WE round-up our interview with Cde Irvine Khulekani Sibhona pseudonym Cde Barberton Muzwambila, the last ZPRA commander for the Southern Front (SF), an operational area that stretched from Matabeleland South Province’s district of Mangwe and ideally was supposed to reach Manicaland Province.
SF has like its counterpart the Northern Front which was under the command of late national hero, Brigadier-General (Retired) Collin Moyo aka Cde Rodwell Nyika had three regions, each with a regional commander.

However, in SF only two regions were functional that is SF 1 that covered Mangwe, Matobo/Kezi, Gwanda, Umzingwane, Filabusi and Beitbridge. SF2 covered the eastern part of Beitbridge, Mberengwa, bits of Zvishavane and Mwenezi.
In concluding his conversation with our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS), Cde Sibhona who has been overly critical of Zapu’s intelligence unit, the National Order and Security (NSO) speaks about his exploits at the SF.
Below are excerpts of the interview. Read on…..
MS: You spoke about being recalled from the front in Mashonaland West to the rear and being sent to Kohima to do an officer’s course, how was it there?
Cde Sibhona: We were a group of 95 ZPRA guerrillas there and some of the comrades I was with were Major-General (Rtd) Chancellor Diye, John Nyamupingidza ( Col Waison Tshipa) who like me had been recalled from the front where he was a field commander in the Victoria Falls, Hwange and Tsholotsho areas, now former Ambassador to Mozambique, Major-General Nicholas Dube, uBhuzwha, Carlos Mudzingwa whom I later on replaced as the SF frontal commander, Mike Ndlovu and Major-General Emmanuel Matatu who is still serving in the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), Stephen Moyo, Richard Moyo, Cockson Nsingo, Njabulo Gwembenja etc.
From our group of 95 Carlos Mudzingwa was the senior under officer (SU) for us as ZPRA, meaning he was our leader. As recruits there we did a strictly officers cadet course under the mentorship of the Zambians. Besides us Zimbabweans there were also cadet recruits from the host country, Zambia, Botswana and Tanzania.
We were properly commissioned after 18 months, that was August 1978. At that time ZPRA was being transformed into a proper conventional force and conventional soldiers were also being trained by Zambians at Mlungushi while their commanders were being sent to countries like the Soviet Union for further training. From our group of cadet officers, Nyamupingidza was picked to join senior commanders to redraft the operational boundaries.
MS: Who were others in that committee and what did they come up with?
Cde Sibhona: Nyamupingidza joined Rodwell Nyika, Zvafa Moyo, (elder brother of current Airforce of Zimbabwe commander, Air Marshal Elson Moyo), Richard Mataure and Mpondo Khumalo. The committee was chaired by Mike Reynolds (late Brigadier Charles Grey). This is the committee that did away with the old operational code names such as Livingstone, DK, Feira, BL1 and so on. They came up with the two fronts, the northern and southern which had three regions each. Each region had three sectors. This is because in the military language you count from one to three. So in the ZPRA operational areas covering the whole country there were six regions with 18 sectors.

MS: On your part from Kohima where were you deployed?
Cde Sibhona: That was at a time when the Rhodesian army was launching raids into Zambia prompting comrades to be evacuated from the camps. The Rhodesian aircrafts would fly low so that they were not detected by the radar. I was then deployed to carry out a mop operation against the Rhodesians.
I was given 500 conventional forces from Mlungushi, those were regular troops. They came with Cde Sambulo who became my second-in command(2IC). Unlike the guerrillas those from Mlungushi had been trained to fight and hold the ground. It was no longer a hit and run affair. We were deployed along the Great East Road but little did we know that the Rhodesians were planning to bomb Freedom Camp and Mkushi which they did on 19 October 1978.
The intelligence missed that. I was then later on deployed to the Southern Front as frontal commander taking over from Carlos Mudzingwa who had got into some problems with the Tswanas. The Tswanas did not allow us to carry weapons through their country, we did that discreetly.
MS: How was your structure like at the SF, who were some of the top commanders?
Cde Sibhona: Under me as the front commander l had Dutsa as my front intelligence officer deputized by Witness Moyo. The front communications officer was Cde Fred Tapela (Charles Ndlovu), the younger brother of Thambolenyoka while Cde George Chavunduka was the front political commissar.
Below us were regional commanders. SF1 had been under the command of Mphini who was then killed in combat, resulting in Bigboy Dlodlo taking over. In the Southern Front when I took over we had to restructure as some things were wrong.
MS: What were some of those things?
Cde Sibhona: I picked a section to accompany as the headquarters of the SF commander were in Botswana. There was a hill outside Selebi-Phikwe where we based but we had to be wary of the Tswanas as they did not want us to carry arms. At times I would be in Francistown. I then crossed into Rhodesia to get first-hand information and correct those things I said were very wrong. There was a section that was operating in Namande and Maranda areas, Mwenenzi District of Masvingo Province.
Those guerrillas based there should have been around eight and they included the likes of Brian Mashila, Gadaffi, Thatha and Farai Muzorewa. They had arrived there from Mozambique in 1976 after Zipa with specific orders from Mangena to base there. It’s clear Mangena wanted a ZPRA presence in his home area as to him it was going to be embarrassing to have a ZANLA presence without ZPRA.
In Zambia Mangena even used to boast that his home area was a liberated zone. So those guerrillas had been there from 1976 to 1979 when I took over command of SF. I got there in June 1979 and I had to ring changes because those guys had become part of the community. Then Gadaffi got injured through an accidentally discharge and was taken to Botswana. The area we are talking about fell under SF2 so I changed the regional commander there from Mashila and Gadaffi.
I deployed Revees as commander deputized by Thathani. I poured a big force there with guerillas coming from Mlungushi. The situation on the ground changed dramatically because now there were guerrillas who had been trained in conventional warfare. During my presence in that area we engaged the Rhodesians for two days at Namande and Iam sure up to now villagers who were there are still talking about that battle.
The Rhodesians were shocked to face guerrillas who were not running away but prepared to engage them blow by blow. Among the guerrillas there were people like Dust Ndlovu, Matshukutshuku and Sylvester.
MS: Besides re-organising the command on the ground, what other problems did you find on the ground?
Cde Sibhona: I had to deal with the issue of self-deployment, there were many guerrillas in the SF who had gone there without the blessings of the command element. For example, someone deployed in Nkayi would cut across the country and go and start operating in his home for instance in Gwanda.
When they started operating in their home areas they would start killing neighbours over old grudges. Also I have noticed that in your column you have spoken to some individuals who were lying that they were commanders, some claiming to have been zone commanders, my foot, that’s a load of lies. Some guerrillas had just become gangsters and I had to bring discipline and indeed I did that.
One day I called for a gathering point at Mahongola in Gwanda District and about 300 guerrillas converged there. I asked the guerrillas to put their arms down and one by one I asked how they were deployed where they were operating. I discovered that more than 100 had self-deployed, so I moved them to the SF2.
MS: In your field assessment which areas did you cover?
Cde Sibhona: I covered Gwanda that is areas such as Kafusi, Mahongola and moved to Siyoka, Makhado, Toporo, Mavhunga and Mzingwane areas in Beitbridge. I went to Maranda and Namande in Mwenezi. From there Chegato, Masase and Dolo Range. I moved and reached some parts of Zvishavane and from there covered Gwatemba in Filabusi after which I went to Stanmore in Gwanda under Chief Mzimuni.
While at Stanmore I received communication from the front commissar, Cde George Chavunduka that there were some urgent matter to be attended to at my headquarters in Botswana. In some of these areas there was heavy presence of ZANLA guerrillas as well. The overall commander of ZANLA was Cde Rungano. We were together at the first Assembly Point at Brunapeg.
MS: In your operations at SF I am told you worked closely with Umkhonto WeSizwe as they used your operational zones as a corridor to get into South Africa. Tell us more about that.
Cde Sibhona: The ANC also supported us logistically. They gave us their own vehicles for use. In Botswana they had a Land Crusier, Bakkie and a kombi which we often used. I worked closely with Cde Simphiwe not Siphiwe Nyanda. We also operated with MK guerrillas and they took part in the battles we fought in our operational areas inside Rhodesia.
When we moved to Zezani Assembly Point in Beitbridge they also moved in disguised as ZPRA. Then intelligence leaked that we were keeping the MK comrades and Dabengwa after speaking to former President Mugabe called to say there were high chances that Zezani could be bombed by the South African apartheid regime. Dabengwa then suggested that we remove them.

Myself as the one whose forces had been operating with MK came under a lot of pressure. Besides the MK guerrillas who had been with us in the SF, there were others who had been jailed after being captured during the joint ZPRA/MK Wankie Campaign of 1967. After their release from Khami Maximum Prison they together with our own who had been at Khami were sent to Zezani.
MS: How many MK guerrillas were there with you?
Cde Sibhona: All in all they were 112, one of them came here and spoke at the funeral of Dabengwa. Of the 112 we decided with Dutsa to declare 88. Eventually those MK comrades were taken back to Zambia while 14 were left in Zimbabwe. The remaining melted into Bulawayo.




