Chronicle Editor
Pathisa Nyathi
THAT the death of ZPRA Commander Rodgers Alfred Nikita Mangena was shrouded in and fraught with controversy is never in doubt. There are many reasons for that. Conspiracy theories abounded, from the death of ZPRA Commander-in-Chief JZ Moyo to the disgruntlements of some ZPRA cadres who were of the opinion they were not well equipped with arms to fight the war. It was an inside job, alleged others. The war effort was ramping and was having some negative impact on Rhodesia’s fledgling economy and morale. The sanctions were biting and the pariah state was not receiving recognition from the international community. Many Rhodesians, both black and white were dying in the war while many others were maimed. The war engulfed the entire territory, including the urban areas where ZPRA waged guerrilla warfare.
At the same time, cold war considerations were coming to bear. Economic interests were at stake. The armed wing of Zapu, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) had embraced Marxist-Leninist political ideology which was encapsulated in the booklet titled “Zapu’s Ideological Concept and Political Program.” It was a blatant and brazen manifestation of Zapu/ZPRA’s proximity to the mortally dreaded Communist Bloc. It was something most unpalatable to the Nato countries. Whereas Nato did not provide Zapu with arms of war, it did collaborate with the Rhodesians when it came to intelligence sharing. They were an interested party in the type of settlement that would emerge in Rhodesia.
The one question that we might pose relates to the political and military conditions that allowed the conspiracy theories to flourish with abandon. Some of the conditions were created within the cold war context.
The West by and large operates African desks whose mandate is to study the political infrastructure and leanings of African leaders and their countries. This is done with a view to identifying fissures and faults within the body politics of these countries.
Out of that intelligence intervention strategies are crafted that seek to keep the countries on track and eliminate elements that are seen to be spoilers for the chosen paths. The strategies work in such a way that the perpetrators are not suspect but all is blamed on internal, ethnic and ideological divisions.
The strategies facilitate and foment political divisions, tensions and animosities which allow their interests to flourish and hold sway. In the context of Zapu, divisions were created between the released nationalists and guerrillas with different ideological standpoints and persuasions with regard to the East and West. The nationalists never at any time embraced Leninism-Marxism.
Within the army itself fissures developed. Some ZPRA cadres felt they were not adequately armed to stand up to the Rhodesians with their superior fire power. Cases abound among which were Mafutha and his group and Chirunda who went as far as Lusaka to present his disgruntlement. At the time of ceasefire when cadres were going into assembly points there were some at Tsholotsho that had to be rounded up by their own comrades led by Mike Reynolds (Charles Grey). Some guerrillas left the theatre of war in Rhodesia and went straight to Botswana before undertaking return journeys to Zambia. Some became loose cannons within Rhodesia, taking no instructions from the High Command. Such cases, when apprehended were punished severely by Commander Mangena, a move that did not endear him to such comrades.
The net result was the creation of divisions within the army itself. In a situation like that the tendency was strong for the nationalists and disgruntled guerrillas to move towards each other and strike common ground. The first attempt in 1978 on Mangena’s life took place against that background. As pointed out Edward Ndlovu berated those who took no steps to apprehended the culprits who, in his opinion were well known.
The large populations in refugee camps were interested political parties when it came to matters of how the liberation struggle was being prosecuted. For many the nationalists back in Rhodesia were the sources of attraction and inspiration and admired them immensely. Now the nationalists were in Zambia.
Where they saw the existence of rifts and tensions it was pretty clear which side they sympathised with. What all this translated to was the weaker position in which Mangena and some of his commanders found themselves. Quite obviously the Rhodesians were not on their side, nor were all the nationalists.
The vast majority of the refugee population was not on their side, particularly after the arrival of the nationalists in Lusaka. Mangena was not particularly tolerant of nationalists’ interference in the execution of the armed liberation struggle. His view was that the army should be left alone to do that the best way they knew how. A case is cited when Chief Enock Tshangane (Jevan Maseko) remonstrated following Secretary General Joseph Wilfred Msika demanded some military briefing on the prosecution of the war from Chief of Operations, Enock Tshangane.
The Shona-speaking component within the nationalists was not particularly amused with the ethnic composition of ZPRA at the command level. Their expectation was that the ethnic composition at Zapu’s National Executive Committee level ought to be mirrored at the ZPRA command level and, it was not. All that created some tensions within the army.
What was not in doubt were the very cordial relations between both JZ Moyo and Mangena with the Soviets. When JZ Moyo was killed by a parcel bomb at the beginning of 1977, Mangena was at the Soviet embassy in Lusaka. After being alerted of the death of JZ Moyo he moved from the Soviet embassy to the Zapu offices where Moyo met his death. That did not endear him to some quarters of Zapu. This is the scenario and background prevailing at the time of Mangena’s death. It would be naïve to say he was not aware of the current political matrix. Be that as it may, there does seem to be some unanimity in terms of events that took place before Mangena breathed his last. He is said to have uttered the words, “Kanti ngifelani?”
The statement is packed with meaning? It is indicative of one who was faced with a desperate situation, a situation where he was not being appreciated for what he was doing. He was facing condemnation from some quarters within the party. It was some painful lament by one who was strongly maligned, one who was perceived as a hurdle and obstacle to certain desired designs and interests. Otherwise Mangena would have known he was dying in the hands of the enemy he had willingly sought to dislodge from power. It is patently clear he was not referring to that enemy in the statement attributed to him. He would have known too that the demise of JZ Moyo left him vulnerable and isolated to a fast-changing political climate, both within the party, in the region, particularly with regard to South Africa and also at the international level.
Given such a complex and confusing political scenario, his death was bound to be attended by numerous conspiracy theories and jubilation from ill-informed, well informed and non-informed quarters alike. Indeed, at the Victory Camp (VC), when Elliot Masengo (Harold Chirenda) went to announce the death of the ZPRA Commander there were hardly disguised animated scenes of jubilation. As promised in the last article, today we give some variances in the narratives rendered in Mangena’s biography and in the Gedi Document. We may remind the readers that the rebuttal document was written by former three high ranking ZPRA commanders, Gedi Dube, Eddie Sigoge and Jack Mpofu (Makhetho Ndebele). Only Jack Mpofu survives. Sigoge did not sign the document though his name appears on it.
Before we deal with varying accounts it is important to identify commonalities. The group which was ambushed while crossing some stream was led by Asaf. These were cadres from Angola who were being deployed to the front, in Rhodesia. There was heavy presence of Rhodesians in the area of ambush who placed landmines in the area as they suspected there would be follow-ups by the ZPRA commanders keen to see what had happened. In fact, a story is told of one white Rhodesian soldier who when he was shot by ZPRA combatants, the claymore mines he carried on him exploded and shredded his body. Asaf was identified through a wrist watch which had been appropriated during a raid in Kamativi.
The site of ambush was beyond Kabanga Mission. The Rhodesians had been seen moving about in the area where the ambush was laid. Joseph Dube who was in the area got onto a Zambian bus to forestall the Asaf-led ZPRA unit from proceeding on their fateful mission.
From the bus he was travelling in he did see the unit proceed to their fate.
Mangena abandoned his land rover at the rear base and proceeded to the site of ambush on foot. Burials were conducted before they started on the return journey. Mangena got tired from the leg injury he had sustained earlier in March when he was ambushed and shot at while travelling to Freedom Camp.
Accordingly, Mangena radioed that the Land Rover come to pick him up as they were returning to Lusaka.
There were three land rovers with Mangena’s taking front position. His Land Rover was beginning to pick up speed when it detonated a landmine. Other senior ZPRA cadres were moving towards the two other Land Rovers to board. At this juncture we may identify areas of departure. In Mangena’s biography there is reference to the fact that when the landmine explosion took place the ZPRA cadres who were around probably giving cover to the Commander panicked and started firing.
It was during that panic firing that one of the signatories of the Gedi Document, Jack Mpofu, sustained injury to his leg and walks with a limp. The Gedi Document makes no reference to the firing that ensued following the landmine explosion.
According to the Gedi Document Mangena’s death was immediate. Besides there is no mention of his “Kanti ngifelani?” lament.
Readers are at liberty to read the two versions of Mangena’s death. There are other versions that differ, albeit to no substantial measure between the two. It is up to the readers to analyze and interpret the various versions and arrive at conclusion, one way or the other. Subsequent articles will focus at instances of tensions within the liberation movements and within Zapu itself. Such identification may hopefully, unpack areas of tension and isolate the causative factors which stand in the way of genuine national unity and social cohesion for sustainable development in Zimbabwe. Players in the political arena may find snippets from which to draw upon formulae and strategies to implement for the good of the motherland.
Online Reporter