Sundaymail Editor
THIS week, CDE AMBROSE MUTINHIRI recounts a critical setback faced during the liberation struggle. He narrates to our Society Editor PRINCE MUSHAWEVATO how the struggle eventually got back on track, highlighting his work alongside figures like Rex Nhongo, Nikita Mangena and Jevan Maseko.
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Q: Last week, you told us about the famous Hwange (Wankie) battle and your subsequent move to Morogoro. Were there other significant battles/incidents you were involved in back home?
A: I trained numerous fighters who were deployed back home for various missions. However, I could perhaps highlight the downing of two Rhodesian Viscount planes by fighters I trained.
The aircraft were brought down using the Strela-2 anti-aircraft missile, a handheld, shoulder-fired weapon operated by a single person.
In this particular incident, a section of anti-aircraft personnel was assigned to the mission to down the Viscount(s). The weapon is designed to target low-altitude aircraft. At the time, I was the Chief of Staff of ZIPRA. Our plan was to target the tourism industry, aiming to disrupt it, as it was a major source of funding for Ian Smith’s regime. We intended to halt tourist air travel. We had also, in the process, destroyed the Elephant Hills Hotel.
Furthermore, we had targeted one of the aircraft because we believed General Walls, the Rhodesian army commander, was on board.
However, we later learnt that he had changed his travel plans and used the road instead.
Q: Please continue.
A: The mission was a success, although some had reservations about it. When we downed the first Viscount aircraft, Joshua Nkomo summoned me and Nikita Mangena. He was furious and confronted us, asking if we had resorted to killing civilians. We assured him that was not the case and explained our strategy of targeting the tourism industry, which was funding Smith’s regime. While Nkomo was still processing this, about two weeks later, we downed the second Viscount. Again, he called us, but this time he did not shout. He simply stared at us and asked, “Lifunani lina, abafana?” (What exactly do you want, you guys?) Nikita replied that we only wanted to liberate the country. Nkomo told us that our actions would have repercussions, and that the international community would turn against us. He continued to express his concerns, but Nikita stood his ground during the confrontational meeting.
Nikita countered by asking Nkomo if Smith was not already killing ordinary civilians across the country.
I tried to calm Nikita down, but he persisted.
Nkomo was not pleased. We left, but the tension remained high that day.
Q: We are told that these clashes and many other similar issues occurring at the time created problems for the struggle. Can you give us some insight into this?
A: Indeed, a lot was happening during that period, not only within ZAPU, but also within ZANU. This eventually led to the armed struggle encountering significant challenges, a period commonly referred to as détente.
The struggle nearly came to a standstill. At that time, Julius Nyerere, the president of Tanzania, and Samora Machel met and, after some deliberations, decided that the Zimbabwean liberation struggle should resume, but without the politicians.
They argued that the politicians were complicating the situation.
“The mission was a success, although some had reservations about it. When we downed the first Viscount aircraft, Joshua Nkomo summoned me and Nikita Mangena. He was furious and confronted us, asking if we had resorted to killing civilians. We assured him that was not the case and explained our strategy of targeting the tourism industry, which was funding Smith’s regime.”
Consequently, they invited fighters to Mozambique, which had recently attained its independence.
Ten of us met in Maputo — five from ZIPRA and five from ZANLA.
That is when we formed a military wing called the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA).
We reached an agreement and appointed Rex Nhongo (Solomon Mujuru) as the overall commander, with John Dube, who commanded the Hwange Battle, as his deputy.
Nikita Mangena became the political commissar and I became the director of training.
Training was my forte.
Tanzania and Mozambique were part of the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) Liberation Committee based in Dar es Salaam, so all assistance provided to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe was channelled through ZIPA.
And because Mozambique had been liberated, there was a substantial increase in the number of recruits crossing into the country from Zimbabwe, and I was responsible for training them.
I trained some individuals who now hold very senior positions.
I also trained the late Perrance Shiri, and he worked under my command for a period of time.
There are several other high-ranking Government officials whom I trained, including the late Rex Nhongo.
Q: After ZIPA was formed, what happened?
A: ZIPA began as a 10-man command military organisation, but it was later expanded to 18 men because the workload became too demanding.
We expanded it by creating deputy positions in all departments.
Where the head was from ZANLA, the deputy automatically came from ZIPRA, and vice versa.
My deputy was Parker Chipoyera. We launched a campaign that was impactful and continuous. It was that campaign that ultimately liberated the country.
However, we faced leadership challenges.
Apparently, the ZANLA comrades had their leadership arrested in Zambia concerning Herbert Chitepo’s death, among other issues.
Our leadership, including Jason Moyo, was in Zambia.
Our ZANLA colleagues then wanted us to chant slogans denouncing figures like Joshua Nkomo, but we refused, as we had no issues with our political leadership at the time.
This led to disagreements and ultimately the collapse of ZIPA.
It was also around this time that Samora Machel challenged ZANLA fighters to identify a single leader they would frequently consult and for ZIPRA to do the same.
We (ZIPRA) nominated Jason Moyo and ZANLA nominated Robert Mugabe.
During the initial formation of ZIPA, Robert Mugabe, like Joshua Nkomo, was not involved. Nkomo was back home negotiating with Ian Smith, which further complicated our situation outside the country.
The ZANLA fighters consistently reminded us that even if Nkomo’s talks were successful, the struggle would not end. They assumed we were half-hearted in the struggle, hoping for a peaceful settlement back home.
However, that was not the case. We were just as committed to the struggle as they were.
Q: Can you take us through the split and what happened after ZIPA disbanded?
A: The main issue the ZANLA fighters wanted was for us to denounce Nkomo’s activities back home. They were against the talks with Ian Smith.
The friction became so intense that we decided to withdraw from ZIPA.
After that, we went to the Geneva talks. We did not go as ZIPA, as it had already been dissolved.
The ZANU delegation was led by Robert Mugabe, while Joshua Nkomo led ZAPU, although we had initially chosen Jason Moyo to lead the delegation.
The arrangement was changed in the sense that we had seconded Jason Moyo to Samora Machel, but he (Moyo) was ultimately answerable to Joshua Nkomo within ZAPU.
He was the vice president, having taken over from James Chikerema after some internal disputes within ZAPU.
Chikerema faced some difficulties; however, I am unable to elaborate on the developments that occurred at that time, except to say that it was unfortunate.
He was effectively forced out. But it was not a case of Chikerema having failed.
Figures like Jason Moyo, George Silundika and Dumiso Dabengwa simply chose to disobey Chikerema and he lost control.
It appeared they had support from Joshua Nkomo. That is when Chikerema decided to leave ZAPU.
Q: Are these factors part of the reason Robson Manyika crossed the floor from ZAPU to ZANU?
A: Well, it was a more complex issue altogether.
When FRELIMO liberated Tete province, they invited ZAPU to use the passage to cross the Zambezi from the Mozambican side, then enter Rhodesia.
This was for training and other military-related activities.
However, some within ZAPU, including Dumiso Dabengwa and George Silundika, deemed it prudent to decline the offer.
They feared that by accepting, ZAPU would be overwhelmed and infiltrated by the ZANLA fighters joining the struggle in Mozambique and eventually lose control of the party.
In essence, they believed that accepting the deal would enhance the power of individuals like myself, since the majority of people in Mozambique came from the Mashonaland areas.
ZANU, on the other hand, engaged Samora Machel and accepted the offer.
They crossed into Mozambique and entered northern Zimbabwe.
That is where the war began, in Centenary. It became easier for freedom fighters to cross into Zimbabwe and for thousands of recruits willing to join the struggle to cross into Mozambique.
That is how ZANU managed to recruit significantly more fighters for the struggle compared to ZAPU.
It was during this period that Robson Manyika crossed the floor from ZAPU to ZANU, feeling it was the right decision based on the prevailing trends.
Phelekezela Mphoko had remained in Mozambique when ZIPA was disbanded. Perhaps this is an opportune moment for me to clarify something: I do not understand why some people believe the Unity Accord (1987) was between the Shona and the Ndebele, and not between ZAPU and ZANU.
Most of the top figures in ZAPU came from Mashonaland East, specifically the Chihota area. Consider James Chikerema, George Nyandoro, Dan Madzimbamuto, Josiah Chinamano, Samuel Tichafa Parirenyatwa and others. This is why I was among the five men from ZIPRA who went to form ZIPA.
Next week, Cde Ambrose Mutinhiri will discuss his final days with Nikita Mangena and Jason Moyo, with whom he shared close personal relationships.
Online Reporter