Online Reporter
Business Reporter
AFRICAN economies face mounting pressure from rising energy costs, shipping disruptions and tighter financial conditions following the United States-Israel war of aggression on Iran, according to a new report from the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank).
The document says the crisis, which began on February 28, 2026 after coordinated strikes on Tehran by US and Israeli forces, might potentially affect African countries through energy price shocks, shipping rerouting through the Red Sea-Suez system, war-risk insurance surcharges and tighter global financial conditions.
However, it concludes that under most plausible scenarios, the economic and financial implications for Africa are likely to remain contained.
“Africa’s exposure is mediated through global commodity and logistics systems, and while these channels can generate temporary macroeconomic pressures, they do not fundamentally alter the continent’s medium-term growth trajectory,” the authors say.
The research emphasises that the latest episode reinforces the policy rationale for diversifying trade routes, expanding refining capacity, deepening regional logistics networks and strengthening financial institutions that can stabilise trade flows during external shocks.
While Africa’s direct trade exposure to Iran remains limited, the report cautions that the continent is highly sensitive to disruptions in energy markets and maritime logistics.
The Middle East is Africa’s third most important import market, accounting for approximately 11,2 percent of imports, worth about US$82,4 billion in 2024, with a heavy bias towards energy products.
According to the report, the crisis has converged around two critical transit routes.
The Strait of Hormuz — through which an estimated 20 million barrels of oil flowed daily in 2024, equivalent to roughly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption — is now at risk of disruption.
Further, the Red Sea-Suez corridor remains severely compromised.
London’s marine market has expanded its listed “high-risk” areas to include waters around Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, with Gulf war-risk premiums rising approximately fivefold within a week.
Major carriers including Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd have reportedly paused Trans-Suez sailings and are rerouting around Southern Africa, while applying conflict surcharges on Middle East-linked routes.
Even before the latest conflict, the Red Sea crisis had already forced widespread rerouting.
By June 2024, ship tonnage arriving at the Gulf of Aden had dropped by 76 percent, while traffic through the Suez Canal was down by 70 percent, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
Arrivals at the Cape of Good Hope increased by 89 percent over the same period.
Afreximbank’s analysis sets out three possible trajectories.
The most likely outcome, assigned a 50 percent probability, is a “managed disruption” in which the Strait of Hormuz continues to operate despite heightened risks, producing moderate and manageable inflationary pressure across Africa.
A “moderate escalation” scenario, with a 35 percent probability, assumes shipping companies maintain Cape of Good Hope rerouting, adding roughly 10 days to Asia-Europe voyages and incurring incremental costs of approximately US$272 per forty-foot equivalent unit.
This would translate into stronger imported inflation, tighter monetary policy and greater fiscal pressure on governments that subsidise fuel.
The most severe scenario, assigned a 15 percent probability, envisages effective disruption of the Strait of Hormuz.
Supply losses could reach 3,3 million barrels per day by the eighth day, potentially rising to 4,7 million barrels per day by day 18, with liquefied natural gas flows also affected.
This would trigger sharp inflation shocks, foreign exchange drawdowns and wider sovereign spreads across the continent.
The report notes that net oil-importing economies face the most immediate macroeconomic pressures, with rising fuel import bills, inflation and widening current account deficits.
Countries that maintain fuel subsidies face rising fiscal costs as governments absorb part of the price increase.
Egypt is identified as particularly exposed, given its dependence on Suez Canal revenues, which fell sharply to approximately US$4 billion in 2024 from roughly US$10,25 billion in 2023 — alongside high fuel import sensitivity.
Kenya, Morocco and Ethiopia are also listed as highly vulnerable due to their reliance on imported fuel and the Red Sea-Suez routing.
Even smaller economies face disproportionate risks.
The report estimates that approximately 33,9 percent of Sudan’s trade volume and about 30,5 percent of Djibouti’s trade volume passes through the Suez Canal corridor, leaving both countries exceptionally exposed to any disruption.
The financial sector is experiencing the shock through second-round transmission, the report warns.
