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Rudo Grace Gwata-Charamba Correspondent
In 2004, the island of Madagascar went through two major cyclones which affected about a third of its rice-producing fields and also destroyed, completely, an estimated 10 percent of national produce.
The nation was unable to replenish stocks of this staple food, as necessary, through importation, due to its weakening currency within an environment of rising global rice prices.
By the end of that year, the price of rice in the capital city, Antananarivo, had doubled from the previous year’s price and communities resorted to selling their livestock and kitchen utensils, at rock-bottom prices, in a bid to secure food for their families.
Swift action to evade a famine was, thus urgently required.
The situation was similar to the one Zimbabwe currently finds itself in, namely persistent droughts coupled with cyclones along with floods, leading to a shortage of the staple food and limited resources for importation of the same.
With assistance from the World Bank, the Rapid Results Approach (RRA), which had demonstrated immense capacity to overcome many obstacles often encountered in public sector management reforms, was identified as the most viable solution for Madagascar.
The approach entails quickly finding original, and often cross-cutting solutions to crises.
The solutions are obtained through the implementation of short-term projects referred to as Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) that entail a sharp focus on the achievement of clear, concrete goals and tightly defined results.
The success of these initiatives significantly depends on the maximum participation, in all processes, of wide-ranging groups of stakeholders representing the interests of the public, private, and civil society actors, among others.
In Madagascar, a pilot project was formulated with the objective of increasing rice production, for implementation in four of the nation’s 22 regions.
The objective was effectively achieved.
Motivated by this success story, the RRI was scaled up throughout the country, leading to national average yields of 2,5 to three tonnes per hectare between 2005 and 2009.
Zimbabwe can learn from this experience in Madagascar, and also use RRA to effectively address the current challenges that relating to food shortages, in the short term, and also for improving service delivery in the long term.
Several factors, including high-level leadership plus commitment and support for the initiative, a prerequisite for the effective implementation of RRIs, propelled the success of the pilot project.
The president’s office pledged to fully adopt and institutionalise both the Results Based Management (RBM) and the associated RRA as strategies for implementing the nation’s development plan.
In fact, commitment and support, notably the promotion of the RRA by the same office, was regarded as one of the strongest drivers of the successful rice project as well as the subsequent institutionalisation of the RRA.
Moreover, strong internal and external stakeholder participation in all the RRI processes contributed significantly to the success of the initiative.
The RRI was conceived by very high ranking staff from the president’s office, with help from the development agencies, as well as officials from other sub-sectors encompassing agriculture, customs, transport, among others.
Schaffer Consulting, a United States-based private company which developed the Rapid Results methodology was the principal adviser.
Their primary goal, “To increase rice production in the selected four regions,” was clearly understood by stakeholders as were the associated measurable expected changes in conditions (termed the outcome) for each region.
For example, the expected result from Boeny region was increased production from 2,5 to 3,5 tonnes per hectare in 150 days.
A list of provisional objectives relating to the scaling up of the RRI to all the rice-producing regions was also included and shared extensively among stakeholders.
The RRI team members possessed the required capacity, in terms of knowledge and experience to guarantee the success of the initiative.
The consulting firm, Schaffer Consulting, had demonstrated proficiency through successfully implementing several World Bank projects leading to its recommendation by the same.
Additionally, invaluable, physical plus virtual, leadership and support from knowledgeable and experienced local as well as international consultants was also readily available to the team throughout the life of the project.
An inter-ministerial steering committee comprising a group of strong advocates for RBM and the RRA, who also held senior positions in the public service, headed a clear management structure to oversee the RRI at both the central and local levels.
The structure included a support unit that was in charge of finance, training, monitoring and evaluation plus general administration.
Rapid Results management tools were used to help the project to maximise results while utilising existing resources.
This experience also shows that identifying and supporting strong advocates for both RRA and RBM, from the public service, is worthwhile for the effective adoption and implementation of the approaches towards solving pressing issues as well as improving service delivery in the long-term.
Literature also shows that such action helps to nurture and strengthen a culture of results as well as the associated learning towards successful programme and service delivery as was the case in Madagascar and Kenya.
Furthermore, the functions of the project were closely aligned to each other.
The steering committee provided the necessary guidance and monitored progress in the field while the coaches worked with public service staff and Government officials to propel Rapid Results projects forward at all levels.
A number of lessons learned also emerged from the experience of Madagascar which could be useful to Zimbabwe and any other country that happens to face the same or a similar situation.
First, there were challenges with several long-standing bureaucratic, notably limited stakeholder participation leading to equally limited cooperation between the Ministry of Agriculture and other ministries in the former’s initial efforts to confront the rice crisis.
This was in line with previous common practice where ministries formulated and implemented policies and projects without the adequate participation of other stakeholders, including fellow ministries.
Also, an inherent administrative culture in the public sector characterised by risk-averse officials accustomed to the safety in collective responsibility, discouraged the necessary use of personal creativity, a key element of RRIs.
In addition, most project implementers had difficulties with shifting from traditional cumbersome planning with multiyear timelines to a clear focus on results, swift implementation and tangible progress.
To tackle the barriers to reforms, cross-agency meetings of officials from main stakeholder entities were convened to set the related pilot project parameters while the inter-ministerial steering committee was tasked with overseeing the project, identifying key priorities, selecting strategies to overcome major bottlenecks and manage communications.
At the end of pilot phase, a Cabinet retreat was organised to present the results to key stakeholders.
Stakeholders also had difficulties with setting concrete goals and working towards achieving them alongside understanding their roles and responsibilities of stakeholders due to limited staff and organisational capacity.
The steering committee recruited consultants and coaches to help build capacity provided the necessary support throughout the execution of the RRI.
Following its categorical success, the rice production RRI was scaled up to all the regions with the average rice yields increasing steadily from 3,75 to 5,8 tonnes per hectare between 2006 and 2009.
Accordingly, use of the RRA was, subsequently, expanded to other spheres across government ranging from births registration to the collection of taxes with similar levels of success.
The approach continues to make a significant impact in Madagascar, signifying its utility in improving both project and service delivery.
In Zimbabwe, invaluable lessons can be drawn from the reported imminent success story of a winter maize project in Masvingo, identifying best practices and lessons learned for informing decision-making about current and future projects.
The information can be shared extensively, the necessary adjustment made to project processes then the initiative can be scaled up for continued improvement in maize as well as other production processes.
Dr Rudo Grace Gwata-Charamba is an author, development project/ programme management consultant and researcher with a special interest in Results-Based Management (RBM), governance and leadership. She can be contacted via email: [email protected]
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