Online Reporter
CDE HUMPHREY MAKUYANA, who used the Chimurenga name Kidd Kanyau, this week talks about the establishment of their training camp in Tanzania. In this account, shared with our Society Editor PRINCE MUSHAVEVATO, he describes being trained by both local and foreign nationals. He also highlights the immense challenges faced during the initial stages.
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Q: Our discussion last week ended as you were about to begin training in Tanzania. Can you pick it up from there?
A: After arriving at Nachingwea and spending a couple of months constructing makeshift barracks, we officially commenced training in January 1977. However, at the onset, a jurisdictional dispute arose between the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) instructors and the Tanzania People’s Defence Forces (TPDF) regarding who should oversee the programme.
The Chinese instructors remained neutral, as they were only scheduled to take over during the second phase. The primary disagreement centred on the curriculum. This was on whether the focus should be on conventional “regular” training or guerrilla warfare. ZANLA favoured guerrilla tactics, while the TPDF preferred a regular military approach. Ultimately, they reached a compromise to teach regular military discipline while maintaining guerrilla warfare tactics. I trained under those conditions at Nachingwea. Out of the 5 000 ZANLA fighters in that group, there were only 50 women, including figures like Brigadier-General Tino Mukurazhizha. We trained in phases until our graduation in July.
Q: Can you take us through specific phases of that training?
A: Phase One (January to March) focused on the fundamentals: drill, discipline and weapon handling. It also included field craft, tactics and intensive physical training. Phase Two was the specialisation stage. At this point, the focus shifted to support arms and weapons, specifically 60mm and 82mm mortars.
Following that, we moved into air defence, anti-tank manoeuvres and 76mm recoilless rifles — essentially light infantry support weapons that could be carried by hand. I personally specialised in combat engineering, which primarily involved demolitions, mine warfare and booby traps.
This specialisation took an additional two months. The final, and perhaps most vital, component was the contingent trained by the Chinese instructors. They focused on guerrilla warfare tactics, political mobilisation and fighting across various terrains. Crucially, they taught us how to interact with and treat civilians.
This is where the song “Kune Nzira Dzemasoja” originated. It was derived from the codes of conduct in Chairman Mao’s “Red Book”. After these specialised tracks, the units were combined for final integration.
Q: What exactly occurred during the final coordination phase?
A: This was the integration stage where commanders were selected and the group was organised into platoons and sections for field exercises. Those specialised in tactics served as commanders, while those trained in engineering were tasked with planting mines in ambush zones.
Those trained in anti-tank manoeuvres operated the support weapons, forming “stop groups” to intercept reinforcements and neutralise incoming vehicles. We conducted these field exercises — or war gaming, in military terms — to ensure every individual understood their specific role and could coordinate under a single command.
The goal was a synchronised combat scenario that ensured a successful mission without “friendly fire” or injuring our own troops. I should mention that while we received political orientation under the trees (pasi pemuti) at Nachingwea, the bulk of that ideological work had already been completed in the transit camps in Mozambique.
Q: Could you elaborate on that political education?
A: The instructors went deeper into the vision for a post-independence Zimbabwe. We discussed socialism, the type of Government we intended to establish and the specific injustices our parents had suffered under the colonial regime. The core focus was understanding exactly why we were fighting to replace the current system with a people’s Government.
Q: What do you believe set you apart and led to your selection as an instructor?
A: The Tanzania People’s Defence Forces was an exceptionally well-trained army. Their officers had a global pedigree, having trained at elite institutions like Sandhurst (United Kingdom), West Point (United States of America) and Nanjing (China), as well as in Canada, Libya and Pakistan.
This created a highly diversified and “top-of-the-range” pool of military instructors. For instance, our engineering training utilised British manuals covering mine warfare and booby traps. I was selected alongside others — including the likes of retired Major-General Bonyongwe (former Director-General of the President’s Office) and Major-Generals Lifa, Gutu, Mtetwa and Nkosi — primarily because we were literate.
Since I had reached Form Two, I could read and write proficiently. Our initial task was to translate the Swahili syllabus and the instructors’ commands into English for the other recruits.
They had a very persuasive method of teaching the language. If an instructor gave a command like “kimbia!” (run!) and you did not move because you did not understand, you were punished. You learnt very quickly out of necessity. By the end of our nine months, we were fluent enough to read their military pamphlets, which were all written in Swahili.
Next week, Cde Makuyana recounts his successes as an instructor. He also explains the strategic importance of the rear and why the logistical and training bases were the backbone of Zimbabwe’s journey to liberation.
Q: So, there was no English used during training at all?
A: Not for instruction — it was strictly Swahili. While the officers knew English, they followed a philosophy, likely influenced by Julius Nyerere, that people learn more effectively in their own language. The logic was simple: if you teach in a foreign tongue, the student must translate the information before absorbing it, which wastes critical time. By teaching in Swahili, the information was processed instantly. I became as fluent as a native Tanzanian. Anyone who trained there can understand and speak the language, but those of us who remained from 1976 until October 1979 developed a much deeper mastery. For those four years, my primary role was training recruits and deploying them to the front lines.
Q: During such a rigorous programme, was there ever a moment where you felt like quitting?
A: Absolutely not. We were grounded by discipline and a clear sense of purpose. Our political orientation taught us to follow the mission without second-guessing. We were prepared for the reality that not everyone would be on the front lines. Some were assigned to the rear — serving as instructors, manning supply stores, guarding ammunition or escorting materials from rear bases to the border. While everyone naturally wanted to be at the front immediately, we understood that every role was vital to the war effort. As for my path, the instructors assessed us based on our literacy and our ability to grasp and demonstrate both theory and practicals. After my initial training, I underwent a month-long rigorous assessment to become an instructor. I passed and that defined my contribution to the struggle.
Next week, Cde Makuyana recounts his successes as an instructor. He also explains the strategic importance of the rear and why the logistical and training bases were the backbone of Zimbabwe’s journey to liberation.
