Chronicle Editor
Pathisa Nyathi
JOINT operations between MK and Zapu’s armed wing marked a new phase in the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe.
Never before had there been a larger force than was thrown into an operation that was that daring. Further, the joint incursions were sustained as they took place in two successive years, 1967 and 1968. A lot of preparation went into the campaign codenamed the Luthuli Detachment which was commanded by Algeria-trained John Dube (Sotsha Charles Ngwenya from Zimnyama near Plumtree) and Chris Hani from South Africa.
As part of the reconnaissance for the 1967 joint infiltration, an advance guerrilla group was sent ahead in 1966 to get as much intelligence as possible so that the campaign would draw upon. Some of the guerrillas on that campaign were Roger Matshimini Ncube, Tshinga Dube and David Mongwa “Sharpshoot” Moyo, among others. Indeed, in 1967 the Luthuli Detachment crossed the Zambezi at Chisuma and headed towards the Wankie (now Hwange) National Park.
An encounter with the Rhodesian forces took place at Nyantuwe and subsequently at other places.
There was, in 1968, a similar campaign codenamed Pyramid Detachment which was commanded by Moffat Hadebe. The detachment crossed at Feira and headed towards Sipolilo (now Guruve). The two incidents serve as an introduction to what then followed in 1969, with its culmination taking place in 1971. A better appreciation of the events requires that the two campaigns be located within the context of the Cold War and the response thereof.
Both Zapu and the ANC were sponsored by the Soviet Union, and its allies in the Warsaw Pact bloc, an adversary of the western NATO countries. It was expected that the west would get alarmed and craft a strategy to neutralise the advance of communism to a region that it considered geopolitically important.
As a result, a number of events took place leading to the emasculation of Zapu and its military wing under the Special Affairs Department.
Persons I interviewed in the 1990s indicated swift action by western intelligence organisations. James Robert Dambaza Chikerema, who was the Acting President of Zapu outside the country, and also in charge of Special Affairs, was given money by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in order for him to ‘‘see’’ what he had hitherto not seen. The MI5 also lurched into the arena with an analysis of the composition of Zapu’s top echelons. The Nguni were not sufficiently represented. The tribes calling the tune were Kalanga, Sotho, Venda and Nambya, they advised. Nyandoro, who was very close to the British and to Chikerema added another dimension. He was reportedly fond of bringing whiskey from the UK for Chikerema.
To make matters worse, Chikerema single handedly took a television crew from Granada Television from the UK for the filming of military operations by Zapu.
The military command was not informed, let alone consulted. Military operations were simulated and tactics displayed to the television crew which filmed the entire process. That riled JZ Moyo who responded by writing a scathing document titled “Observations on our Struggle” where he attacked the actions of James Chikerema. Chikerema responded through his own “Observations” document which was equally scathing.
A third document in response to this was penned by JZ Moyo in collaboration with Edward Ndlovu and TG Silundika. Meanwhile, Chikerema had taken moves that did not help to reconcile the two antagonistic camps. Chikerema dissolved the military command, took over certain departments such as Education, took charge of the administration of the transport department, dissolved the Lusaka District Council of the Party and took control of all external accounts. He was on track to dissolve the entire administration and replace it with younger people including Walter Mthimkhulu. Both Joshua Mahlathini Mpofu and Owen Tshabangu have written on their grievances against the Zapu leadership in Lusaka.
Too much power was concentrated in the hands of five men, namely Chikerema, Nyandoro, Moyo, Edward Ndlovu and George Silundika. The Zapu leadership did not spell out their main goal and fundamental objectives as had been the case with the ANC’s Freedom Charter. The leadership failed to produce analysis and interpretation of the military forces in Rhodesia. For that they accused the Zapu leadership of acting like village chiefs.
Disgruntled members of the March 11 Movement alleged there was no strategy being used to fight the Rhodesian forces. The leaders were running Zapu like a private company that had gone bankrupt. Tribalism was being entertained by the leaders who were retreating to their tribal enclaves. The absence of a strategy at a time when the war was escalating lay behind bickering among the leaders.
The fighters viewed themselves as armed politicians out to bring about freedom and social justice. It was time that the guerrillas be viewed as such. As fighters were politically motivated and had voluntarily taken up arms, they demanded to be treated as such. In their view, a guerrilla is not like a conventional soldier who works under the command of political leadership. The fighter recommended the suspension of the members of the National Executive (see “Cradle of the Revolution: Voices From Inyathi School’’, Amagugu Publishers, 2018)
Zapu’s armed wing had its capacity to wage the liberation struggle emasculated. Very few cadres such as Brigadier-General Abel Mazinyane and Roger Matshimini Ncube, and others remained on the ground resorting to laying of landmines at different places to create an illusion there were many of them involved in the struggle. As a result, by 1969 there were no more joint incursion by the two parties, Zapu and the ANC’s MK. In fact, Zapu was not doing much by way of waging the armed struggle.
Aaron Milner, the Zambian Minister of Home Affairs came into the fiasco following the arrest of the Zapu leadership at Zimbabwe House (ZH) in Lusaka.
Allegations were that Milner had sympathies for Chikerema. The warring parties were taken to Mboroma in the hope of reconciling them. Things did not work out. Some of the people who attended the meeting were sacrificed through being taken across the border at Chirundu into the lion’s den. Their future was in the hands of Ian Smith, the Rhodesian Prime Minister.
The two warring parties together went to Chakwenga near Mwembeshi where MK had a military camp nearby. It was at Chakwenga where Chikerema decided to go his own way. He was “tired of carrying Nkomo,” he said. Effectively, that meant Zapu had split into three groups: the March 11 Movement led by Philemon Mabuza Ncube, Zapu, then led by JZ Moyo who became the Acting Commander-in-Chief of Zapu’s fighting arm. The third splinter group was Frolizi which was led by US-educated Shelton Siwela. In reality it was Chikerema and Nyandoro’s project. Now it was time to get to the drawing board and restructure Zapu and re-launch it on a new trajectory.
A new, restructured Zapu came about following a meeting that Moyo chaired. The restructuring was accompanied by adoption of a new political ideology and political and economic program. The armed wing suffered some casualties when a new leadership was appointed. The civilian and military components were brought closer to together. What then emerged was an even more refined, more effective and ideologically sound movement that pushed the war to a higher level.
That revamping within Zapu presented new threats within the context of the Cold War. A new strategy to destroy the party was crafted. It worked. What now remains is to unpack just how Zapu restructured to a point when it became a well oiled, well coordinated and effective war machine.
This article is the first in a three-part series. The second instalment will deal with the restructuring of Zapu in exile and the third and last instalment will deal with how Zapu was outmanoeuvred when US Secretary of State Dr Henry Kissinger lurched in by introducing Détente. The operations, both overt and covert, will be looked at.
Some of its aspects have already been dealt with — the deaths of Zapu stalwarts JZ Moyo and Ethan Dube.
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