The sustained offensive (Part 4)

Ambassador Professor Simbi Mubako

The Herald today publishes Part 4 of the exclusive excerpts from the forthcoming book, The Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1960-1980, a comprehensive work by Ambassador Professor Simbi Mubako, who was an active participant in the liberation movement and served as Minister of Justice in the first Cabinet of independent Zimbabwe.

Every year on April 28, ZANU and ZANLA commemorated the Battle of Chinhoyi as a day of mourning for those who died, but also a day of celebration for the successful launching of the liberation war, and a re-dedication to prosecution of the war until victory. 

The seven brave fighters who made up the Chinhoyi Seven and gave their lives for the freedom we have today are Simon Chimbodza, Godwin Manyerenyere, Christopher Chatambudza, David Guzuzu, Arthur Maramba, Shadreck Sawana Mutendazamira and Godfrey Matsikidze Dube. 

The bravery of the Chinhoyi Seven exploded the myth, which had acquired a strong hold upon the people of Zimbabwe, that the settlers were invincible. 

Chinhoyi destroyed the myth of their ‘immortality’ and established the link with the First Liberation War fought by our ancestors in 1896 and 1897, symbolising the continuity of the struggle.

When the guerrilla war broke out again in 1972, the policy of the settler regime was to take all necessary military steps to ward off the attacks while telling the world that Rhodesia was an oasis of peace and normalcy. 

The local press, even when they had information to the contrary, were not allowed to publish it. The names of ZANU and ZAPU were banned and could not be mentioned or printed in Rhodesia. 

The beginnings of the north-eastern campaign for long remained one of the enigmas of the Zimbabwe liberation movement. 

The speculation that Frelimo had urged ZANU to open up a campaign in Zimbabwe was really based on common-sense guesswork. The war in Mozambique had reached a very crucial stage. 

The Portuguese control over the country they called Portuguese East Africa was gradually being pushed to the southern provinces as Frelimo created liberated zones. 

In their desperation the Portuguese came to rely on their South African and Rhodesian allies. From 1969 to 1973 there were frequent joint or co-ordinated operations between Rhodesian and Portuguese armed forces in Mozambique.

 Along their common border, Rhodesian troops and aircraft took over most of the policing role from their beleaguered allies. 

At the same time ZANU in the post-Chinhoyi period was busy recasting its military strategies and tactics after failing to sustain its own campaigns and after witnessing the more serious military reverses sustained by its sister party, ZAPU, in its campaigns especially the forays of 1968 and 1969. 

Internally, both had restructured better for action. Herbert Chitepo had established an elected Dare Rechimurenga (War Council) under his chairmanship as well as a Revolutionary Council. The former was the political body and the latter the military arm. Perhaps even more significant was the rise of a well-trained and highly intelligent group of officers with both the ability and motivation to plan and launch a sustained war of liberation. 

The leading personalities in the new group of officer corps in ZANLA were Josiah Tongogara, Mayor Urimbo, John Mataure, Joseph Chimurenga, Rusununguko Ernest Kadungure, William Ndangana and Justin Chauke. 

All of these had received their initial training in Tanzania and most of them had gone on to China for more sophisticated training in the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare.

Chairman Chitepo said that in the past too much emphasis had been on military activity over political matters and that ZANU corrected this error “by politicising and mobilising the people before mounting any attacks against the enemy.” 

The plan was simple, yet militarily and politically sound. ZANU would provide men who would go with Frelimo soldiers through Mozambique and from there infiltrate into Zimbabwe. 

The principle merit of the plan was the element of surprise. The enemy least expected that any liberation group would attack through Mozambique. 

Enemy troops reinforced by South African troops were dug in all along the Zambezi river against attacks from Zambia, not from Mozambique where the Portuguese had some 60 000 troops. 

Since they established bases in Mozambique the guerrillas had a long land border and not a difficult river plus jungle to cross. It was safer to fight with your back to the Mozambique jungle than with your backs to the Zambezi River. However, it did mean that there was no secure base anywhere near to retreat to in case of danger, a consideration which was crucial in determining ZANLA’s approach to the whole struggle. 

When ZANLA soldiers infiltrated an area they intended to stay there among the people not just to hit some targets and return to base.

The people there were undergoing the same oppression and suffering experienced by all Africans in colonial Rhodesia. Such was the process of conversion, slow and laborious, but rewarding.

 The freedom fighters endeared themselves with the villagers by living and working with them and demonstrating their commitment to fight for their country. They followed the lines of village authority from the headman to the chief and to the spirit medium whom the settlers called “witchdoctor”. 

They were able to enlist the prestigious support of the venerable Mbuya Nehanda medium, successor to the great Nehanda medium who was publicly executed by the settlers in April 1898 for leading the African war of resistance in 1896-97. 

The incumbent Mbuya Nehanda was reputed to be 80 years of age, a woman of great spiritual authority among the people. The freedom fighters knew the traditions of their people, and also drew on the lessons of African history. 

In every real sense a blessing from Mbuya Nehanda was worth more to this small band of guerrillas than a thousand bazookas. It assured them all the support of the people which they needed to launch the war. 

The Smith regime issued a warrant for her arrest, but she disappeared under guerrilla escort into the Mozambique bush; the guerrillas carried her for three hundred miles until they reached their base at Chifombo, on the Zambian border.

Spirit mediums became a familiar scene of camp life from the days of the north-eastern campaign to the end of the war. 

The role of the mediums is not something easily understandable to scientific-minded observers. One has heard well-meaning people expressing fears that the party might be deviated from the path of rational planning of the war and might place its reliance on mystical incantations. ZANLA took a practical attitude towards the mediums, and their enormous potential in mobilising the people was fully harnessed for the needs of liberation.

 

Their continuing role in the camps should be seen as the same with that of social workers or chaplains — that of comforting and encouraging the combatants. 

Just before Christmas day 1972, ZANLA attacked Altena Farm in the Centenary district, launching the second and protracted phase of the armed struggle which would lead to victory. 

The attacks shook the confidence of the white settler community in the ability of the Smith regime to protect them. Farmers started deserting their farms and forming defensive groups as their Kenya counterparts had done during the Mau-Mau uprising.

But the significance of the 1972 Christmas offensive does not lie so much in how many white settlers were killed or how many freedom fighters were captured and civilians detained. 

It lies rather in the fact that the guerrilla movement was immeasurably strengthened and Rhodesia’s weakness was exposed. 

It transformed the history of African resistance in Rhodesia and planted a guerrilla military presence in the country which evinced every sign of viability and capacity to expand. 

The settlers suffered their heaviest casualties in a single engagement with ZANU guerrillas five months after the commencement of hostilities (four soldiers killed, five seriously wounded). 

Early in 1974, ZAPU returned to the sustained offensive by killing four South African troops in an ambush along the difficult terrain of the Zambezi Valley. 

Gone were the days when Rhodesia could boast of having the most docile Africans on the continent; gone too were the myths of the efficiency of the Rhodesian forces. 

Rhodesia’s inability to defeat the freedom fighters had been underlined by the presence of South African troops in the country and Smith’s apparent demand for more. 

©SV Mubako

The Zimbabwe Liberation Movement 1960-1980 is well-illustrated with pictures of the period and will be published soon by African Publishing Group. [email protected]