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WE conclude our interview with former freedom fighter and Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services senior officer, Commissioner (Rtd) Claydon Seula pseudonym, Cde Sizwe Ngcobo. During the armed struggle, Comm (Rtd) Seula worked as an intelligence officer deployed in the ZPRA communications department. One of the highlights of his duties was being the point man in receiving signals from the First Battalion when it engaged the Rhodesian forces for more than five days near Kariba, but on the Zambian side.
In an interview with our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS), Comm (Rtd) Seula gives insights on how the situation was unfolding on those tense days when the First Battalion under the command of now Major-General (Rtd) Stanford Khumalo pseudonym Cde Madliwa Mbila came under heavy bombardment from the Rhodesian forces, but still held its own. The Rhodesians were shocked by the way the ZPRA battalion responded to the attacks. Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) biographer, Barbara Cole, the author of The Elite: Story of Rhodesian Special Air Service admitted that that particular battle had been a sharp exception. She wrote:
“The enemy (ZPRA) had undoubtedly won that round.” She went on: “It was the first time in Zambia that (ZPRA) terrorists were determined to hold their positions against an equally determined attack. They were well disciplined, knew how to use their weapons and were fairly happy about their defences. That night, the Rhodesians’ positions were subject to an extremely heavy artillery bombardment before the ZPRA forces effected a reasonably orderly retreat. The mission had been bad news for the Rhodesians. They had grossly underestimated the enemy and had the living daylights shot out of them. They (Rhodesians) had been outgunned and outranged and had been unable to take the position.”
MS: As we conclude our interview today, please tell us about the Battle of Kariba, in which it is said you are the one who was in direct communication with the forces on the ground.
Comm (Rtd) Seula: As ZPRA prepared for the Zero Hour, which was the code for the operation in which we were going to storm Rhodesia, four battalions were deployed along the Zambezi River. However, of the four, only the one under the command of Madliwa, which was the First Battalion was attacked. From our department of communication, we had Cde Sifiso Velani as the battalion communications officer. He had his own team on the ground. Velani was one of the people who knew what he was doing. Military communication is a technical area. Velani did well there, in setting up his equipment, which made it possible to communicate with us as the headquarters. In fact, there was a lot of activity and movements to the river.
MS: So, take us through what happened?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: On Wednesday, 18 October 1979, our platoon that is of the First Battalion, under the command of Cde Mvuti, which was on a reconnaissance mission, had a contact with the Rhodesian forces. Unfortunately the platoon commander, Cde Mvuti was killed in that ensuing contact. That signalled the beginning of the Battle of Kariba, a historic incident in the history of our armed struggle. However, the following morning that is on the 19th of October 1979, all hell broke loose as the Rhodesians deployed jet fighters to bomb our positions. The Battalion commander, Cde Madliwa got in touch with the HQ to relay information that they had come under heavy attack from the enemy. At first, the thinking and anticipation was that the Rhodesians would bomb and leave them. However, the attack was intensifying every minute of the hours. We requested them to send C-traps at intervals and they kept on telling us they were still under serious attack. To the credit of our forces, they repulsed both the jet fighters and ground forces. That is why there is a lot of literature on that battle. The Rhodesians even admitted that they were outgunned. The enemy was used to fighting guerillas who would quickly withdraw, but in that battle they were shocked to fight guerillas who were not prepared to move an inch.
MS: So, as the fighting intensified, how did the commanders at HQ respond? We quoted Velani here saying he was sending signals to you but there was no joy from the rear.
Comm (Rtd) Seula: At first, the communication was being received by my juniors, combat ladies who were manning the station. As the temperature grew hotter, I was personally doing it myself. Velani is correct when he said I was receiving the signals and taking them to the ZPRA Chief of Staff, Enoch Tshangane (late Major-General Jevan Maseko). Tshangane would look at the communication and order me to write a response. But I could see that General Tshangane had also been taken by surprise.
MS: Why do you say so?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: From my analysis and to be honest, we never anticipated that we would engage the Rhodesians in that way. Like I said before, we never anticipated that the Rhodesian forces would launch a sustained attack while on their side they never thought they would be repulsed in that way. So, as the battle went on, Madliwa was yelling,especially on the fourth day.
MS: What was Madliwa saying?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: He was sending information that they were running out of supplies. They needed anti-air ammunition, mortar bomb shells and other necessities. The battle had reached a critical stage. I would go to Tshangane with the request from Madliwa. As for Velani, the battalion communication officer was also telling us that soon, they would stop communicating because they needed batteries for their equipment. They could not charge their batteries because of the raging fighting. Then on the fifth day of the fighting, Madliwa sent an SOS (Save Our Souls). The message was also that communication was dying slowly and supplies were running out completely. Again, I went to General Tshangane with the message.
MS: What did Gen Maseko say at that moment?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: He looked at me and kept quiet for sometime and then said; “Tell them that I said they should fight hard or else they would be overrun.” I did as I was ordered but I was no longer myself. I couldn’t eat, no appetite at all. I knew what being overrun meant, it meant the destruction of that battalion. In the First Battalion were comrades I had trained with, some I knew from home and so on. It was not easy to accept that.
MS: Then came Day Six, what happened?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: I think Day Six of that battle was a Monday and the situation was terrible. Tshangane kept on saying I should tell them to hold on as he was mobilising something. However, he was no longer himself, the Chief of Staff was troubled. He was facing difficulties.
MS: Why the focus on General Maseko, where were other senior commanders?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: The army commander himself, General Mafela (Lookout Masuku) was not there, if my memory still serves me right, he was on the ground, seized with the movement of troops that were being deployed along the Zambezi River. The other senior commander, now Brigadier-General Tjile Nleya, uDubhu or Ben Mathe as he was called during the war was seized with the movement of troops from Angola to Zambia. Then on Tuesday, after realising that there was no joy from the HQ, Madliwa ordered a withdrawal. Madliwa had realised that there were no reinforcements being deployed and the replenishment of supplies. Madliwa then pulled out his troops.
MS: Did they inform you that they were pulling out?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: Yes, they sent a signal informing the HQ that they were pulling out. They withdrew nicely without any casualties. They then advised us where they were. We liased with the Zambian Defence Forces to look at the new location. As ZPRA, we were very proud of what the First Battalion had done, it was a brilliant performance of the comrades.
MS: After that battle, what happened?
Comm (Rtd) Seula: I remained at our HQ. When the ceasefire period came, I was one of those who left Zambia and moved to Papa Assembly Point in Mashonaland West Province, which was initially under the command of Rodwell Nyika, the late Brigadier-General (Rtd) Collin Moyo. I was appointed the head of communications of the AP. However, I did not stay long there as I was deployed to Lundi Flats in Mt Pleasant in Harare where ZPRA had set up its HQ. Then in October 1980 I was sent to the Zimbabwe Military Academy (ZMA) in Gweru where I came out with the rank of Major. I served in the ZNA for some years, particularly in the Signals Squadron, which was under the command of Colonel Tshinga Dube. From the ZNA, I was moved to the now Zimbabwe Prisons and Correctional Services and at some point I was its regional commander for the Matabeleland region.
Online Reporter