalo