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The post-colonial nation state finds itself in a conundrum when it comes to shaping acceptable ideologies and forms of democracy that endear the leader to the people.
In his quest to remain in power the nationalist leader coins ideologies that support his thinking, usually without any input from the masses, which to him are non-existent.
The word democracy in all its variables pervades discussions in Ousmane Sembene’s “The Last of the Empire” (1981), which makes it imperative to discuss how democracy or purported democracy is used to maintain power by an individual or a caste.
The dialectical tensions that erupt because of the hegemonic nature of democracy and ideology need to be probed to determine how the concepts are hinged to a specific class’ material gain.
In an interior monologue Cheikh Tidiane reveals his thoughts thus: “As far as he was concerned all African heads of state hold their positions for life. They rule, appoint heirs from their family or their party. The theatre of politics is played on a stage drenched in the people’s blood. It’s up to the star actor to play his part, under the media floodlights”.
This confirms the ideas on the post-colonial nation state posited by Mbembe (2001) and Fanon (1967). It is not uncommon for African heads of state to create autocracies and dynasties through various forms of coercion and deification.
The ideals of democracy and governance seem to be borrowed robes from Europe and fail to speak to and impact on African realities.
Doyen Cheikh Tidiane Sall says that there is, “European democracy, and there is our own African democracy as well”, and that “African style democracy is public (whereas) European-style democracy is kept under control”. In addition, “French democracy is fetishism! They always vote for the Right”.
The Speaker of the National Assembly, Magatte Kane reveals that, “our Constitution was patterned on the American model”. Considering all the different takes on democracy articulated in the statements above, it suffices to say that the concept of democracy is problematic.
Africans have always had their own forms of democracy as is portrayed in Chinua Achebe’s “Things Fall Apart” (1958), and Djibril Tamsir Niane’s “Sundiata: An Epic of Old Mali” (1961). Colonial hegemony brought Western forms of democracy, which were alien to Africans, and were moreover forced on them.
As is the case in “The Last of the Empire”, leaders in the post-colonial nation state believe that they owe their legitimacy and power to the people through democratic processes, which they preside over. However, a close analysis of what constitutes democracy reveals a different scenario altogether and shows how much the people are used and are rarely part of the democracy of the day.
Some of the key elements of a democratic government include a political system that makes it possible to elect and replace the government through free and fair elections, the active participation of the people as citizens, and a rule of law in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens (Diamond, 2009).
Montesquieu (1689, 1755) puts democracy in context thus: “As in a country of liberty, every man who is supposed a free agent ought to be own governor; the legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. But since this is impossible in large states, and in small ones is subject to many inconveniences, it is fit the people should transact by their representatives what they cannot transact by themselves (cited in Held, 2006: 66).
Both Diamond (2009) and Montesquieu (1689, 1755) concur that the people’s will, as citizens or through their representatives, are major cogs in a democratic society. In Marx’s view, social classes also play a major role in what constitutes democracy because materialism is always at the centre of whatever decision that the ruling class makes.
In “The Last of the Empire”, the Venerable One, who is at the head of the dominant class, uses ideology and hegemony to determine constitutionality in Senegal.
He has a government of predominantly young ministers and deputies, who rubberstamp whatever he says because they form a caste that benefits at the expense of the majority whom they pretend to represent. He changes the constitution each time he feels that the one in place does not suit his means, and each time legislators overwhelmingly support it through a system skewed in his favour. After all, they are supporting a class move, which keeps them privileged; and without an opposition to challenge them, they feel little threatened to even bother to think of the people whose will they tread on with impunity.
When issues come to a head after Leon Mignane’s disappearance, which turned out to be a coup, Correa, the Minister of the Interior, declares that: “Apart from the clandestine communists, the whole legal opposition was set up by the Venerable One”, and Mapathe, the Minister of Information, adds: “We are no worse with that semblance of democracy, even if it was created by the Venerable One. It’s a victory for him abroad, enhancing his reputation”.
The learned Attorney Ndaw points out that: “The constitution isn’t a sacred truth. It functions as a law without being one … The way Leon Mignane had himself re-elected, with a made-to-order constitution! It’s pure Machiavelli!” It is evident that Mignane rides on a bastardised form of democracy that places him at the centre as the benefactor of those in his government and in Parliament.
The opposition is his own creation, so there is no opposition, especially since the Communists have no following to write about. He just wants to make sure that there are no free and fair elections whose outcome may not be favourable to him. The results of elections are predetermined through a “made-to-order constitution”, which is a sham.
Mignane presides over a patronage system that revolves around him and benefits his cronies at the expense of the people. The conditions outlined, thus fail the test of democracy as outlined by Diamond (2009) and Montesquieu (1689, 1755).
Though power is important in class relations, “hegemony is more than social power itself; it is a method for gaining and maintaining power” (Lull, 1995). Once subordinate classes are psyched up to accept and even make sense of their subordination, they make it possible for those ruling over them to sustain their dominance, believing that the dominating class’ interests are theirs too Martin-Barbero (1993).
As a tool for acquiring and sustaining power, hegemony becomes effective if the subordinate classes accept “the dominant ideology as “normal reality or common sense . . . in active forms of experience and consciousness” (Williams, 1976: 145).
Leon Mignane, who is central to the power structure in the ruling party, uses his Authenegraficanitus ideology to hoodwink both members of his party as well as the people to believe that his interests are theirs too.
Ideology, which according to Althusser (1981: 184) has “a material existence” “represents individuals’ imaginary relation to their real conditions”, making them accept what is imagined to be the reality. Thus, the Venerable One’s imagined Eurafrica becomes a reality to members of the ruling party and the people, who believe that they are represented by their deputies in the National Assembly.
To those in the ruling class, whatever Leon Mignane says goes if the material reward remains in sight. Dissenting voices aired through sober-minded people like Doyen Cheikh Tidiane Sall are stifled through the “tyranny of the majority”. In a world where individuals are inherently selfish, democracy functions through quashing the will of the minority through numbers, and thwarting the will of the majority through intimidation, tall talk and outright lies. The National Assembly members who pretend to represent the people only care for themselves.
The Doyen opens up to Attorney Ndaw: “Surrounded by expatriate advisers, Leon Mignane decided everything on his own. The young ministers went along with everything. Meeting after meeting, I was being attacked, almost assaulted. In the end I kept quiet, while still taking part in Cabinet meetings once a week”.
No matter how people-oriented his views may be, the Doyen is always shot down because of the tyrannical nature of this sham of democracy. During the debate on whether Senegal should send troops to Zaire, Cheikh Tidiane expresses his reservations but Correa tells him: “Doyen, you are undermining our unity by opposing majority rule,” and he responds: “Your democratic majority is a monarchist pyramid, Correa. The President is in the wrong. And he is dragging us after him”.
In a Manichaean world where you are either with or against and where dialectical realities recognise “the basic pillars of ruling class power, particularly private property” (Riley, 2011: 19), Senegal is divided into a small clique of rulers and the majority ruled who have no say in anything.
When it suits them and only when it threatens their class interests, the same people rubberstamping Leon Mignane’s policies in both Cabinet and the National Assembly and calling it democracy (like Mam Lat Soukabe and his cabal) cry foul. It is because of this self-serving inclination of Man that the hope for humanity lies in Montesquieu’s thesis thus: “In a world in which individuals are ambitious and place their own interests above all others, institutions must be created which can convert such ambition into good and effective government (cited in Held, 2006: 69).
But in situations where institutions are put in place by the same individuals who sideline the masses, or are inherited from colonial governments, can they curb individual ambition when democracy comes in so many shades and may be used against the feeble and the vulnerable through power and material might?
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