Online Reporter
AS the war combatants of 1962–79 are getting reduced in number as a result of natural wastage and memory loss, the necessity to record their story now cannot be over emphasised.
The million rand question that you as readers out there may want to ask is “Why did ANC cadres from Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) die alongside ZAPU’s ZPRA cadres between 1967 and 1979 in the Zimbabwe war of liberation?”
My major focus will delve on the impeccable ZAPU and ANC Alliance in retrospect; the 1967 Wankie and 1968 Sipolilo (Guruve) joint campaigns.
Early ZPRA inland Rhodesia operations between 1965 and 1966 had specific, intelligence missions defined by reconnaissance and military hardware logistics personnel.
Apartheid South Africa had sought to enter Zambian territory under the pretext of miners destined to the Zambia Copper belt mining towns, gathering information that would be relayed back to RSA in collaboration with Rhodesia for military incursions.
It became necessary that the ZAPU and ANC forces worked together to dismantle colonial Rhodesia’s impunity that was supported by Apartheid RSA.
ANC type chapters in Southern Rhodesia(Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi) had been established in the 1950s.
These chapters were banned in 1959. In the end, the NDP was formed in 1960 and facilitated the ANC cadres who came through Rhodesia to cross the border into Zambia.
Later, in 1962, when ZAPU decided to engage in the armed struggle, it established an external office in Zambia. By this time, the ANC had already established an office in Lusaka.
As a result of the relationship of both parties, the heads of the military wings of ZAPU and ANC realised the need to engage each other.
First they held a number of exploratory meetings where they discussed their strategies.
The ZPRA (then known as the ZAPU Military Wing) was represented by its Commander Akim Ndlovu and Chief of Reconnaissance Dumiso Dabengwa, plus, whenever necessary, by other relevant command staff.
The ANC military wing MK (Umkhonto we Sizwe) was represented by its Commander Joe Modise, Chris Hani, Zola Zembe plus others in the command structure where necessary.
During these interactions, the ANC explained its main obstacles in the deployment of its cadres for operations in South Africa.
They told of their limited choice through Botswana and how in most cases their cadres were intercepted by police, arrested and sent to prison before they were deported back to Zambia.
ZPRA on the other hand felt uncomfortable about the extent of this co-operation, taking into consideration that their military wing had only been established in 1965 and had started with small scale deployments into Rhodesia.
They were still testing the ground as it were.
On the other hand, MK had been on the ground for some time. However, their cadres at the holding camps in Tanzania were growing weary of waiting to be deployed.
This posed a big headache for MK as they were expected to come up with some significant movement or face a revolt in their holding camps.
The main topic therefore became the need for cooperation between the two military wings to use Zimbabwe instead of Botswana for significant deployment of their cadres.
It was then recommended that the leadership of the two parties be briefed before they could be any concrete suggestions on the extent of the co-operation.
After each side had briefed its party leadership, the leaders approved the idea and suggested that the military should come up with firm proposals on how they would implement this co-operation.
At this stage the two commanders then set out to establish relevant sub-committees to plan and submit their recommendations.
The sub-committees made their reports which included a full operations plan with the Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns earmarked to kick-start the cooperation.
This operations report was later presented to a combined meeting of the two organisations and their military wings.
In this meeting the ANC was represented by Oliver R Tambo and Thomas Nkobi while ZAPU was represented by James R Chikerema and Jason Z Moyo.
At the end of this meeting the military wings were given the go ahead to work out the details of this implementation and to report back to another combined meeting.
All the relevant military departments such as Reconnaissance, Logistics, Training and Operations were assigned to study their roles and ensure that they would fit into the broad operational plans of the two campaigns.
Initially, it had been suggested to undertake the two campaigns simultaneously through Wankie and Sipolilo; but later on account of logistical problems, it was agreed to start with Wankie.
The Wankie campaign Reconnaissance, Logistics, Operations and Training departments all went into overdrive to achieve their targeted date of August 1967. The choice of selecting a crossing point at the Zambezi River Gorge area, about 10 kilometres from Victoria Falls entailed complications:
Climbing down the 90 metre distance by rope to the river.
Using three available canoes capable of carrying only two passengers.
Climbing up another 90 metre distance by rope onto the Rhodesian side. This issue was debated at
length but the main topic therefore became the need for co-operation between the two military wings to
use Zimbabwe instead of Botswana for significant deployment of their cadres.
The Reconnaissance team would not be drawn to find another alternative. The operation strategy
entailed that within one week after crossing, two ZPRA sections (6 to 8 men) would separate from the
detachment with one to deploy permanently in the Wankie district and the other in Lupane district.
These would remain springboards to provide support for future campaigns. Similarly, when the detachment reached Southern Matabeleland another two ZPRA sections would support the MK cadres to cross the Limpopo and stay behind to redeploy in the Matobo and Gwanda South districts.
For the Wankie operations the Luthuli Detachment was led by John Dube (Sotsha Ngwenya) deputised by Chris Hani as the commissar.
In spite of some setbacks, the final combined meeting of the two parties and the military commanders approved August as the crossing date. August 1, the setting down of the sun signalled the D-day for the Luthuli detachment.
OR Tambo was there to raise the flag for the crossing to go ahead.
It took the whole night to cross about half the detachment of three platoons. At daybreak, everyone on both sides of the river had to take cover and rest until nightfall the following day. On the following day, crossing resumed at night until early hours of the morning.
Once the entire detachment had crossed, they were guided towards the main Victoria Falls to Wankie road by a few cadres selected from the reconnaissance team.
As soon as they cleared from the Rhodesian side of the bank, two old men from Matetsi village, as arranged, drove a large flock of goats to cover the footprints of the detachment.
The two ZPRA sections were allowed to separate for deployment in the Wankie and Lupane areas.
Meanwhile, the detachment proceeded and encamped in the Inyantuwe area on 12 August.
The following day on the 13th, they had their first encounter with the Rhodesian forces, comprising a platoon made up of BSAP and RAR.
After Inyantuwe, they had a number of other major battles at Sinamatela, Tsholotsho and along the Natha and Tekwane river areas before they retreated into Botswana.
The Botswana police arrested and had them imprisoned before deporting them back to Zambia. For ZPRA the battle of Wankie was understandably the watershed in the history of Zimbabwe and South Africa’s armed liberation struggles.
The Luthuli detachment’s indomitable fighters proved the lie of the invincibility of the Rhodesian and South African racist and apartheid regimes.
Chris Hani as commissar of the combined forces in the Luthuli detachment commented on the battle of Inyantuwe thus, “It was one of the battles they were engaged in that will probably go down in the history of MK military operations as one of the most heroic.
Displaying outstanding heroism and sacrifice, they fought like lions and actually kept Smith’s forces pinned down for the better part of the day”.
The Rhodesian account of the same battle, “contact was made between the terrorists and a patrol led by senior officer Barry Tiffin at first light on the 13th August near Inyantuwe railway siding. The BSAP was pinned down and reinforcements were called for.
After reinforcements had arrived and during the encounter, five ZPRA terrorists were killed and Tiffin was seriously injured. Two RAR were killed and three European and one African security force members were wounded”.
The Tegwane (Thekwane) River battle
One of the most memorable of the battles of Wankie which perhaps places the commanders and fighters of the Luthuli Detachment in a class of the greatest fighters of all time anywhere was fought on 23 August 1967 in the Tegwane (Thekwane) River area.
Chris Hani had this to say about the battle: “So the enemy commander and the enemy’s HQ must have believed that the air-force had struck at us accurately and yet the truth of the matter is that we were not affected by the bombardment at all.
The commander of the joint MK/ZPRA Detachment took the decision that this was the time to raid the enemy.
We organized units to go and raid the enemy. I was in that, together with James April, Douglas Wana, the late Jack Simelane, Victor Dlamini and others. We crawled towards the enemy’s position and first attacked their tents with grenades and then followed with AKs and LMGs.
The enemy fought back furiously and after 15 minutes, we called for reinforcements from the rear and within 10 minutes we overran the enemy position. In that battle, we killed the enemy’s colonel who was commanding.
His name was Thomas, a huge chunk of a man wearing size 10 boots. We killed a few lieutenants and other soldiers. The story was the same as in our previous battle.
The enemy fled leaving behind supplies, weapons, grenades, and ammunition and communication radios. Another victory for our Detachment! I want to emphasise the question of victory because the Luthuli Detachment was never defeated in battle.”
Chris Hani’s account of the battle is also corroborated by a member of the Rhodesian forces: “After a fleeting 12 minutes of strafing by the hunters and before a scheduled bombing run by Canberra’s from No 5 Squadron at 1800hrs, Wintall moved the two platoons into thick cover to prepare a safe night position.
All their movements were watched, however, and as the Rhodesians relaxed with no apparent sentries, terrorist leader Dube and one of his men put on captured Rhodesians combat jackets sauntered over to unsuspecting R.A.R troops. It took the whole night to cross about half the detachment of three platoons.
Shortly afterwards, heavy fire was brought down onto the platoons by hidden terrorists wounding eight including P.O. Horn Wintall himself. P.O Spencer Thomas died of gunshot wounds to the chest.
Two terrorists were killed. Taken totally by surprise and under immediate threat of his position being overrun, Wintall organised a withdrawal as fast as he could, leaving behind weapons and kit.
The story of victory was the same in all the battles.
The enemy was overrun and leaving behind supplies, weapons, grenades, uniforms and communication radios.
THE THINKER-Volume 80/2019
To be continued with focus on the Sipolilo Battle
NB: Dabengwa, a former Zapu head of intelligence and Cabinet Minister in Independent Zimbabwe died on 23 May 2019 and was declared a National Hero.
