Online Reporter
Mabasa Sasa
For a long time, I have closely followed Africa’s development challenges: how we can achieve sustainable industrialisation, how we can turn political goodwill into tangible economic gains, and what kind of international partnership truly serves our long-term interests.
Like many observers across the continent, I have often reflected on a critical question: why do substantial international support and grand cooperation frameworks sometimes yield uneven results for African nations?
Recently, during valuable exchanges with Chinese scholars and experts focused on Africa-China relations, I encountered a sharp and insightful observation that cuts to the heart of this issue.
There is a widespread misunderstanding across parts of Africa that cooperation commitments under the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) are simply cash handouts.
Because of this misconception, many governments, agencies and private sector entities fail to fully grasp the technical nature of these cooperation frameworks and thus cannot maximise the real benefits available to them.
This observation reveals a central contradiction in Africa’s engagement with China: while we speak enthusiastically about Africa-China cooperation, many of our institutions still do not fully understand how to position themselves to participate effectively.
This insight carries special weight at a time when high-level exchanges and training programmes organised by China’s Ministry of Commerce through the Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO) are helping African participants understand the real mechanics behind China’s development partnerships.
These programmes go beyond headlines and diplomatic rhetoric; they explain the systems, financing structures and institutional processes that turn pledges into reality.
Nowhere is this understanding more important than in the context of FOCAC.
At the 2024 FOCAC Summit in Beijing, China announced 360 billion RMB (roughly 50 billion US dollars) in financial support for Africa over three years. The figure drew global attention, yet the real issue is not the size of the pledge, but how the framework functions.
This 360 billion RMB package is not a giant cheque given to African governments for equal or proportional distribution. It is a structured financing arrangement supporting specific fields of cooperation.
Official breakdowns show the package includes 210 billion RMB in credit lines, 80 billion RMB in various forms of assistance, and 70 billion RMB in investment expected from Chinese enterprises operating in Africa.
In practical terms, this means governments, State-owned enterprises and private companies must identify viable projects, develop bankable proposals, build technical partnerships and actively engage Chinese financial institutions, investors and project partners. Support is unlocked not by speeches, but by solid preparation.
For too long, parts of Africa have discussed FOCAC in broad political terms while neglecting the technical work needed to unlock opportunities.
China’s cooperation model increasingly centres on implementation capacity, covering industrial parks, logistics systems, manufacturing platforms, agricultural modernisation, digital infrastructure and trade integration.
Countries and enterprises that understand this logic tend to benefit far more.
Ethiopia, Kenya and Egypt have leveraged FOCAC and related cooperation platforms to expand industrial parks, upgrade transport infrastructure and boost manufacturing.
These projects did not materialise automatically from summit declarations; they succeeded because national development priorities were carefully aligned with available Chinese financing and technical cooperation mechanisms.
Previous major FOCAC financing rounds followed a similar pattern. At the 2015 Johannesburg Summit and the 2018 Beijing Summit, China announced US$60 billion packages focused on infrastructure, industrialisation, trade financing and agricultural modernisation.
Over time, these commitments evolved into roads, ports, power stations, railways, telecommunications facilities and industrial investments across the continent.
Yet implementation varied sharply: some countries moved decisively, while others remained stuck at the level of political enthusiasm.
Zimbabwe has a clear opportunity to avoid this gap.
Bilateral political relations between Harare and Beijing are already strong and deep-going. The challenge now is to translate this goodwill into more practical economic and industrial cooperation.
China’s new zero-tariff policy for African products creates additional opportunities, giving Zimbabwean exports — from agricultural goods and minerals to processed products — easier access to China’s huge market than ever before.
But market access alone is not enough.
Zimbabwe must now strategically strengthen value chains, industrial processing, logistics integration and export readiness. The real opportunity lies not merely in exporting raw materials, but in integrating local industries into regional and global supply chains linked with China.
The private sector has a crucial role to play. China’s cooperation frameworks are no longer limited to government-to-government channels; they increasingly involve private enterprises, technology firms, manufacturers, logistics providers and innovation ecosystems.
Zimbabwean businesses cannot afford to be passive spectators waiting for governments to act alone.
Chinese investors seek structured partnerships; Chinese development zones look for feasible production projects; Chinese supply chains need stable industrial linkages in Africa. The question is whether African businesses are organised and ready to respond.
As highlighted at the 2024 FOCAC Summit, China aims to turn its big market into Africa’s big opportunity. This reflects an evolving shift in Africa-China relations.
While infrastructure connectivity remains important, cooperation increasingly emphasises industrial collaboration, trade integration, green development, digital systems and supply chain participation. Africa must adapt accordingly.
Too often, we discuss partnerships in abstract political terms while overlooking the institutional and technical preparation needed to deliver results. Modern economic cooperation is highly technical: it requires feasibility studies, standards compliance, financing models, policy coordination and meaningful private sector participation.
Programmes that deepen understanding of China’s development practices and operational logic are therefore highly valuable. They help Africa see not just China’s achievements, but the systems that make them possible.
The real lesson is clear: FOCAC is not a model of aid dependency. It is a framework for practical integration and mutually beneficial cooperation.
Nations that understand this — and prepare accordingly — will gain tremendous benefits. Those that do not will continue attending summits, applauding declarations and issuing communiqués without turning goodwill into genuine development.
Note: The author, Mabasa Sasa, is a veteran journalist, editor and independent commentator.
