I’d like to offer a frame of reference for democracy that emphasises democracy as it relates to the functioning of an industrialised economy.
To begin with, we must track back through economic history. Long gone are the days of the feudal agrarian economy in much of the world.
Agrarian feudalism was the structure of economic governance for hundreds of years from about 900 AD to the late 19th century.
At the beginning of the 1800s in Europe, much of the dominant economies still had remnants of impressionable influence from feudalism.
Feudalism was a system of centrally managing an agrarian economy under the rule of monarchies or militaristic structures. Essentially, nearly all peasants would exert their economic effort into agriculture on land availed to them by the ruling elite.
Only a few citizens were able to be artisans or craftsmen; but in most cases, these skills were meant to support the agrarian livelihood.
The land which was worked on was a “fief”.
A fief was land that a peasant could only use strictly on condition that at harvest time, a payment would be made as gratuity and allegiance to governance. Inevitably, socio-political upheaval fomented revolutions which put an end to this oppressive economy.
This was the dawn of industrialisation; a new means of economy which permitted human effort beyond forced agrarian commitment. Industrialisation brought about new ways of working.
There was new technology such as electricity, and extracted minerals found incremental utility.
This was a time of radical invention and curiosity; hence, industrialisation came with the encouragement of more creative thought. Key to industrialisation was its dependence on allowing more freedom for society to take part and contribute to an endless number of new tasks that enhanced productivity.
The economic gains experienced by industrialising economies were undeniable. Factories employing thousands came. Incomes and living standards rose significantly, in effect stimulating greater demand for further economic activity. Industrialisation was a self-reinforcing means of wealth-creation!
In only a few decades, agrarian feudalism and its repressive governance simply became a relic.
For the new-found prosperity to continue, new socio-political dynamics had to be embraced. Governance could no longer be authoritarian — it only had to manage socio-economic interaction.
This new role depended on pro-actively attaining greater understanding of the social dynamics that influenced the industrial economy.
A new relationship between economic stakeholders and governance had to be realised.
There was need for comprehension that the impulses and sentiments of economic stakeholders were the variables of industrialisation.
These were not to be suppressed.
Instead, they had to be understood and monitored over identified periods of economic cycles. Such impulses and sentiments include consumption, investment, savings, risk appetite, security, and confidence.
The policies, legislation, and economic models created by governance in order to manage an economy would have to be constructed around these variables. By ignoring or miscalculating the impulses and sentiment of economic stakeholders, governance risked leaving the economy vulnerable to depression or collapse.
For instance, through loss of currency confidence, capital flight, or industrial action by disgruntled labour, the industrial base could seriously be harmed.
Moreover, beyond just understanding socio-economic dynamics, governance had to establish institutions that forged attentive relationships with economic stakeholders.
As a result, the growth that came from industrialisation was accompanied by the foundation of institutions concerned with occupational safety and health, securities exchange commissions and ministries of labour.
Some of these institutions still find relevance today.
Understanding this foundational history of industrialisation, especially paying careful attention to the new relations it created between governance and economic stakeholders, helps elucidate democracy.
Definitively, democracy is how economic stakeholders communicate with governance.
It is the medium through which economic stakeholders are empowered to express their economic impulses and sentiments.
Conversely, it is also a medium for governance to be informed on the ever dynamic social elements it needs to know of these economic stakeholders.
Democracy, therefore, is a mutually-beneficial means of economic communication.
This is what Africa as a continent, Zimbabwe included, has failed to relate between democracy and the industrialised economy.
Democracy allows governance to understand society, therefore, allowing governance to influence the economic cycles of industrialisation. Without understanding the dynamics existing within economic stakeholders, accurate economic models cannot be designed and policy cannot achieve effective market potency.
This is the unfortunate story of Africa.
We have been oblivious to how democracy enables systematic management of an economy.
As such, we have failed to appreciate the social motivations and behaviours that need to be managed carefully for better economic outcomes.
Only when economic governance becomes aware of the predominant impulses and sentiments held by its economic stakeholders can it influence positive macro-economic outcomes!
Economics enthusiasts will now see why Africa has offered little in terms of economic models and market theory: how can we do so when we overlook the fundamental variables of the discipline?
Political economists will also see why ever since Africans took over economic management from colonialists, we have struggled to deal with residual marginalisation.
How can we do so without interrogating the match between our socio-economic behaviour and the retained economic structures?
However, those are topics we can explore later.
Nevertheless, opponents to my notions on democracy will argue that centralised command economies have experienced industrial growth.
That is credible to an extent.
However, they have historically proven to have limited potential for long-term success.
They have only been able to erect a few strategic industries, but even those tended to be confined within commodities such as natural resources, and maybe military armaments.
Beyond that, command economies have typically struggled to sustain competitiveness and diversify their industrial base.
Hence, you will find that as command governance seeks to develop new industrial sectors, such an occurrence is stubbornly accompanied by pressure for more democratic socio-political transformation.
Nations of such a trait are going through that right now.
The reason reverts to my notion that expansionary economic models and policy-making cannot undermine the influence of impulses and sentiment of economic stakeholders.
On that note, allow me this week not to engage in discussing the specifics of both monetary and fiscal policies.
Instead, cognisant of my proposed notions, perhaps we can reflect on more fundamental concerns of economic modelling and policy-making.
An introspective perusal of Zimbabwe’s short economic history will reveal command tendencies, and the accompanying undesirable effects. We have had frequent instances where we have allocated resources and capital without being mindful of whether or not allocations satisfied stakeholder sentiments.
Likewise, we have had policy and legislative enforcement disregarding rational impulses of stakeholders.




