When night momentarily turned into day

In today’s Lest We Forget column we continue with the interview with Cde Enoch Dube pseudonym Spox Mthunzi on the battle between a Zipra conventional battalion led by Retired Major-General Stanford Khumalo (Madliwa) and the Rhodesian forces in October 1979. Last week Cde Dube spoke about the formations of the battalions at Mlungushi in Zambia and on their deployment near the Zambezi River on the Zambian side. In the last instalment he also spoke about how the enemy was about to launch its attack on their positions at Zhibambe. In today’s interview with our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS) Cde Dube picks up the discussion by narrating the offensive the Rhodesian forces carried out on the Zipra positions and how the freedom fighters repulsed them.

MS: Cde Dube, earlier on you spoke about the enemy prodding your positions using its war planes and also that you did not suffer any casualties on that day. You also told us that you had realised that the war was about to begin, so what happened the following day?

Cde Dube: The following day at about 5.30am the commander of the first company, Cde Jesus ordered a section of his troops to go on a patrol as part of a clearing process to check on the movement of the enemy. That section was a combination of a reconnaissance team and infantry men. The section was under the command of Cde Mvuti, a platoon commander in the first company who had decided to be part of the clearance team for the purposes of effectiveness. While they were still doing the clearance patrol they came across some Rhodesian forces that were moving towards our deployment preparing the ground work for an attack. It looks like the enemy was trying to locate our positions. There was a contact and Cde Mvuti was killed. I think they could have identified him as the commander and concentrated their fire on him and that was a very unfortunate incident. However, our guys managed to recover his body, withdrew and reported that Cde Mvuti had been killed. It became clear to all of us that the enemy meant business and was about to launch a full scale attack.

MS: What was your response to that?

Cde Dube: All the troops were alerted of the incident and everybody was now on his toes because we had all heard the exchange of gunfire as the deployment of the whole battalion stretched for about 2,5 kilometres. Cde Jesus then withdrew his outposts from their observation posts because he realised that the enemy was coming to attack through his side. That was a precautionary measure as he felt his outposts were also in danger of either being attacked or captured alive by the enemy. Then when we were still trying to come to grips with the morning incident where Cde Mvuti was killed the Rhodesians made a quick follow-up with an air attack using Hunter planes. Our infantry troops quickly dived into the trenches while the anti-air guys dealt with the enemy’s airforce. Heavy fighting ensued.

MS: Were you taken by surprise by the sudden air attack and how did you guys handle the enemy fire coming from above?

Cde Dube: We were not caught by surprise at all because the reconnaissance team that was across the border had relayed a signal to the battalion headquarters that the planes were leaving their base in Kariba. Because we had communication radios it was easy for the signal to travel quickly and the ground forces quickly dived into the trenches leaving the anti-aircraft unit to deal with the warplanes. The planes carried out their sorties for about 10 minutes but they were not accurate, it looks like they were searching for the targets and also the return of heavy fire by the anti-air unit meant that they could not hit their targets accurately. We did not suffer any casualty in that morning bombing. After the planes had left the anti-air guys reconciled their positions so that in the event the enemy returned they found them having changed where they were positioned.

MS: Who were the comrades who were in charge of the anti-air unit in that battle?

Cde Dube: The battery commander was Cde Malikwa and had three crew commanders under him. Each Zegue was manned by a crew of three with the crew commander adding the number to four men. However, the overall commander of the whole artillery unit was Cde Mahewu. He was in charge of the Zegue, B10, mortars and Grap P crews. In that battle we had deployed three Zegues.

MS: Let us go back a bit. Tell us what happened when the planes had stopped bombing?

Cde Dube: The infantry units emerged from their trenches and maintained vigilance but we were not attacked anymore that day. We kept our positions. The following day we had our morning patrols as usual and the outposts stationed on the northern side reported that the enemy was moving from the north and was possibly carrying out preparations to intensify the attack. The commander, Cde Madliwa then recalled the deputy commander of company three, Frank (now late) to counter those Rhodesians who were coming from the northern side. Madliwa then picked randomly other members of the counter group to be under the command of Frank and this was because some of the troops who were on the northern side were still green horns and he was not sure that they would do the job properly. He further reinforced the group with four veterans who had just arrived from Lusaka and these were battle hardened comrades who had seen it all at the front. Cde Frank and his group went for the counter attack but to their surprise they found the enemy soldiers cutting down trees. Cde Frank correctly assessed the situation and realised that the enemy was doing this for easy elevation of their mortar bombs, so that when firing them they would not hit trees.

MS: So what happened, did Frank go for the attack?

Cde Dube: No, he reported back to Madliwa who immediately ordered them not to attack but withdraw together with the outposts. Madliwa further ordered Frank and his group to cross over the swamp and join Company Three under the command of Lovemore, which then indicated was to carry out counter attacks when the battalion was under attack from the enemy ground forces. Frank and his group duly did that. After sometime the Rhodesians started firing using their mortar weapons. They were prodding us, also trying to ascertain our positions and the type of weapons we had. They were also gauging the distance and elevation. The artillery unit then sprang into action and there was heavy exchange of fire with our comrades also returning fire with mortar bombs. At around 11.30am the Rhodesians sent their planes and the bombing resumed and this time they were almost accurate. While the planes were bombing our positions, the enemy mortar unit stopped its attack.

MS: Did they cause any damage to your positions and how was the casual list like?

Cde Dube: When they fired their missiles for the first time that day they were not accurate but when they returned for the second bombing they were accurate as they hit our Zegue positions. In fact in the second attack they made a quick return and found the gunner for their intended target still trying to elevate his machine and they hit close by resulting in the Zegue thrown off position by the shock wave. The gunner abandoned the machine and quickly dived into the defence pit where his loaders were. However, fortunately the two-barreled machine was not damaged. They then stopped the bombing but continued hovering over our deployment zone and as trained personnel we realised that they were giving cover to their ground troops to move closer and we emerged from the trenches and engaged them. In Mlungushi where we had been based we were bombed several times by the Rhodesians and to us it was those particular battles being replayed. In fact most of the comrades in our battalion were no longer afraid of the sight of the Rhodesian military aircraft. At Mlungushi after carrying aerial attacks they would try to mop up the area but on several occasions they were driven off, so on that particular day their ground forces tried but they were repulsed at a heavy cost to them. To make matters worse for them Cde Lovemore’s company counter-attacked them heavily. So that day also ended with our morale high and it was victory for us.

MS: That was day three. Take us through what happened on day four.

Cde Dube: On the fourth day they deployed the ground forces supported by helicopters. The enemy ground soldiers tried to attack from the eastern side and we allowed them to reach the centre where the ground was swampy. They only realised our presence when the platoon under the command of Cde Phandasi (late National Hero Cain Nkala) fired at the helicopter which was giving the enemy cover using rocket launchers. The helicopter quickly flew away, never to return. This was part of my company and I was with the Phandasi platoon because Cde Madliwa had ordered me to be closer to that platoon as we had used it to close a gap which was left open when the other platoon was assigned to take positions for reconnaissance purposes across the Zambezi River. So when the Rhodesian forces reached the centre of our deployment we opened fire, cutting them down. We pinned them down and a unit which was trying to assist them was also pinned down when we applied the Zegue on them. What came out of that engagement was disastrous for the enemy. The Zegue guys did their job to a devastating effect because when we carried out the mop up we found at some places pieces of heavily stained blood with Rhodesian camouflage uniforms hanging on trees. A number of Rhodesians were seriously injured while some died but because they were swift in recovering their casualties we did not pick any of them. At some point they had positioned snipers on a higher ground and those guys almost got me. I then told Cde Phandasi to order an RPD in their direction and it did its job. Its either those guys were killed or they fled because after concentrating our fire in that direction everything went quiet. The following day the fighting was sporadic and in the evening Cde Madliwa announced that we were supposed to make a tactical withdrawal.

MS: Any reasons given why you were withdrawing as according to your narration and those of the Rhodesians in some of their books you had managed to score successes?

Cde Dube: The feeling was that there was a need for us to change positions and tactics. It had also been realised that the Rhodesians after realising that they were losing the battle had started sabotaging infrastructure such as bridges and communication systems to cut us off from the rear. We realised that when we lost the artillery commander, Cde Mahewu when he and some comrades were trying to detonate a landmine that had been planted on strategic bridge. The landmine hit Mahewu, who was also an engineer while he was trying to detonate it. He could have relaxed a bit and did not realise that the mine was reinforced. So all in all we lost five cadres in that Kariba battle, the commanders Cdes Mvuti and Mahewu and three soldiers. However, to take you back on our withdrawal Madliwa gave instructions that the battalion was to split into smaller groups of between five and seven. We were now reverting to guerilla warfare. He told us that the gathering point would be a place near the artillery forward base about 50km from where we were. The other instruction was that I was to remain in charge of a section of nine to monitor the situation and follow later. Before the withdrawal the commander further ordered that the artillery unit must fire the Grad P to scare the hell out of the enemy. When the Grad P was fired it lit the whole of the Zambezi Escarpment and the night momentarily turned into day, the soldiers then moved.

MS: What happened to your equipment and how was the next day?

Cde Dube: It was camouflaged and some crews were sent after some days to recover it. They were recovered without any incident. As for the next day I and the few comrades that I had been left with at the base left at around 8am and a few hours later the enemy planes arrived and started bombing but the Rhodesians could have been disappointed when they realised that their action was in futility as there was no one. We could not help but laugh our lungs out. So we moved to join others but on the way we stumbled upon a Rhodesian unit which had deployed some kilometres from our base. They were not expecting us and we were not expecting them. We only saw them when we were about 20 metres away. Those Rhodesians just froze when they saw us and we looked at each other and passed by. We laughed about it later. They could have killed us because they were well positioned but because of what we had done to them in those last few days they just froze. Base bebhekane labobhinya. As for us we didn’t want to start a contact because we were not sure of their strength. I was to return to the base giving protection to the Zipra chief of training, the late former commander of Four Brigade, Brigadier-General Mike Reynolds who wanted to carry out an assessment at the battle zone. What should be noted is that after the attack on us, the enemy went for the Soneni battalion which they also failed to crack.

MS: What happened to your battalion and how was the mood after that battle?

Cde Dube: We were still inching for a fight because we felt we had unfinished business with the Rhodesians but then came the Lancaster House agreement and the ceasefire was declared. We were very disappointed. To some of us a round table settlement denied us the chance to inflict pain on the Rhodesians and on a personal note I would have preferred a situation where we marched into the streets of Harare and Bulawayo victorious while the Rhodesians were hiding somewhere with tails between their legs. Even our late commander Cde Mangena could have turned in his grave because he was always hammering into us that the Rhodesians should be physically driven off.

MS: After the ceasefire where did you go?

Cde Dube: Our assembly point was at Gwayi River Mine and later I was attested into the Zimbabwe National Army. I served briefly and left under the demobilisation exercise. I ventured into private business in the construction industry but now I am working in the legal fraternity.