Constituency Development Fund: No standard community devolution

Constituency Development Fund is a monumental pro-poor policy innovation.
It is targeted at community development, participation, capacitation and empowerment. It is one of the most progressive proposals to come out of the fiscus in recent times.
The fund entails decentralisation of resource allocation where the community representative – in this case a Member of Parliament – is given the responsibility to distribute resources to the community.
Decentralisation is relative but its common meaning in terms of allocation of power, authority and responsibility for fiscus varies along a continuum.
At the end the centre (in this case the fiscus authorities) maintains strong control with limited power and discretion at lower levels (deconcentration) to progressive decreasing control and increasing local (community) discretion at lower levels (devolution).
This is the same model applied to local governments.
But what the CDF is intended to achieve is even lower and, if well-articulated, can be effective in poverty reduction.
The fund is insightful and has impact on grassroots development and engagement by delegating fiscus authority and power to the MPs. The fund has skipped national and local government bureaucracies. And it is believed by all progressive minds that given space and well-meaning community engagement it will achieve allocation efficiency and speed implementation of projects that improve grassroots wealth acquisition and creation capabilities.
Up to this moment, there is every reason to give the fiscus a deserved pat on the back.
The critical fault of the CDF deployment is evident on the non-availability of a standard interface between the MP and the community.
I am comfortable with the objects of the CDF. But what is intolerable is the overtly or implicitly unilateral and absolute custodial and allocative powers conferred to the MPs.
I am talking about liquid financial resources whose sight tempts all, especially those who represent weaker and disoriented communities, which is indeed a replica of the greater part of our society.
There is an open fissure of misuse, misallocation, weak accountability and transparency. The major building block of all public policy is premised on strong structures of accountability.
It is important to build and institutionalise a culture of accountability in all Government programmes – new and old.
It is not enough for the fiscus authorities to only maintain control at the top without designing new mechanisms that ensure that that notorious secretive Comptroller’s office that sanctioned the depletion and misuse of public resources.
This is through inaction, weak or non-available oversight of parastatals and Government ministries is capable of enforcing budget execution alignment of remote community programmes.
I have nothing against a performing Comptroller’s Office as its appointment to oversee the CDF is procedural but I have grown to know our auditor-general to sit in when required most and sweep facts under the carpet when it matters most.
The fiscus has failed dismally to elaborate on how the Comptroller will apply the overseer role at national level and, most importantly, how devolution at community level is going to be attained.
There is completely no community devolution of power and accountability driven from the fiscus for them to take charge of their funds.
Some communities maybe totally unaware of the fund and it is true that our country has a weak sporadic civil society.
There are certain social groups that have been marginalised for such a very long time they are unable to engage in effective collective action.
Such communities are likely to be circumscribed and fragile and at the mercy of their government representatives.
I proffer a proposal what I think can enhance such communities’ participation and align the execution of the CDF with both national and community interests going forward.
Uniform Qualified Citizen Committee
The fiscus should have required and prescribed a standard transparent community organisation before disbursement of funds to set a national norm that institutionalises the deployment of the fund and promote full community accountability and participation.
The fiscus should have required each constituency to come up with a citizen committee with certain qualifications and experience that will have all rights to safeguard, control and oversee the fund.
The community committee should be empowered to report back to the Comptroller through the MP. The committee is also handy to busy MPs and is most likely going to be aligned to the aspirations of the community.
The fund is likely to be a common and permanent feature of the national budget because of its importance.
It is thus likely to grow as the national cake grows. It is therefore important that oversight is so strengthened at both national and community levels that we set critical tenets for a uniform competitive deployment and application of funds capable of delivering commercial villages, wealth creation, technical and leadership capacitation as well as employment creation.
Bottom-Up Project Prioritisation
Provision of funds should be top-down while the prioritisation of community projects must be bottom-up.
Communities should have the prerogative to debate, decide and prioritise projects they want undertaken because they are the ones who better understand their problems and challenges.
It is critically important that whatever development and investment is to happen in the constituencies has full support and interest of the community.
No substitution of Poor Local Government Service Delivery
The fund should never end up substituting lack of local government resources or willingness to fund service provision.
There are unemployed educated youth who are interested in income generating projects in their constituents and such projects as building bridges will not in any way be in their interest and impedes the ability of the fund to snowball further community wealth acquisition and creation. Bridges should be left to local councils while the CDF zoom on income generating projects that alleviate poverty reduction.
Incentivise Performance
Once there is a standard local accountability of funds, the government can provide incentives and sanctions that encourage MPs to be responsive and accountable to local needs and preferences.
These are particularly those needs and preferences that serve to accomplish delivery of national socio-economic goals, such as poverty reduction and pro-poor service delivery.
Decentralisation Laws, Institutions and Procedures
In this country decentralisation laws if any, institutions and procedures are incomplete, weakly implemented, creating an institutional “limbo” where the fund will suffer from incoherent implementation, hazy accountability and poor performance. We always come up with great ideas but the implementation leaves a lot to be desired.
There is deliberate need to strengthen the deployment of the CDF through national laws, institutions and scrupulous procedures.
Advice to Communities
My advice to those that are informed, want to offer community service without malice and have the potential to enhance the deployment of the fund in their communities is: take action now, knowing that any organism (whether cultural or biological) has to struggle in order to survive.
If it lays back and waits for outside help it stagnates, it weakens and it is easily exploited. I take heed to join my MP envisioning an ideal village.
l Last Mazambani is a Strategy Execution Analyst. He can be contacted on [email protected].