MOSCOW. – Even if the conflict in Ukraine is resolved diplomatically by the end of this year, this will not remove the “Ukrainian question” from Russian politics.
Armed confrontation is only the most dramatic part of a much longer relationship between two neighbouring peoples. This complex issue is emotionally charged and historically intertwined.
The point is simple: Russia and Ukraine exist within a shared political civilisation. This does not mean identical institutions, identical values, or inevitable common statehood. But it does mean a common historical and cultural foundation, expressed through shared practices, symbols and a broadly similar worldview. And it is exactly this proximity, rather than mere foreign manipulation, that makes the conflict so bitter.
At the core lies a clash of interpretations of independence.
Both Russians and Ukrainians value the ability to determine their own path without coercion. The contradiction stems from how that principle is understood.
For Russia, independence is primarily freedom. That is freedom from external dictates and freedom to act even when powerful actors attempt to constrain Moscow’s choices. This is sovereignty in the classical sense: the right to decide without permission.
For the Ukrainian people, willpower comes first. Independence is often perceived not only as resistance to foreign pressure, but also as the rejection of internal constraints: fewer rules and fewer restrictions. Their political instinct places greater emphasis on personal and collective will than on institutional discipline.
Experience shows that both peoples are ready to sacrifice for their version of independence. But because the meanings differ, the collision becomes nearly inevitable.
From this follows the most important issue for Russian policy after the conflict: how to combine these two interpretations within a framework that allows peaceful coexistence and, ideally, joint development. If there were a simple model of stable neighbourliness between two independent states, it would likely have emerged over the past 30 years. It did not. And this suggests that the relationship cannot be treated as purely external or purely diplomatic. It contains a civilisational dimension that cannot simply be “closed.”
The roots of the problem are partly objective. After the collapse of the Old Russian state in the 13th century, Russia re-emerged as a new political organism in a different geographical space, between the Volga and Oka rivers. Ukrainian identity formed under far less stable conditions, under shifting foreign control and in struggle against it. – RT.com



