Online Reporter
Constance Chillilele
In 2025 and early 2026, the African continent has been characterised by a great truth: Africa is not passively being carried along in the global winds, but it is in fact becoming a continent that is moulding its own future politically.
Between military-dominated regimes in Sahel and hotly disputed elections, modern African politics is a complicated game of sovereignty, security, democracy and development.
The ongoing regional politics indicate the vulnerability and sustainability of the African political formations and require responses based on African agency, as opposed to foreign dictate.
The most evident change is perhaps happening in the Sahel. A dramatic breakage in West African regionalism was the exit of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger out of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The three states, now united under the Alliance of Sahel States, explained the move out of their perceived foreign-imposed sanctions and interference.
In the case of ECOWAS, considered by far the most aggressive regional organisation in Africa, this exit casts some grave doubts on the efficacy of sanctions diplomacy and the scope of normative enforcement (International Crisis Group, 2023).
The series of coups between 2020 and 2023 was an indicator of the deep disillusionment with the failure of governance, insecurity, and economic marginalisation in various regions of West and Central Africa.
But the resurgence of military rule is a direct threat to the democratic principles entrenched in the African Union (AU).
The concept of zero tolerance to unconstitutional alterations of government, which is enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, has been put to the test in numerous occasions (African Union, 2007). Suspensions and condemnations have had little deterring effect.
The question that is haunting African policymakers: is strict adherence to punitive action enough, or should more context-based engagement, that is, a response to structural causes of instability, be more useful to long-term democratic consolidation?
Security is the main point of weakness. Extremist violence has continued to undermine state power in the Sahel and some areas of the Horn of Africa. The withdrawal of French troops under the operation Barkhane and the restructuring of global security alliances have changed the balance in the region (BBC News, 2022).
In places like Mali and Niger, the emergence of new security partnerships with non-Western actors indicate the re-alignment of foreign policy on a larger scale.
This pivot addresses a more profound vision of strategic independence – a demand that African states should not be attached to the past colonial countries but diversify their relations (Williams, 2023).
The Horn of Africa is used to demonstrate the complex relationship between domestic politics and regional stability. The reconstruction efforts in the post-conflict period in Ethiopia after the Tigray war are still fragile even after the November 2022 Pretoria peace agreement (African Union, 2022).
In the meantime, the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia over the access to the Red Sea shows that sovereignty and maritime entitlement may take regional shapes rather quickly.
It has the AU, with its headquarters in Addis Ababa, positioned both symbolically and practically in the centre of these negotiations to balance non-interference and proactive mediation.
Southern Africa can be discussed as another, but equally informative account occasionally moderates blunt candour.
The core of these dynamics is demography. The young African population, which is estimated to be doubled by 2050, is a demographic dividend and a possible destabiliser (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2022).
There is also economic sovereignty that towers. One of the most ambitious integration undertakings in the continent can be seen in the operationalisation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
It is expected to increase intra-African trade, decrease reliance on commodity exports, and reinforce regional value chains, in case implemented fully (World Bank, 2020). Yet progress remains uneven.
Full realisation is still hampered by infrastructure shortages, non-tariff impediments and political distrust. The success of the AfCFTA does not just hinge on technical harmonisation, but on the political will, which must remain over time rather than just one manner or the other, especially in ensuring that national interests are aligned with the continental dreams.
On the outside, Africa is becoming more and more courted in the context of growing geopolitical rivalry.
The addition of African states to the BRICS group highlights how strategic the continent is in the negotiations about reforms in global governance.
At the same time, the partnerships with the European Union, China, and the United States remain at the level of investment, climate finance, and infrastructure. Nonetheless, unity is the ultimate strength of Africa. It is fragmentation, which weakens the bargaining power, and coordinated diplomacy, which makes it strong. – Belgian ThinkTank.
