adminGeneral Ham that are posted on the website of Africom. Of the evolving threats, al-Qaeda’s core has been weakened and resulted in affiliates growing in importance.
Ham spelt out for the colloquium the existence of the “network of al-Qaeda and its affiliates”, warning that these networks are changing in ways that increase threats to states but also regional stability. In his words, what was particularly worrisome was not each individual group, but the growing connectivity between groups.
General Ham told his audience that the al-Qaeda networks were starting to form a network with indications of communications of training, sharing funding and weapons. He spelt out that this process was most mature in the Maghreb where al-Qaeda was well funded by outsiders and that they increased their capabilities through kidnappings and criminal activities.
The three dominant extremists that were featured by the general were Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, Boko Haram group in Nigeria and AQIM. These groups were increasing collaboration and he cited developing linkages between Al Shabaab and AQAP in Yemen.
In particular, the idea that AQIM was a major threat was presented earlier in the week at George Washington University. Despite this gloomy picture of the growth of extremism, General Ham went on to praise the regional efforts to counter extremism in Africa, especially in East Africa. He noted that, “It was easy to get captured by the negative, but also there were very good efforts underway.”
The AMISON mission of the African Union in Somalia was a success story because the situation has changed to the point where the people of Somalia and their representatives have been able to elect a president, a parliament and have begun to establish embassies overseas.
Al Shabaab has largely been removed from Mogadishu and the port of Kismayo in just a year. For General Carter Ham, the important lesson was that the nations of East Africa and the African Union decided to take action.
“It was not the international community and certainly not the United States; it was regional states making that decision.” Carter Ham then reported on a heated meeting among general and intelligence chiefs on how to dismantle al Shabaab. After the discussion, the military chiefs then turned to US and said what Africom needed to do. What Carter Ham neglected to say was that the United States was not the only non-East African represented at those discussions and offering assistance.
General Ham pointed out that AMISON was not the only success story of regional initiatives in Africa to combat extremism and insecurity.
Carter Ham brought attention to the increased political will inside the African Union since 2007 and pointed to the fact that patience is necessary for these AU operations and that one should think of the long-term.On the point of maintaining global access, General Ham addressed the need for maritime security in Africa.
This had been very important in East Africa where the waters of the Indian Ocean had been plagued by piracy.
General Ham reported that in 2009 the waters of the Indian Ocean had the highest rates of piracy anywhere in the world. At great expense, private shipping has increased security so that instances of piracy have declined since 2009.
Carter Ham spoke of the great expense in fighting piracy and that only two wealthy states in Africa, Nigeria and South Africa, had the capacity to deploy maritime resources. Of the third and fourth points, General Ham highlighted the role of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) as a non-state actor terrorising citizens in Eastern and Central Africa. Again, General Ham pointed to regional efforts by African states to counter the LRA.
Referring to this organisation as the embodiment of “evil”, the Commander of Africom gave a selective history of the origins of this “army” in Uganda and that the Uganda government had pushed out this movement and that this “army” was now scattered in the areas of Central Africa, South Sudan and the Congo. He reported that there were 100 Special Forces in various locations providing training, communications, medical and logistical support for African forces. “The Africans are out trying to get Joseph Kony. The United States brought unique support in fixed lift, communications support, solicit volunteers for regional communications.”
He revealed that Africom has provided special communication networks so that villagers could call for help if threatened by Lord’s Resistance Army.
As a result of this assistance, there have been increased defections from the LRA and fewer attacks and increased co-operation. “But he is still at large,” and the “fundamental mission is to bring him to justice.” General Ham expanded on the threats to the peoples of West Africa since the Malian military coup in March 2012.
He said that since the coup and the collapse of the government in Bamako, there has been a breakdown in security with the establishment of a safe haven for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Carter Ham reported that Africom was working to address four interrelated problem sets in Mali.
First: Restoration of constitutionally-based government. He noted that it was difficult to proceed with peace and security until a legitimate government was restored.
Second: Address legitimate concerns of an underappreciated and often neglected demographic group in Northern Mali, mostly Tuareg.
Third: There is a terrorist problem in Northern Mali.
He noted that there was a “relatively small hardcore of terrorists”. And fourth, there was the need for continuing humanitarian assistance in the Western African region of the Sahel. The strategy of Africom was to deal with all four issues but the solution had to be African-led with support from the international community. General Ham said he believed that there was need for a negotiated solution and ways to separate the people from terrorists.
He referred to organisations in the country of Mali that have aligned “somewhat” with the terrorists and said that it was necessary to prepare for military intervention.
The mandate for such intervention had to come from the Security Council of the United Nations and with such a mandate the US planners had to work alongside African planners. He noted that the African planners had not yet requested US help but there would be need to assist with “logistics, financial support, intelligence, training and equipping.” General Carter Ham did not see the role of Africom in any combat operations and that the efforts to combat AQIM should be “African-led.”
General Carter Ham concluded his presentation by justifying the mission to advance US security interests across Africa. This was best achieved by advancing African countries. Military force was often essential but a non-decisive component in addressing many of the challenges that present themselves.
General Ham then drew from official statements of the US government especially the updated US National Security Strategy in Africa that had been spelt out by the White House on June 14, 2012. In that document signed by Barack Obama, it was stated that the United States will partner with sub-Saharan African countries to pursue four interdependent and mutually reinforcing objectives:
- strengthen democratic institutions
- spur economic growth, trade and investment
- advance peace and security
- promote opportunity and development.
General Ham repeated these objectives and stated that stability and security were necessary preconditions for others to take hold. The second document to which Carter Ham referred was the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. This document provided guidelines for the priorities of the military and what armed forces are expected to do. General Ham then spoke of the challenging ‘development’ issues in Africa and that Africans were seeking to bring the military under civilian control while investing in people. In Africa there was the effort to uphold legitimate civilian control, under rule of law where the military was respectful of human rights. The military in Africa needed to be seen as “servants of the nation, rather than oppressors”. He noted that this was “easier said than done”.
His final comments were that while the security challenges were complex and diverse, it may be easy to come away and worry yet he was optimistic about the future.
He then reported a dialogue that he had with a high ranking African official who said to him that, “more than assistance or help, we want your partnership — treat us like equals, with dignity and respect, recognise this is my country, not your country. Yes we need help, but that we stand shoulder to shoulder together.”
General Ham did not disclose which country the speaker was from but underlined that the right word to describe the work of the United States Africa Command was “partnership” in describing what we seek to achieve . . . almost always closely aligned with African states. Carter Ham stated that the US military was not an independent actor in Africa, that the actions were guided by the Secretary of Defence and the president.
He pointed out that there was a very deliberative process in the Department of Defence. The Africa Command did not provide weapons to governments. That weapons transfers came under the purview of the Department of State. There was a process of background checks before the US government provides weapons.
These background checks were carried out by the Department of State. He noted that the US military provided training and equipment and the US reserved the right to monitor how training and weapons are applied.
“Is it failsafe? No. Is it in accordance with laws and standards — yes.” The military was not operating as an independent actor in Africa. “We are one small part of US effort. If we look at US spending in Africa — military is dwarfed; most US spending is in health, education and agriculture. That reflects our values. We invest in human capital.” If the United States and its government were serious about investment in human capital, then the present dominance of the military over aid and education ventures would be reversed.
Granted, the general claimed that these successes were possible with the collaboration of Africom, but from the point of view of this author, most of the “partners” of the United States military were states that did not derive their legitimacy from democratic participation and expression. The general did not make reference to or comment on the ongoing war in the eastern Congo and the role of “allies” of the USA such as Rwanda and Uganda in supporting the rebel group, M23. His presentation omitted to mention Libya which is now overrun with militias and that one year previously, Africom was claiming credit for the “success” of the Nato intervention. This author brought to the attention of the audience of the reports in the US government press that the president had appointed a new commander for Africom after the investigation on what happened in Benghazi on September 11, 2102. The present insecurity in Mali emanated from a military coup d’état that was carried out by a captain who had received military training in the United States.
Bearing in mind the fact that the United States had expended more than one billion dollars in Mali on “development and military training” this author reflected on the musings of one former US Ambassador to Mali who wrote and posted pictures of himself and Captain Sanogo under the caption, “ Sanogo: A hero or a mutineer?” There is need for a thorough evaluation of the role of the United States and Nato in Libya and for a full disclosure of the relationship between the US Africom and the current instability in Mali.
It was the incongruence between the media hype about AQIM and the reality that the present insecurity in the Maghreb was generated by the past US military activities from the period of the Pan Sahel Initiative to the Nato intervention in Libya that is the most persuasive argument for the dismantling of the United States Africa command. None of the member states of Nato want a proper inquiry of the impact of the Nato intervention on West Africa. The South African representative in the Security Council that South Africa has been calling for a proper acknowledgement of the direct impact of the Nato intervention in Libya. — Pambazuka News.
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