Who owns the company car?

been found in breach of contract by failing to sell the cars to the managers at “book value” after a certain mileage or number of years.
Inevitably, many of these cases are spilling to the courts and most companies have been on the receiving end. Packrite (Private) Limited employed David Masiya as a human resources manager.
Masiya resigned from his position in January 2011, subject to his serving three months’ notice up to April 30 2011. His resignation was accepted.
However, Packrite later filed an application at the Labour Court for the return of its vehicle, which Masiya was using prior to his resignation.
It was submitted that the vehicle had been handed over to Masiya for use during the course of his duties as its employee and that benefit ought to have been returned upon resignation.
Masiya submitted that the vehicle was, in fact, his and not the employer’s. He submitted that the car’s registration book was in his name in support of his submissions. Masiya alleged that the employer had given him the car to appreciate his service with the company and had then registered the car in his name.
Packrite had initially reported the matter as a criminal case alleging that Masiya was using the vehicle without the company’s consent.
However, prosecution was denied and Packrite made an application to the High Court for vindication.
It failed to pursue the matter and the matter was dismissed in the High Court for want of prosecution.
Packrite then approached the Labour Court with the same claim that the Toyota vehicle be released to it since Masiya had no right to its continued use.
Its argument was that Masiya’s right to the vehicle was by virtue of his employment with the company.
The right to retain it ceased with his resignation. Packrite also disputed that Masiya was the true owner of the vehicle. Masiya opposed the application, but argued in limine that the matter was now res judicata.
In support of his claim that the matter was now res judicata, Masiya placed reliance on the case of Banda versus Zisco 1999 (1) ZLR 340.
In that case, the learned judge considered the case of Pretorious versus Barkly East Divisional Council 1914 AD 407, where Searle J set out the requisites of the plea of res judicata as follows.
“ . . . that the action in respect of which judgment has been given must have been between the same parties or their privies, concerning the same subject matter and founded upon the same cause of complaint as the action in which the defence is raised . . .”
Again in the case of Mitford Executer versus Ebden’s Executers and ARS 1917 AD 682 Page 686, Maasdorp JA listed the requisites to a plea of res judicata as follows.
“To determine that question it will be necessary to enquire whether the judgment was given in an action with respect to the same subject matter. It also looks at whether the judgment was given in an action based on the same ground and between the same parties.”
The judge also considered another requirement commended on Justice Antony Gubbay in Wolfeden versus Jackson 1985 (2) ZLR 313.
Justice Gubbay said the plea of res judicata could succeed in a case where there had been a final and definitive judgment delivered by a competent court.
The court in that case came up with the conclusion that where the Supreme Court had dealt with a matter between the same parties of the same subject matter, the parties could seek a review in the High Court.
The judge also reasoned that the Supreme Court judgment in that case was definitive. This was so in spite of the fact that what was being sought to be brought before the High Court were review proceeding. The Supreme Court’s decision was not based on any procedural considerations but on the merits of the matter. The grounds of review were different from the reasons for appeal but it was held that there had been a definitive judgment. In the present case, there cannot be disputes as regards of the three listed grounds.
Firstly, that the dispute is in respect of the same subject matter. Secondly, that the claim is based on the same grounds and, thirdly, that the dispute is between the same parties.
The claim before the High Court was between the same parties and the dispute is based on the same ground that the vehicle allegedly belonged to Packrite and that Masiya must return it.
The subject matter — that is the return of the vehicle — is the same as that in the High Court application.
Masiya therefore argued that in view of the above, the defence of res judicata must be upheld.
Packrite, on the other hand, did not dispute that the parties were the same and the grounds for both applications also the same. It argued that for Masiya’s defence to succeed there ought to have been a distinct decision on the specific issues raised by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Reliance was placed on Mapurara versus Mapurara HH 177/88. The essence of Packrite’s argument was that the High Court decision was not based on the merits of the matter but had been based on a technicality that the application had been dismissed for want of prosecution, then there had not been any definitive decision.
The issue of rei vindication that had been placed before the court by Packrite had not been decided on, it argued. The dispute between the parties therefore remained undetermined and could be brought before the court for determination.
However, the court must look at the effect of the High Court decision in order to decide whether there had been a final definitive judgment. The High Court decision meant that the parties could not approach the court again on the same subject matter.
Although the decision was based on a legal technicality, it was definitive and final in nature and the parties could not raise the same dispute again in the High Court. The decision had a final effect on the parties’ rights and obligations.
But, can the dispute be raised in another court, which is not the High Court? To help in answering that question, Justice Gubbay reasoned the following in the case of Wolfenden versus Jackson 1985 (2) ZLR 313 AT 316 B-C.
“The exceptio rei judicata is based principally upon public interest that there must be an end to litigation, and that the authority vested in judicial decisions be given effect to even if erroneous.
“It is a form of estoppel and means that where a final definitive judgment is delivered by a competent court, the parties to that agreement or their privies are not permitted to dispute its correctness.”
It certainly would not be in the interest of public policy to allow defendants to be dragged to a court that Packrite had picked. After exhausting the processes in that court and obtaining a decision that was final and definitive in nature, to be dragged again to another court to yet again be subjected to the other court’s processes in relation to the same dispute.
It would not again be in the interest of public policy to keep in perpetuity litigation after a competent court has issued a final and definitive decision. There must be an end to litigation. After a definitive and final judgment, a litigant who has lost a case cannot raise the same dispute, involving the same subject matter and the same parties in a different court.
As a result, Labour Court president Ms Lilian Hove ruled that the point raised in limine by Masiye succeeded, and accordingly dismissed the application by Packrite with costs.