Online Reporter
Amir Hossein Hosseini
Iran’s Ambassador to Zimbabwe
The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a geographical feature; it is the vital artery of global energy and trade. Yet, today, this waterway faces a profound crisis of stability.
This erosion of security is the direct consequence of repeated, unlawful actions by the United States and the Israeli regime, actions that stand in flagrant violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and the peremptory norm (jus cogens) prohibiting the threat or use of force.
When the operational and logistical dependencies of aggressor actors are inextricably linked to a waterway, the link between security threats and the strait’s function is absolute.
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, as the pre-eminent coastal state, the active management of this maritime space has become an unavoidable necessity.
A New Regulatory Framework for a Changing Environment
In response to a “fundamental change of circumstances” in the regional security environment, Iran has implemented a comprehensive regulatory framework to manage and secure maritime traffic. It is imperative to clarify: this is not an act of obstruction.
Rather, it is a framework designed to guarantee the safety of navigation amidst unprecedented instability.
Our measures are rooted in the specific rights and duties of a coastal state under international maritime law, tailored to the unique geographical and security imperatives of the Strait of Hormuz. We act to preserve regional peace when the baseline of stability required for traditional transit regimes has been shattered.
The Legal Reality: Beyond the 1982 Convention
There is a persistent misconception regarding the legal regime governing the strait. The following points are essential for a clear understanding of Iran’s position:
Non-Membership in UNCLOS: The Islamic Republic of Iran is not a party to the 1958 or 1982 Law of the Sea Conventions. We are bound only by rules that have achieved the status of international customary law.
The “Transit Passage” Exception: The regime of “transit passage” is a treaty-based creation; it lacks the uniform state practice and opinio juris required to be considered customary law.
The Persistent Objector: Since the inception of this regime, Iran has maintained a consistent and explicit objection.
Through our domestic legislation, including the 1964 Maritime Law (amended 2012) and the 1993 Marine Areas Act, we have never recognised “transit passage.”
The Question of Estoppel: It is legally untenable for the United States, which has itself failed to ratify the Law of the Sea Convention, to demand that Iran adhere to its provisions. Furthermore, under the doctrine of estoppel, a state that has accepted similar regulatory restrictions in other strategic straits cannot selectively protest those same measures when applied by Iran.
Managing Risk, Not Halting Trade
The current situation, characterized by active threats and hostilities against Iran, is legally distinct from the “conditions of peace” that informed classic rulings like the Corfu Channel case. Consequently, our domestic legal system mandates a regulatory and control framework.
For the protection of our national security and the maritime environment, certain vessels, including warships, submarines, and ships carrying hazardous materials, are required to obtain prior authorisation.
Furthermore, in line with international practice in other strategic waterways, Iran reserves the right to receive proportionate fees for services rendered, such as traffic management and environmental protection.
Our objective is to ensure that maritime transit remains continuous and rapid within designated corridors, while simultaneously safeguarding our national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the fragile marine ecosystem.
The Strait of Hormuz must remain a corridor of commerce, not a theatre for aggression. By asserting our sovereign rights, we are ensuring that the safety of navigation is managed by those who bear the greatest responsibility for its shores.
