Africa’s future hinges on balanced funding

Tedious Ncube, [email protected]

In development policy, Africa sits in a strange contradiction. There is money flowing in, a lot of it in fact, but the way it is structured does not seem to match the scale of the problems on the ground.

On average, Africa receives over US$50 billion a year in official development assistance, according to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data. In 2022 alone, total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Africa was estimated at around US$62 billion, with significant portions directed towards health, humanitarian aid, governance, and civil society programming. A large share of this goes into non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working across human rights, governance, health, education, and community development.

These organisations are important. In many cases they are the ones documenting abuses, filling service gaps, and responding where the state or market is weak.

But there is a deeper question that is often avoided. What happens after the funding cycle ends?
Most NGO programmes run on two to five-year funding cycles.

They are designed around projects, targets, and outputs. A workshop here, a training programme there, a reporting mechanism somewhere else. When funding stops, the structure that held everything together often weakens or disappears completely. What remains is awareness, documentation, sometimes improved knowledge, but rarely a self-sustaining system.

At the same time, Africa is sitting on a much bigger problem that is not being matched by the type of capital being deployed.

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) estimates that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Africa face a financing gap of over US$330 billion annually. That is capital needed for businesses that could actually create jobs, build infrastructure, improve services, and solve many of the same issues NGOs are trying to address from another angle. In addition, Africa’s annual infrastructure financing gap is estimated at between US$130 billion and US$170 billion per year, depending on sector classification and methodology.

So, on one side, you have tens of billions going into NGO systems every year. On the other side, you have hundreds of billions missing from the productive economy.

That gap matters.

NGOs mainly operate in what you can call a consumption model of development. Money goes in, activities happen, outputs are delivered, and then the cycle resets when the next grant comes. There is impact, but it is often not compounding.

Start-ups and enterprises work differently. They operate on a survival logic. If they do not solve a real problem in a way that people are willing to pay for, they do not last. But if they do, they scale. They hire people, reinvest profits, expand markets, and gradually become part of the economic structure.

That difference between funding a cycle and funding a system is the real issue.

We already see what happens when capital is aligned with systems instead of projects. Mobile money is one example. In Kenya, M-Pesa scaled financial inclusion from below 30 percent in the early 2000s to over 80 percent within a decade according to the World Bank Global Findex Database. Today, it processes over 20 billion transactions annually across multiple markets. That was not achieved through workshops or short term programmes. It was achieved through a functioning business model that solved a real transaction problem at scale.

The same pattern shows up in pay-as-you-go solar companies that have reached over 10 million households across Africa, and in agri-tech platforms that connect hundreds of thousands of farmers directly to buyers, improving incomes by reducing intermediary losses that can reach 20 to 40 percent of farm gate value in fragmented markets.

These are not aid outcomes. They are market outcomes.

The uncomfortable truth is that many of the problems NGOs are working on sit on top of economic systems that are weak or incomplete. If people do not have income, access to markets, or productive opportunities, then rights awareness, training programmes, and community interventions have limited long term effect. They help, but they do not structurally change the situation.

This is why the mismatch matters.

We are heavily funding systems that help people cope with constraints, but underfunding systems that remove those constraints.

Even venture capital, which is supposed to be the bridge into productive enterprise, is still small in Africa. According to the African Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (AVCA), Africa attracted around US$5,2 billion in venture capital in 2022, down from earlier peaks closer to US$7 billion, representing less than two percent of global venture capital flows (over US$600 billion globally). Meanwhile, development and NGO funding is many times larger, but not always directed towards assets that generate returns or scale independently.

So, what we end up with is two parallel systems.
One system is strong in delivery but weak in sustainability. The other is strong in sustainability but starved of capital.

This is where the real policy question sits.
If even a small portion of annual aid, say 10 percent of the roughly US$50 to US$60 billion in Official Development Assistance (ODA), was redirected into structured start-up investment, that would unlock over US$5 to US$6 billion a year in productive capital. At start-up, funding sizes between US$500,000 and US$5 million, that is thousands of businesses that could be financed every year across different sectors.

That changes the base of the economy, not just the surface of it.

To ground this in real country dynamics, the pattern becomes even clearer.

In Zimbabwe, total development assistance has at times ranged between US$1,5 billion and US$2,5 billion annually according to OECD data, with a significant share channelled through NGO-led programming in health, humanitarian support and governance. At the same time, formal small and medium enterprise (SME) lending is estimated to be below 15 to 20 percent of total banking sector credit according to Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe reports, reflecting a structural constraint in productive financing relative to social programming inflows.

In Nigeria, development assistance and NGO programming combined have consistently exceeded US$5 billion annually in certain years according to World Bank and OECD datasets, particularly during health and humanitarian peaks. Yet Nigeria’s Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) financing gap is estimated at over US$300 billion, with over US$40 million micro and small enterprises facing limited access to affordable credit, according to

International Finance Corporation assessments and development finance studies.

In Ethiopia, donor inflows have historically ranged between US$4 and US$6 billion annually, heavily focused on food security, rural development, and social protection programmes delivered through NGOs and multilateral channels. Despite this, private sector credit to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) remains below 20 percent, reflecting constrained financial intermediation and limited expansion of scalable private enterprise.

In South Africa, while aid dependency is lower in macro terms, development and philanthropic funding still channel hundreds of millions of USD annually into NGO ecosystems focused on inequality, education, and community development. At the same time, South African Reserve Bank data and development studies indicate that small business failure rates remain high, with estimates suggesting up to 70 percent of small enterprises failing within three to five years, often linked not to demand but to financing and scale constraints.

Across these four contexts, the pattern is consistent. Programmatic funding is relatively stable and well-structured. Productive capital remains fragmented and insufficient.

This is not an argument against NGOs. There are spaces where they are absolutely necessary, especially in emergencies, human rights protection, and areas where markets simply cannot operate.

But the imbalance is what needs attention.

Right now, we are over-investing in systems that manage problems and under-investing in systems that solve them structurally. We are funding awareness more than we are funding agency. We are funding intervention more than we are funding production.

And over time, that creates a cycle where the same problems keep reappearing in different forms, even as billions continue to be spent on them.

The real shift needed is not just more money. It is a different way of thinking about where money goes.
From programmes to platforms.

From cycles to systems.

From dependency to production.

Until that shift happens, Africa will continue to look like a place that is constantly being helped, but not fully enabled to build.

l Tedious Teddy Ncube is an entrepreneur and academic.

Related Posts

Government pledges long-term support for returning Zimbabweans

Sikhumbuzo Moyo [email protected] THE Minister of State for Bulawayo Provincial Affairs and Devolution, Judith Ncube, has assured Zimbabweans returning from South Africa that Government will continue supporting them beyond their…

Police release picture of Zim mom and daughters found dead in UK – as father ‘on the run’

Police in the United Kingdom have released images of a mother and her two daughters who were found dead at their home in Bedfordshire, as investigations into the tragedy continue.…

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

×