ZPRA-MK collaborate to open infiltration routes to SA

Pathisa Nyathi
THERE are many facets of the struggle for independence that require investigating and unpacking so that we have a fuller overview of what was happening and who was doing what during the struggle for independence. The struggle brought together people coming from bases outside the country and those who remained behind.

The two played complementary roles. The two groups were brought together through various political and organisational arrangements. In this article, we shall investigate routes that were taken by infiltrators from Zambia to the South African borders with Rhodesia and Botswana. The facilitation of ZPRA and Zapu supporters was critically important in the arrangements.

As far back as 1967 South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC)’s uMkhonto weSizwe (MK)’s cadres were collaborating with Zapu’s armed wing (ZPRA) in order to kill two birds with a single stone. ZPRA, though the armed wing did not go by this name then, needed to get to Rhodesia for reconnaissance, recruitment, politicisation, working out infiltration routes as happened in 1966 when Roger Matshimini Ncube, Tshinga Dube, David “Sharpshoot” Moyo did in preparation for the John Dube and Chris Hani-led Luthuli Detachment, contact with Zapu political structures at home and, in some instances, arms caching operations.

MK on the other hand was finding it a daunting task then to travel through Botswana which had too many white British officers both in the army and police. Further, those officials were collaborating with kith and kin in both South Africa and Rhodesia. It was against this background that the two liberation movements collaborated.

It was a collaboration that, after 1968, transformed in response to interference from Western intelligence organisations. Collaboration between the two did not end. What ended were large scale infiltrations as had taken place in 1967 and 1968 (the Pyramid Detachment led by Moffat Hadebe who trained in Algeria).

It was only much later that Botswana was open to infiltrators. For ZPRA, that was after the opening of the Southern Front (SF) in 1974. Before then the likes of Tommy Ndebele had recruited one or two individuals in Botswana as part of preparations for the 1967 Luthuli Detachment.

In those later years, there were ZPRA and Party Representatives in Botswana. They were based in Francistown which was closer to the border with Rhodesia, the country to be infiltrated. We shall, in forthcoming articles, take a look at the crossing points that were used by ZPRA to cross from Zambia into Rhodesia on various missions including those listed above. As the struggle progressed, infiltrations were for direct military confrontation. There were factors that were considered before designating crossing points.

It was not just the physical spot that mattered, the physical terrain and human settlement beyond the crossing point were equally important factors to consider. A spot which was heavily patrolled on the other side was not ideal. The Zambezi River was a big physical obstacle. Here there were geophysical considerations together with settlement patterns across the crossing points to take into consideration. Many interviewees will make mention of DK as a crossing point. Hardly are its merits DK identified to explain why it was such an important crossing point throughout the war period.

Today we shall have a look at two routes, one for unarmed personnel and the other for weapons. We begin with the route used to get weapons across to South Africa via Victoria Falls. Here the train was the mode of transportation. Rhodesia was already well connected in terms of the rail infrastructure. More importantly, however, some undercover personnel had already been infiltrated in order to facilitate the movement of weapons and sometimes personnel too. Some of these people were railway conductors.

Some worked within the railway stations. The route that the weapons followed was the Malvernia route to Mozambique. Arms couriers travelled by train as far as Chiredzi after crossing the Salisbury-Beitbridge Road. Trunks were used to carry the arms and ammunition.
They went, by train, as far as Chikombedzi where they alighted and took their contraband with them. Villagers sympathetic to Zapu in the area were co-opted to ferry the baggage. It was important to have Zapu members in the area if the arrangements were to work smoothly.

Travel was through the bush and white commercial farms where there was limited human traffic. From there, they proceeded to Nyala and onwards to the Gonarezhou Game Reserve. Here there is comparison with the 1967 Luthuli Detachment and the 1968 Pyramid Detachment both of which infiltration routes were worked out to pass through game reserves or national parks.

This was so as to travel through areas with limited human traffic. That was possible if the cadres carried their own food provisions. They then got to a mountain close to Mwenezi Ranch (then known as Nuanetsi). The border with South Africa was close by. The immigration officials, who were mostly Boers, were ready to have their hands oiled. They needed money. Those intending to cross, with the contraband, presented passports with no pages but some Rand instead. The officials pocketed the money and allowed the couriers unfettered entry.

The police too were equally corrupt. They worked in cahoots with the immigration officials and people who were more than willing, at some price of course, to carry the heavy trunks. Once across the border, the people who facilitated crossing had the trunks carried by cars belonging to the Kruger Game Reserve authority. From there the weapons were delivered where they were being awaited by MK cadres who did not cross where the weapons were taken through — on the eastern side of the Beitbridge Border Post.

In all this the key person was Zipha Ncube, a Zapu traditional doctor and nationalist. He served time at Gonakudzingwa. He worked closely with a man from Mutare who too was a keen Zapu supporter. Meanwhile, there was another complementary route. That one extended from the copper-rich Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The transport trucks were ferrying copper to South Africa, more or less as Zilawi Transport does these days.

The route did not have strict border checks before getting to Lobatse in Botswana. However, the people travelling along this route were smart dressed guys who did not carry any weapons on them. Further, the ANC had a community of its own people living in the Lobatsi area on the Botswana side of the border. These were familiar with the route beyond Mafikeng. Once the smart guys were at Lobatse, they were accompanied by the members of the ANC who lived near the border with South Africa.

They travelled through expansive farms with maize fields starting in Botswana and extending to South Africa. Sometimes they roasted green mealies along the journey. Their destination was Mafikeng in Bophuthatswana where Chief Mangope was leader where they were going to wait for the train from Cape Town en route to Johannesburg. They boarded the train on their way to Park Station in the City of Gold.

In Johannesburg there was a group of Zimbabweans mostly from Kezi, Tsholotsho, Beitbridge and Plumtree. The group liaised with the ANC and it was an enduring relationship dating back several years. The Internal Settlement of 1978 was reached between Bishop Abel Muzorewa and other parties including the Rhodesian Front (RF). Some of the men in the group were Peter Makwala Ngwenya, Totshana Ncube, Ross Moyo Ndwangu and Dolphus Ncube, among several others.

Tragedy struck when the Internal Settlement was created in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The activists in Johannesburg were rounded up and their fate has not been established to this day. It can only be suspected that they were killed by the Muzorewa regime working in cahoots with the settler regime. As may have become apparent, there were efforts to scuttle the struggle for independence by creating pseudo political arrangements all in a desperate effort to delay or curtail genuine independence.