‘West against a new, multipolar model of world order’

Konstantin Kosachev Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council

Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Konstantin Kosachev about future world order. The West is not against the East or Russia, but against a new, multipolar model of the world order.

Abstracts from the address to the VIII annual Forum “Primakov Readings”

***

Today we are discussing the transformation of the world order, but first we need to decide: what is it? Strictly speaking, there is neither the first — world order, nor the second — Eurasianism as its dimension.

There is discord in the world order, fraught with chaos. It consists of four different elements inherited from the past, each of which I would designate with symbolic numbers.

• 1945 — The Yalta Treaty of 1945, which laid the foundations for a post-war settlement, including, first of all, the UN, the Security Council and the right of veto for its permanent members, a set of world rules in the form of the UN Charter;
• 1975 — the period of the Cold War, when the parties agreed to coexist in a confrontation; the culmination of this era was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the creation of the OSCE on its basis, as well as the formation of a system of treaties in the field of security and arms control;
• 1995 — it is the end of our own illusions and romantic expectations of building a single security space from Lisbon to Vladivostok, a common European home from the Atlantic to the Urals and all those goals that turned out to be speculative, it was made to build an “order based on rules”;
• 2015 — the beginning of the military operation in Syria, the action of Russia as a full-scale global player capable of influencing the international agenda by its own actions; we went to this stage from the famous “U-turn over the Atlantic” initiated by Evgheny Primakov in 1999, through the famous Munich speech of Russian President V.V. Putin in 2007, the repulse of Georgian aggression against South Ossetia in 2008, the Crimean referendum, the support of Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics, the defeat of terrorist groups in Syria which gradually led to a new configuration in the world, met with increased sanctions and the rallying of the West on an anti-Russian basis. The moment has come when we actually expressed disagreement with what is happening in the world.

The current situation is a rather bizarre combination of models explained above, the coexistence and confrontation of these models. None of them is either capable or desirable. And the outcome is far from predetermined.

Only one thing is clear — this is not the “end of history”, and the outcome, will be determined not by the notorious rules of the West but as the sum of the worldviews and ambitions of the sides, where the Russian side has at least its voice, and at most its role, the significance of which is largely depends on our own actions.

Alas, the West has done everything to transform globalisation into a world quasi-order based on its rules (and this is exactly a quasi-order, since it is not universal in terms of its benefits to the world). As a result, a conflict inevitably arose between the goals of sustainable development of all humankind and the selfish goals of the West.

At the same time, unlike the usual scheme of the twentieth century, the split did not occur along the “West — East” line. This split is not geographical, but ideological. The West is not against the East or Russia, but against a new, multipolar model of the world order. Liberal countries have actually built an illiberal world order, unfavourable to the rest of the world, but imposed on it with maniacal persistence worthy of better use.

At the same time, the alternative model, stable due to multi-polarity, does not suit not only the West itself, which receives clear advantages from dominance. Even less it suits neophyte-countries who in their transformation according to the logic of the mentioned milestones from 1975-1995-2015 chose the West willingly sacrificing their sovereignty along the way, exchanging it for an entrance ticket to NATO or the EU. If you think about it, there is actually a direct relationship between sovereignty and multi-polarity. Non-self-confident subjects cannot form a multipolar world, just as unfree citizens cannot form truly democratic institutions in the state. New-comers sacrifice sovereignty and go to the West not for the sake of a just world order.

They choose this way, firstly, to make them beneficiaries of unfair and dishonest globalisation, and, secondly, to provide a forceful cover for any actions to create monosocialities inside themselves — actions against history, national minorities, the opposition, and ultimately outside — against neighbours who think and acting differently. NATO is not going to defend itself, but to attack, which has been confirmed by years and decades of aggressive behaviour of Eastern European states in the alliance.

The confrontation between the concepts of the world order is by no means theoretical in nature, which became especially obvious during the sanction war of the West against Russia. Great forces are involved against multi-polarity:

• Weaponisation (that is, turning into a weapon) of everything and everything — these are reserve currencies, technologies, chip trading, UN resolutions and other organisations, and even the national composition of the apparatus of these organisations, as well as courts, media, history and textbooks, insurance, shipping, visas, and so on to infinity.
• Ideologisation of what is happening — interpretation of events as a conflict of democracies and autocracies. This means in practice that there are no equal actors in the international arena, as was commonly believed in all previous eras, but there are “good” and “bad” ones. That is why there is no need to negotiate with opponents, and sanctions (even those that harm themselves) and interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states have a moral justification. Diplomacy is being replaced by quasi-judicial processes that are conducted around a single version, as well as ultimatums of surrender instead of negotiations to find compromises.

However, multi-polarity is not “unarmed” either. Objective trends work for it:

1. Strengthening of the third forces, increasing the role of the middle Powers as the main driving force behind the reform of the international environment. The formation of such structures as BRICS (and now BRICS+), as well as the “Twenty”, reflected this trend.
2. Economy. Here is an illustrative statistic: in 2000, the states that are now imposing sanctions against Russia produced 80 percent of the world’s GDP. In 2020, the same states produced only 60 percent of the world’s GDP.
3. Demographics. By 2100, there will be five African states in the top ten most populous countries, none European, one Western, and three out of the “top

5″ in Asia. By 2050, a quarter of the world’s population will live in Africa, and by 2100 — almost 40 percent. Of course, this will also affect global balances in all spheres.

4. Strengthening regionalisation; strengthening the role of regional structures seeking to solve their issues independently, through integration and without external influence. Russia should not “oversleep” regionalisation, as it somehow “overslept” globalisation, having integrated into it not in the role of a determining force.

In the context of such divergent trends in the formation of the future world order, there is a demand for the concepts of this future. Russia can and should offer its own, although, in my opinion, it has not yet been clearly formulated. It seems that such a concept should not be only “pro” and only “contra”. Only pro-Russian and only anti-Western, in particular. It should be understood that no models reproducing the Cold War will work, the vast majority of developing countries are not interested in them.

Solving world problems through the development of, relatively speaking, the Eurasian dimension — and in this dimension there is a prototype of real multi-polarity — should not be considered in the usual “horizontal” and “russiacentric” way, as “West — East” or “West against Russia”.

We must speak not only on our own behalf, but consolidate the position of Asia, offer ways to integrate into the common space to everyone without exception, including the European Union, and, ultimately, both Americas and, of course, Africa.

From understanding the situation, it is equally important to move on to what we have to do. And how to give the future processes of world reconstruction a Eurasian dimension?

Here are the first sketches.

For 30 years, the West has actually institutionalised unipolarity, the very order based on its rules and its institutions. NATO and the EU, control over global financial institutions, two world currencies and, finally, attempts to ensure military dominance in the world are the key pillars of this construction.

Similarly, the transition to a multipolar model, to Eurasianism in the broad sense of the word, is impossible without the institutionalization of multi-polarity. It is necessary to create and offer the world a conceptual model that is comfortable for all participants, including the West itself.

The contours of such a model are unlikely to be determined by themselves.

The consolidated political will of the international community will be required in the same way as it was manifested in 1945 when the UN was created and in 1975 when the CSCE was held.

I think we need to work on the basis of the principle of equality and sovereignty of all world players, as it is spelled out in the UN Charter, as well as according to the classic scheme of the OSCE “three baskets”. However, we are not talking about reproducing the OSCE itself, but only about the key areas in which we agreed then and on which we need to agree today.

1. Security. This is, first of all, the reset of security agreements as a fulcrum for the return of the primacy of law over rules. New documents cementing multi-polarity (non-interference in the internal affairs of states, anti-terrorism, cybersecurity). Russia, with all understanding of the complexity of this task, can assume (in alliance with partners) the mission of a reformer of international law in the interests of all mankind, and not of a single group of states.
2. Economy. Without strengthening the democratic foundations of the world economy, everyone will be under the threat of sanctions by powerful powers. This means that global mechanisms must exist and work. The introduction of the principles of justice, the creation of safety mechanisms against the arbitrariness of the powerful.

We need to review the priorities of our work (regional, political, institutional), the management system of this activity and interdepartmental coordination, national mechanisms for international development assistance (assistance to foreign states), the system of trade missions abroad and a number of other quite practical topics.

3. Humanitarian sphere. I think it would be an important task for us to bring to the forefront, including in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, the topic of protecting people, and not just stories about military successes. After all, this was the reason for the launch of a special military operation, and this is what should remain in the focus of politicians, the media, and society. Our goals are achieved on this field. The rights of national minorities, opposition to ethnocide and the abolition of culture should really, and not only declaratively, be at the centre of Russia’s foreign policy, which has absolutely unique achievements in this regard, incomparable with anything.

Of course, the struggle for the future is serious. But the more interesting the modern world is, it is interesting for its lack of predestination and its multivariance.