Online Reporter
Chronicles from the 2nd Chimurenga
Last week, CDE KOSSAM MUTSINZE, whose Chimurenga name was Cde Ignatius Toda Zimbabwe, spoke about the Nhari-Badza rebellion in 1974. In this week’s instalment, he chronicles to Zimpapers Politics Hub’s KUDA BWITITI further turmoil that rocked the liberation struggle in 1975, including the death of ZANU national chairperson Cde Herbert Chitepo.
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Q: What happened in the immediate aftermath of the Nhari-Badza rebellion?
A: The rebellion eventually floundered, and following the elimination of the primary orchestrators — Nhari and Badza — several of their collaborators met a similar fate.
Those who survived the purge faced disciplinary action. Others were eventually integrated back into the ranks, as they had no choice but to align themselves under the command of the ZANLA Commander, General Josiah Magama Tongogara. But we still faced the same challenge of inadequate supplies for combatants.
Q: What caused the shortage in supplies?
A: Many factors contributed. One was that our numbers were growing, so the support that we were receiving increasingly became inadequate. Also, we had a challenge in that the OAU (Organisation of African Unity), which was an important conduit for support, did not, for a time, give us full backing.
They argued that we needed to unite with ZAPU.
Q: So, how did the liberation struggle proceed after the rebellion?
A: It did not proceed smoothly at all. In fact, worse followed. Soon after the killing of Nhari and his foot soldiers, Cde Chitepo was brutally assassinated. As you know, he died on March 18, 1975 after a bomb was placed in his vehicle. The bomb also killed some of his assistants.
We were shattered by the death of Cde Chitepo and virtually everything stopped, in terms of fighting the Rhodesian enemy. The death of Chitepo also caused a lot of internal wars. To us who were in Zambia, the effects were even more tumultuous.
Several of our leaders, including General Tongogara and Cde Hamadziripi, were arrested. Others like Cde Rex Nhongo managed to flee. Some of those who fled Zambia went to Tanzania, where they were welcomed.
I remained in Zambia at the Mboroma Camp for several months, but there was no progress whatsoever, as the leadership had either been arrested or was in hiding.
It was a frustrating period. So, we lived in Zambia until 1976. We were under the close watch of the Zambian army. It was during this time in Zambia that I witnessed a tragic event when some of our combatants were shot by Zambian forces.
Q: Why were the comrades shot?
A: They were shot for voicing a complaint shared by many of us — that we had been confined to the camp for far too long.
You must understand the context that it was a period of profound frustration and inertia. We had never expected to stay for months.
Our assumption was that we would stay for a matter of weeks at most. But the liberation struggle had virtually ground to a halt, leaving us stranded in Zambia with no end in sight.
Our argument then to the Zambians was: Why are you keeping us here? We were eager to go to the front to liberate the country. This is the reason people had left their homes and families. So, to then come and just wait for such a long time was not what they had signed up for.
Q: How many comrades were shot and how did it happen?
A: Approximately 15 to 20 of our comrades were shot and killed.
The action was sparked by our collective frustration, but the most vocal among us were singled out. The Zambian forces opened fire randomly and indiscriminately.
I only survived by running for cover. I was lucky — it could just as easily have been me. I hold the Zambian soldiers directly responsible; their disproportionate and brutal use of force caused these deaths.
We were not their enemy, and the force they used was entirely unjustified. I believe that they should have dialogued with us instead of taking this decision to shoot and kill.
This is a segment of history that is rarely told. It was one of the dark episodes of the liberation war.
Even Zambian leader Kenneth Kaunda knew that his soldiers had done wrong but he preferred that this matter be swept under the carpet.
As you may know, Dr Kaunda was not very friendly to ZANLA; he preferred to work more with ZAPU and was a close friend of the late Vice President Dr Joshua Nkomo.
Driven by the conviction that internal ZANLA machinations were responsible for Chairman Chitepo’s assassination, Dr Kaunda’s subsequent mistrust towards the movement precipitated a heavy-handed crackdown, resulting in the incarceration of the ZANLA High Command stationed in Zambia.
With the political climate in Lusaka becoming increasingly untenable and host to mounting hostilities, most cadres in ZANLA realised that it was better to seek sanctuary elsewhere.
Many proceeded to Mozambique, which was newly independent under FRELIMO and provided support to our war effort. Others like me relocated to Tanzania. In Tanzania, I was based at the Mgagao Military Academy.
Q: How was the situation like in Mgagao?
A: When we first arrived in 1976, it was not all rosy. At first, supplies in terms of food and materials for the war were not adequate. In one of the incidents, the situation was so bad that some of the comrades demonstrated and walked away. They said they would walk until they reached Dar es Salaam, from where they would proceed to Mozambique.
Q: The distance from Mgagao to Dar es Salaam is more than 450 kilometres. How did they manage?
A: They acted out of frustration and were filled with passion. The route was not easy to navigate. Mgagao was deep in the bush. So, to get to Dar es Salaam was quite a distance.
I am not sure how they made it since I was not part of them. Maybe they hitch-hiked along the way.
But I only got to know that some of them made it to Dar es Salaam.
Their idea was that when they went to Dar es Salaam, they would proceed to Mozambique, from where they would then head to Zimbabwe to fight at the front.
Q: Why did you decide to remain at Mgagao when others fled?
A: I was firmly convinced that Mgagao was the right place for me, primarily because a significant number of fellow comrades were already stationed there.
Over time, the situation markedly improved because our provisions of food and military supplies became more consistent and reliable. We also enjoyed the steadfast support of Tanzania, which solidified Mgagao’s status as a crucial strategic point in our liberation struggle. President Mwalimu Julius Nyerere was very much a staunch supporter of our cause.
Our ranks were further strengthened by the arrival of other comrades from different parts of Tanzania, such as Nachingwea. Among those I distinctly remember from that group is Cde Tapomwa, a distinguished war veteran who would later become a senior official in the CIO (Central Intellince Organisation).
Living alongside these seasoned fighters for a period significantly bolstered our morale and sharpened our resolve to fight for liberation. Eventually, the process of deploying fighters from Tanzania into Mozambique became more systematic and organised. Many of my comrades left before I did. Finally, in early 1977, my own turn came and I departed from Mgagao, embarking on the next crucial leg of the journey into Mozambique.
Q: How did you travel from Mgagao to Mozambique?
A: We travelled in two key stages. The OAU provided vehicles to transport us from Mgagao to Dares Salaam. From the Tanzanian capital, we were then flown directly to Beira in Mozambique.
Next week, Cde Mutsinze tells us about his time in Mozambique and how he immediately got involved in the thick of things.
