admin
Aubrey Matshiqi and Gareth van Onselen
WHEN the votes are counted, what will become clear is the fact that, once again, the majority of black voters still do not see the Democratic Alliance (DA) as a credible alternative to the African National Congress (ANC). Similarly, the results will show that, for the majority of white voters, the ANC has never been, is not now, and will probably never be, an option. Voting for the ANC is not in their DNA, it is in their DA.
In other words, there will be a greater coincidence between race and voting patterns and, once again, the convergence between black and white voters on the basis of class will not be reflected sufficiently in the outcome of tomorrow’s election.
What will be is the divergence on the basis of race. Therefore, the ANC and the DA will emerge from this election as the champion of the majority of the majority and that of the majority of the minority respectively.
Voters will elect a party if they see themselves reflected in how the party describes the social, economic, political and other realities in the country.
It thus becomes important, for example, how black leaders of the DA sound when they describe the social and economic conditions of the majority of those who constitute the bulk of the support base of the ruling party.
The DA will make inroads into ANC support base though the width of the inroads will not be much bigger than that of footpaths.
However, suggestions that the ANC will fall below 60 percent are nothing but wishful thinking.
One can predict that with a voter turnout of about 75 percent, the ANC will win about 63 percent, or even higher, of the national vote.
If the voter turnout is percentage points higher or more, a two-thirds majority will be within striking range.
The reasons the majority of voters will defy predictions of a significant fall in support for the ANC include the fact that the DA’s campaign has been less exciting, inspiring and convincing than the 2011 local government election campaign.
More important is the fact that the DA campaign was to some extent hampered by internal opposition from those who decided to go public, especially in the media, with criticism of the direction the DA has been taking under the leadership of Helen Zille.
Some have even tried to disguise their discomfort with attempts by the DA to attract black voters by suggesting that the party has deviated from its liberal roots.
Also, Zille’s position as party leader has been undermined by her contribution to the Agang SA fiasco while at policy level, the DA has been compromised by internal differences over issues such as black economic empowerment.
Notwithstanding, they may bag 22 percent of the vote.
For the ANC, the advantage is that its supporters will distinguish between the party and its leader, and their choice in this regard will be reinforced by the state of opposition at a collective and individual party level.
In terms of campaigning, the road has been somewhat disastrous for the ANC.
The party has done everything in its power to make things as difficult as possible for itself and, at the heart of all that messiness, is Jacob Zuma.
In his place the ANC’s top six have dominated headlines, with the likes of Gwede Mantashe leading its campaign on the ground and in the air. They have operated in a hostile environment. Not just because various members of the old school — “free agents” — have had a go at the party, but because it has had to drag Cosatu along, kicking and screaming, the whole way.
The ANC doesn’t do issue-specific campaigns. It has always relied on a staple diet of set-in-stone events around which it structures election messaging: its 8 January statement, the State of the Nation Address and its final Siyanqoba rally, for example.
This year it had the built-in advantage of 20 years of freedom and those Freedom Day events that accompanied it although the party failed to adequately take advantage of these mass events by crafting relevant messages.
ANC’s policy centrepiece, like the Democratic Alliance (DA), concerns jobs and the offer of 6-million “work opportunities”. But it is such a vague, ill-defined and empty proposal that it has failed to ignite the public imagination.
The only thing that worked to the ANC’s advantage on this front was that it was first out of the door with the offer.
The ANC is on the ground and in its rural heartland where campaigning really matters, and on that front it has been everywhere.
The party needs to get all 11.6-million voters who voted for it in 2009 to vote again (if it can grow in absolute terms even by 500,000 votes you can be sure it won’t drop more than 2 percent or 3 percent).
Although the DA has closed the gap on this front, no one can really compete with the ANC’s depth and reach. For all that reach, however, it is fighting much apathy this time round. A visit doesn’t necessarily mean a vote as in days gone by.
This problem has been complicated for the ANC by the advent of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which is able to campaign in exactly the same manner.
The EFF might not have the ANC’s insidious ability to infiltrate every rural village and home, but it is there, a presence, eating away on the fringes. Countering that takes time and energy away from a focus on other things. The continued collapse of the Congress of the People (COPE) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) will help the ANC make up the difference.
On the other hand, this election has been one of the longest for the DA in South Africa’s post-apartheid history, stretching a year back, when it launched its Know Your DA campaign in April 2013.
Since then, it has run a series of messages to try and grow its support, primarily among black voters. They include:
- Know Your DA
- A Black Economic Empowerment Campaign
- A stop E-tolls campaign (which preceded its electioneering but merged with it)
- A “Believe” campaign for Gauteng
- A manifesto centred on the message: “6-million real jobs”
- A response to Nkandla
- An Ayisafani campaign
It is a curious mix of pro-DA-orientated messages and anti-ANC vitriol. Every time a campaign to promote the DA was run, one denigrating the ANC inevitably followed.
As negative campaigning resonates so much more powerfully with the media and voters alike, the consequence of this is that the party’s desired focus on jobs, for example, was heavily diluted by its relentless assault on the majority party in general and Jacob Zuma in particular.
The real effect of the DA’s 2014 campaign can thus be fairly described as a negative one, and it has paid a price for that.
The main price is that it has had to systematically downgrade its objectives.
As a pragmatic indication of the party’s skewed emphasis, consider these two questions: Could the average voters tell you three things about the DA’s 6-million real jobs offer?
Unlikely.
Now, could the same average voter tell you three things about the DA’s position on Nkandla and Jacob Zuma? Several volumes.
This good-cop, bad-cop attitude has been evident on Twitter.
When the DA hasn’t been mounting assaults on the Institute of Race Relations or journalists, it has tried to flood the market with good news about its record in governance.
Following the DA is like following a psychopath; you never quite know if it is going to stroke a cat or bite its head off.
The party has had no end of internal confusions and squabbles along the way: its position on affirmative action and black economic empowerment, a raft of defections, particularly in Gauteng, a dire set of election posters which, when they weren’t pealing were obscure, overly complex and bland, and, ultimately, a failed merger with Agang, which, if anything, cost it some two weeks of on-message communication as the newspapers documented the stunning collapse of the deal on every front page.
That said, there are a number of positives the DA will be able to take out of this campaign.
It is set to grow by possibly more than 1-million votes in absolute terms, and those will largely be new black voters.
That will make it the party with the biggest growth across the board; no mean feat.
There is also every chance it will, post-election, boast more black support than the EFF — that will be a lateral, mind-bending experience for many in the media, who have simply never thought of the DA in those terms.
Finally, the ANC will in all likelihood lose some support and, although not substantial, these two factors will intensify competition in our electoral politics in the long run, which is a good and necessary thing. — Business Day.
Online Reporter