Guerrilla-trained cadres and their combat tactics

Pathisa Nyathi
THE import of this article, the second after last week’s, is a comparison between guerrilla-trained ZPRA cadres and those who underwent regular training. Those familiar with ZPRA history will know that critical mass in terms of recruits that availed themselves for training was reached in 1977.

From then onwards, thousands were annually being ferried to Boma and Luso in Angola for regular army training. Some more did similar training at Mulungushi and Kohima. The latter was for officer cadets. Guerrillas pioneered the armed struggle from the days of sabotage to the period when trained regular army units were being infiltrated to buttress the guerrillas in the operational areas inside Rhodesia. There were fundamental differences in approach between the two and, as was observed in last week’s article, those differences translated to tensions and failure to read from the same hymn book in the way the struggle was being prosecuted. Why were there differences in the two warfares?

This second article will concentrate on the combat tactics used by guerrillas, which combat tactics set them apart from their regular-trained counterparts. Combat tactics were part of the curriculum for guerrilla training. In addition to combat tactics, there were other subject areas such as political education which was the preserve of the commissariat department, military intelligence, reconnaissance, topography, armed and unarmed combat, medicine (including first aid), which was in the hands of medics as they were called, physical training and military engineering.

Military instructors at the various military training camps were responsible for the teaching of various subjects. For example, at Morogoro in Tanzania, there were a number of instructors at different times including Lameck Mafela (Lookout Masuku), Nikita Mangena, Sam Mfakazi Moyo (who was Camp Commander), Andrew Mafu, Naison Khezwana, Eddie Sigoge, inter alia.

Guerrilla combat tactics were informed by the very nature of a guerrilla warfare. The Chambers Twentieth Century dictionary defines guerrilla as “harassing an army by small bands”, “petty warfare”; one who takes part in such a warfare.”

It was the nature of a guerrilla warfare that dictated combat tactics that were applied. The very first consideration is that guerrillas were armed politicians first and foremost. They voluntarily took up arms out of some political consciousness and thus sought to bring about desire political change. Political awareness was thus the first source of motivation and drive behind political action in pursuit of clearly identified ideology or political philosophy.

The size of a guerrilla army as indicated in the definition cited above, was important — small. That alone was a pointer to the warfare that would be chosen and prosecuted. Small bands were there to harass an army by their very chosen combat tactics which centred around sabotage. Emphasis was on “kill, wound and withdraw.”

The strategic withdrawal was again as a result of the characteristics of a guerrilla warfare. The arms that guerrillas carried were small, ranging from AK-47, AKM, Simonov, RPD, hand grenades, bazookas, grenade launchers to landmines. These were the sort of weapons that allowed for ease of mobility in the hit and run manner of guerrilla tactics.

One cannot talk of a Grad P or B10 when referring to guerrilla weapons. Possession of SAM 7 missiles by ZPRA guerrillas is something unique, a phenomenon best understood in the geo-political situation and circumstances of Rhodesia in relation to Southern Africa. Political education was a critical component on the curriculum of guerrilla training. Those who went to Nampundwe Transit Camp will almost always make mention of Enos Malandu who taught them political education. Recruits arriving at Nampundwe needed grounding in why they had decided to go to war. Why was it necessary to go to war.

That provided them with the necessary conviction, dedication, resilience and commitment to soldier on even when the going got tough. Political education and identified political ideology formed the basis and raison d’ etre for the struggle. In that context, guerrillas were not alone. Their existence depended on the support of peasants, the villagers in their operational areas in the front. There was that important fish-water relationship. Guerrillas were the fish while civilians were the water, the source of life for guerrillas.

Indeed guerrillas advised villagers on their two important tools and obligations: the sourcing of information concerning movement of enemy forces and their agents to guerrillas. Secondly, the villagers needed to be committed to provide food to guerrillas. Both these were not necessary to a conventional or regular army operative.

Guerrillas were not rooted to some garrison of sorts. They operated in small bands from the bush. Combat tactics and villagers were the source of their survival and first line of defence. For them, while their thrust was to kill or wound the enemy and disrupt services and infrastructure, they were committed to their own survival.

Withdrawal was critically important for guerrillas. They resorted to lightning attacks on the enemy, especially when the latter was lax. Hardly would they go for assault where they sought to get inside the garrison or camp. There was time when guerrillas operating in Gokwe stormed a police station.

That was occasioned by the fact that their issue of military boots was depleted after a long journey lasting months travelling from Zambia to Gokwe. The police station was assaulted and military boots taken. Another group went to the stores to take food provisions, in particular tinned food stuffs.

Quick withdrawal was because enemy reinforcements were quick in coming. Dakota planes, spotter planes and helicopters arrived within a short space of time to reinforce their colleagues who would have been attacked. Guerrillas do not operate a fleet of trucks to use to get away swiftly. They rely on foot power. There are no support trucks with first aid kits. There are no infinite stores of food supplies once they are cut off from peasants supply routes. Indeed, the Rhodesians did sometimes cut off supplies from villagers.

The situation got desperate and dire. There were instances in Binga when guerrillas were starved for prolonged periods and began resorting to eating green mealies and afterwards drinking water. When sources of water were cut off, the situation got so dire guerrillas resorted to drinking their own urine.

These were operational circumstances that faced guerrillas and forced them to adopt tactics that ensured their own survival and effectiveness of their operations. As already alluded to above, guerrillas were engaged in hit and run encounters as their modus operandi. The idea was to kill, wound and move off from the scene as quickly as possible.

Reconnaissance was important. Where is the target located? What is the terrain like in terms of it facilitating withdrawal or advancing towards the target? What is the strength of the enemy? What weapons are they carrying? What is the Gathering Point(GP) after attack? After scattering during an attack, what signals did the guerrillas use to identify each other and avoid accommodating enemies.

For guerrillas, the commander did not reveal a mission well in advance. This was to avoid possible capture of guerrillas before a mission was executed, thus running the risk of information falling into the hands of the enemy with possible dire consequences.

The commander would, as they advanced towards the target, study the terrain and identify a GP after an attack. It was a place far away from the scene of attack. When they regrouped there had to be some distinguishing sign that they would have given each other prior to the attack.

It was not a signal that was the same throughout their stay in the operational area(s). Hitting the butt once or twice could be a chosen sign to show whether one is a foe or friend.

Where there was a road to cross, it was important to create a false impression and send the enemy up the garden path. Guerrillas would, for example, walk across in reverse so that the enemy would engage in pursuit and yet moving in the wrong direction. The spoor was not tampered with so that the enemy would think there were many guerrillas when some repeated their crossing to exaggerate their numbers and discourage the enemy from engaging in pursuit operations.

A similar tactic was employed when they got to a village to seek directions or any information for that matter. When they entered and left a village they did so in directions meant to deceive the villagers. They might, for example, be seen leaving towards the east when, in actual fact, they would, once out of sight, change direction and move in a westerly direction.

Pursuing enemy forces may thus be given wrong directions and waste time while guerrillas increase the distance between themselves and the enemy.

Attending to calls of nature were important. One did not just deposit one’s stools in the open. Instead, a rifle bayonet was used to dig a hole in the ground and deposit the stool therein. After the act, soil was used to cover the mess and finally cover with grass and leaves so that disturbed soil was not easily spotted by enemy forces. If left in the open, the enemy might use that as evidence of how long ago the guerrillas were in the area. Wet stools and dry stools tell different stories.

Poisoning of water sources was a common strategy by the enemy. Guerrillas were able to identify possibly poisoned water sources. Where they found dead fish floating on the surface, they did not drink the water. Where mischief was suspected, those villagers bringing food to them were expected to sample the food before guerrillas ate the food.

In Gokwe again, there was a case in an agricultural enterprise run by Agricultural and Rural Development Authority (Arda) where food was laced with nligazwikono, a poisonous tuber. The guerrillas were intoxicated and easily captured and killed. Only two of them managed to survive and escape. Chemical warfare was used. Items of clothing were washed or soaked in chemical poison and then availed to guerrillas.

When such items got into contact with human flesh, after a few days one started falling sick and ultimately dying.

What the guerrillas were taught during training was just the basics. Once in the operational field, they became innovative and adapted to concrete situations. For example, when laying landmines, they placed two litres of petrol above the mine and a kilogramme of powdered peri-peri. When a car exploded the landmine, petrol caught fire and burnt passengers who also had their eyes menaced by peri-peri powder.

The final article in the series shall, next week, interrogate whether the introduction of regular forces within ZPRA was going to work or not.