Brigadier-General (Retired) Ambrose Mutinhiri
IT is difficult for me to trace my long interaction with Nikita Mangena as (it covered) most of the time since 1966 till his death.
For me, this will require a whole book just to narrate who Nikita Mangena was, and his guiding philosophies that made Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZPRA) a powerful fortress.
My interaction with Mangena began officially in 1966 when there was already news within the rank and file about his military prowess as a recruit in Algeria. Although he later became my commander, I happened to be his senior as I had trained in 1964 in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). We were the first group of only six recruits with Ackim Ndlovu as our leader.
Other recruits included Robson Manyika, Arthur Nyoni, Elton Mlala and John Moyo. The second group to train in the USSR was led by Walter Mlambo. It had notable people like Report Phelekezela Mphoko.
There is a need to highlight Nikita Mangena’s background so as to characterise the interaction I had with him during the liberation struggle. Mangena had gone to further his studies in Chingola High School in Zambia after it is alleged he was expelled from Chegato Mission in Mberengwa (formerly known as Belingwe). His major problem he had created with the school authorities was that of being politically active which was considered a crime.
It is for this reason that one must understand the character of Mangena from a vantage point that he became politically conscious long before he joined the armed struggle.

Where was Mangena and how did he join the liberation struggle in those years? In the year 1966, Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) sent two groups to Algeria for military training. Mangena was among the first group of 90 recruits to receive Algerian military training. He had gone with cadres like John Dube, Naison Khezwana, Gordon Munyanyi and Phineas Majuru. The second group had cadres like Moffat Hadebe.
Mangena distinguished himself and became the best recruit in his cohort at the military academy where other recruits were from other liberation movements. During the pass-out parade or what you would call a graduation in civilian lingo, it is alleged that the then Algerian President, Houari Boumediene had to remove his watch and give it to Mangena as a present or award.
This was a gesture to show that Mangena had distinguished himself and surpassed everyone in his group. When Mangena came back from training in Algeria, he was sent to Kongwa Camp in Tanzania. Kongwa was a camp that accommodated liberation movements in Africa and Zapu happened to be there.
At Kongwa, I happened to be the Chief of Staff deputizing the late Albert Nxele who was the then Camp Commander. At that time, I learned three things about Mangena. Firstly, he was a time-conscious person. Each time he would be among the first section commanders to execute a given assignment. Nxele always used him as an example that he was a clear-cut cadre. Secondly, Mangena was very thorough. He would pay attention to every detail and interrogate a problem before coming up with a decision. He dissociated himself from cadres who used to drink beer and smoke during the discharge of their duties in the camp.
Mangena was not that type who would drink or smoke, I never saw him engaging in that till his death. This shows how he was very strict, upright, and focused. Even in the way he spoke and confronted issues, he exhibited intelligence and understanding. Tell you what, even as his superior, I admired his military rigour and vigour!

In 1967, Zapu moved its cadres from Kongwa Camp and opened a new camp at Morogoro. Morogoro Camp had been given to Zapu through the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Remember that Zapu belonged to the authentic six and hence it was mandatory to work with OAU and other liberation movements. At Morogoro Camp, as we moved from Kongwa Camp, I became Chief Instructor to a group of 200 recruits. Among the recruits we trained notable people like now Honourable Obert Moses Mpofu, the late General Solomon Mujuru (Rex Nhongo), among others. It is not a secret that Mujuru was a Zapu cadre before he joined the Zimbabwe African National Union (Zanu). As I was the Chief Instructor, Mangena became an instructor specialising in combat tactics and military engineering. Ironically and the most unfortunate part is the fact that the things he specialized in, especially issues of landmines and explosives, are the same things that caused his death as he was killed by a landmine that his vehicle detonated.
There happened to be a crisis which was known as the Chikerema Crisis on how the struggle should move forward. Remember, some of the Zapu leaders were still incarcerated. The crisis saw the exodus of James Chikerema and other Zapu members from the party and joining the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZ). Later, the struggle was reviewed. A new command structure was put forward and Mangena was appointed as the commander of the newly formed ZPRA with the rank of Chief of Staff.
However, Mangena assumed the position of a full commander shortly after the fall of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA). That is when a new ZPRA structure came into effect with Mangena as the Commander and me as the Chief of Staff. I then served ZPRA as the Chief of Staff to Nikita Mangena.
He was a pleasure to work with. A fluent someone in both IsiNdebele and ChiShona languages who would accommodate every cadre. There were moments when even cadres got confused about the origins and identity of Mangena as he was very fluent and accurate in all those languages.
One interesting thing is that when I joined the war, I did not know how to use IsiNdebele. With time I had learnt how to speak the language with other comrades. With Mangena he used all those languages when we were talking to each other, and I got to learn IsiNdebele.
During this period as the commander, he emphasised that the primary focus was to equip the cadres with resources and training so that the armed struggle moved forward. That was emphasised by his motto of saying: “Everything for the front”. Often than not, cadres who lost their weapons or became mischievous were punished. In all those punishments and discipline procedures Mangena wanted reports of such deeds to be documented and followed-up. He was one person who would not understand who brought up excuses after failing to deliver while on an assignment. In fact, he would be very cross. It was better for one to make it clear from the onset that the task at hand needed more time or reinforcement long before accepting it. He was a practical commander who really understood the art of war and the context of the liberation struggle.
The joint military command of the Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) was to bring together ZPRA and ZANLA as recommended by regional leaders. A command structure was drawn up. I became the Chief of Training and Mangena the Political Commissar.
It was not as easy as anyone would think. We all had a torrid time trying to make the training kick off. There was a great appetite from Samora Machel to have the military take over the leadership of the nationalist leadership as he had done in Mozambique. Being a contemporary of Machel, Mangena refused to such in his presence. He told Machel that the military leaders of ZPRA were not prepared to take over as they were loyal and answerable to the ZAPU leadership who were incarcerated.
This shows that Mangena was very loyal and principled. He never haboured any ideas to assume more power without the leadership of the party.
Training in ZIPA was delayed and did not take off as anticipated. Perhaps it ought to be mentioned what delayed the whole process. I was the Chief of Training and deputized by Parker Chipoyera from ZANLA. The best practice was for me and Chipoyera to agree on the training programme and recommend to the superiors for approval. I requested the proposal from Chipoyera as ours was now ready.
Chipoyera kept on responding using the same answer that: “Ambrose, I will give you.” Imagine recruits were now at Mgagao and others elsewhere while no programme had been finalised. I kept nudging Chipoyera and he giving me the same response. I then escalated the case with Mangena and
his response was: “What do you think we (should) do?” I said we needed to continue with the training programme. What I liked about Mangena was the fact that he was a man after asking for your input would not let you down in all that you would have agreed on.
Later Chipoyera looked at our programme and responded that it was more of a regular army training as opposed to the guerilla type of training. There was nothing regular about our programme, the regular training was considered at a later stage. What made it worse was that some of the ZANLA senior instructors that included the now late Chief Air Marshal (Rtd) Perrance Shiri and General (Rtd) Constantino Guvheya Nyikadzino Chiwenga were still at Mgagao before the finalisation of the programme.

One morning at Morogoro I woke up and addressed the recruits. I knew if I had briefed Mangena, I would have had his backing. The recruits were around 1 000. We started the training and by lunch-time the number had decreased from 1 000 to 600. The following day the number decreased from 600 to 300. I was determined to train even five people. ZANLA instructors only came later.
On the other hand, Mangena had begun the process of withdrawing ZPRA cadres from Mozambique, citing that the joint training programme had failed. It took a brave cadre like Mangena to do that as withdrawing troops from Mozambique was only possible via Rhodesia and he was successful in doing that. ZIPA was short-lived and ZPRA under Mangena continued with its training. It was Mangena who took a bold decision to withdraw the troops. What a leader we had!
ZPRA prioritised military training in such a way that in every command element meeting, a training programme was featured. The policy of training was to have an all-round cadre who was to be a survivor in every terrain. The idea was to have a cadre who could fight alone using weapons at his or her disposal. Mangena was very clear that guerrilla warfare was a strategy and tactic that would be fulfilled by a military-trained someone. It was not just anyone who could do it. We used to say one philosophy of training the guerrilla cadre was to make it known that the strategy was to bring the enemy to your level, hit them hard and displace them. This was the guiding philosophy.
Brig-Gen (Rtd) Mutinhiri served as ZPRA Chief of Staff during the armed struggle and is currently Zimbabwe’s Ambassador to Russia.
This article was extracted from a book titled: Alfred Nikita Mangena: Oral Histories of the First ZPRA Commander edited by historian Methembe Hillary Hadebe. Besides Ambassador Mutinhiri other tributes are from former Vice-President Phelekezela Report Mphoko, late Cabinet Minister Dumiso Dabengwa, field commanders Moffat Hadebe, Lt-Col (Rtd) Stanford Moyo, senior commanders Abel Mazinyane, Marshal Mpofu, Mangena’s wife, Mrs Sikhubekiso Mandeya-Mangena etc.
To be continued next week




