We massacred the dreaded Selous Scouts

LAST week, CDE WILLIE GAVHU, whose nom de guerre was Changamire Monomotapa, narrated how ZANLA forces killed about 60 Rhodesian soldiers during the Rutenga Battle after launching a surprise attack on their base. This was one of the many battles he was involved in as commander of Detachment 3, Sector 3, within the Gaza military province. This week, he tells our Political Editor KUDA BWITITI of the other major attack they made on enemy soldiers.

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Q: What led you to leave Sector 3?

A: The leadership saw the need to expand the war theatre, from the initial sectors, namely Sector 1, Sector 2 and Sector 3, by opening Sector 4, another operational zone, under the command of Cde Watson Juru, but still within Gaza province.

We wanted to encompass areas within the present-day Matabeleland and Midlands provinces. We used to call this opening of new zones within operational areas of any of the three war provinces “Advance”.

This was meant to set up new zones and, therefore, create new bases therein, hence expanding the fighting into other areas in which the war had not yet reached.

It should be understood that opening new war zones was one of the most difficult tasks that one could be assigned to undertake, as there were many unknown dangers.

We equated it to the “death sentence” because of the high possibility of dying during combat.

ZANLA was a national force, whose aim was to operate throughout the whole country, and so, we were not restricted to fighting in one area.

Q: In which areas did you operate outside your initial Sector 3?

A: I traversed several parts of the Gaza military province, which are now the Midlands, Masvingo and Matabeleland provinces; and in the process, rubbed shoulders with great fighters; too many to mention.

The places I covered included Maranda, near Mberengwa; Filabusi; Stanmore; and Silowini. What was unique about the areas I have mentioned was that we operated there while ZIPRA forces were also in the same area, fighting the same enemy, but from different strategic points.

Q: Did you fight side by side with ZIPRA?

A: No. It was not necessary to engage ZIPRA to fight side by side with us because our tactics, strategies and structures were different.

We in ZANLA also had enough cadres within our ranks to adequately execute our missions. The focus, as we both agreed, was fighting the enemy.

We could not afford to be caught unawares by the enemy, who, by the way, had increased in number within the area. Specifically, in the Maranda area, near Mberengwa, enemy forces were greatly shoring up their numbers.

This led to an escalation of attacks by the enemy against our forces and we decided to respond.

Q: How did you respond?

A: We responded through a surprise attack on a large Selous Scouts enemy camp. The response was fast and emphatic.

We deliberately chose to deploy a sizeable number of fighters, comprising multiple sections, to completely overwhelm the enemy. As detachment commander, and one of the commanders present, one of my roles was to make sure that we had adequate ammunition for an effective attack.

Q: Tell us how the attack was conducted.

A: We carried out the attack in the afternoon; in broad daylight.

This was during the sweltering heat of October . . . The enemy soldiers had decided to set up a temporary camp at the top of Buchwa Mountain. They had camped at the mountaintop for some days. They had been launching several attacks against our forces from that camp, so we decided that enough was enough. We had to act so that they would stop the raids on our comrades.

The decision we made was to use heavy weaponry and ammunition. Therefore, we armed ourselves with 137 rounds of 82mm mortars, among other weapons like rocket launchers, 60mm mortars, LMGs (light machine guns) and machine guns.

When we launched the attack, the sheer noise of exploding bombs filled the air.

All we could hear were the sounds of wailing from the enemy. The attack had been extremely effective. We waited for some minutes, observing the situation, but there was no response.

We were, therefore, convinced that the enemy had suffered massive casualties, and I doubt if any of them survived.

The plan was to ensure that we used the most powerful ammunition at our disposal to maximum effect to impact a deadly blow on the enemy, and it really worked perfectly.

It is important to mention here that we also had a 12,7mm anti-air machine gun, as we had anticipated a response from enemy aircraft, but luckily for us, there was none.

This was, therefore, another confirmation that on that occasion, the enemy had been heavily defeated.

Q: What happened after this attack?

A: We celebrated the victory, but we knew the Selous Scouts wanted to retaliate for their heavy losses. So, we hastily retreated from the area and proceeded to Matopos. But the journey to Matopos was made with utmost                         caution. There was a great possibility that the enemy could conduct what they used to term a “hot pursuit operation”. Along the way to Matopos, we also passed through Filabusi and camped at Sandawana Mine for some days.

Q: What were the reasons for camping at Sandawana Mine?

A: We had decided to conduct a raid on Sandawana Mine to close it.

Q: What were your reasons for closing down the mine?

A: We regarded the mine as a colonial enemy enterprise, which, if left operational, would continue sustaining the enemy war machinery.

We also did not want our people to continue working at the mine and serving the colonial regime.

Soon after we had shut the mine, we moved to the Matopos area and were based there.

Next week, Cde Gavhu concludes his account by telling us about the final days of the war, which he spent in Matopos.