admin
Zipra simply dived for cover when a Hunter turned in, accepted the explosions above them, and immediately emerged to continue firing at anything that moved. Cde Spox Mthuzi aka Enoch Dube who commanded the second company in that famous battle recounts the final moments before that famous battle.
THE Zipra forces had by 1979 planned a co-ordinated offensive against Rhodesian forces under an operation code-named Zero Hour. Under Operation Zero Hour conventional battalions with heavy artillery support were to storm through the northern front at Kanyemba, Chirundu and Kariba to enable the troops to cross with armour and artillery. Simultaneous attacks were to be carried out on the airfields at Kariba, Victoria Falls and Hwange, which after being secured was to enable the transfer of MiGs jet fighters from Angola. Guerilla units already operating in the country were to sabotage transport links and continue harassing the enemy to undermine the Rhodesian counter-offensive.
Indeed in October 1979 three Zipra battalions moved from Mlungushi Camp, a base of more than 5 000 well trained conventional forces and deployed along the Zambezi River ready to launch the attacks. A support battalion headed by Cde Clive was left on standby while other units were also waiting for deployment. The battalions that were deployed along the Zambezi River were under the command of Retired Major-General Stanford Khumalo whose pseudo name was Madliwa, Retired Brigadier-General Ben Matiwaza and the late former military attaché to Malawi Colonel Soneni Moyo. However, of the three the Rtd Maj-Gen Khumalo unit engaged the Rhodesian army comprising the Light Infantry troops, Special Air Services (SAS) for almost a week near Kariba just across in Zambia. It was one of the fiercest battles in the history of the country’s armed struggle. The Rhodesians have written books on that battle begrudgingly admitting that they were creamed in that operation.
In excerpts from his book, Winds of Destruction, former Rhodesian combat pilot Peter J.H Petter Bowye said of that famous battle: “Yet, even though the Rhodesians were out-gunned and could not move forward, Zipra preferred to remain in their defensive positions, fearing to expose themselves to the jet-strikes we could not have made so close to our own forces.
“Attempts to outflank enemy gun positions on the eastern ridge resulted in a number of RLI soldiers being wounded. On the western ridge, an RLI trooper had been killed. Hunters, limited to 30mm cannons and 68mm mortar rockets, were employed on numerous occasions, but no strike was really successful. Zipra simply dived under cover when a Hunter turned in, accepted the explosions above them and immediately emerged to continue firing at anything that moved. The Rhodesians were at a distinct disadvantage. They were exposed and only had light infantry weapons, whereas Zipra were dug in with vastly superior heavy weapons. There were tense moments when the helicopters came in to land within sight of the enemy. Zipra had made an excellent appraisal of likely helicopter LZs and had prepared their long-range mortars for the very positions the helicopters landed. The enemy must have enjoyed the sight of Cheetahs making a hurried departure and the mortar teams scurrying for cover.”
The other account of the battle is that of SAS biographer Barbara Cole, the author of The Elite: Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) who admitted that this particular battle had been a sharp exception. “The enemy had undoubtedly won that round.” She wrote. “It was the first time in Zambia that (Zipra) terrorists were determined to hold their position against an equally determined attack. They were well disciplined, knew how to use their weapons and were fairly happy about their defences.” That night the Rhodesians’ positions were subject to an extremely heavy artillery bombardment before the Zipra force effected a reasonably orderly retreat. “The mission had been bad news for the Rhodesians.” Cole conceded. “’They had grossly underestimated the enemy and had the living daylights shot out of them. They had been outgunned and outranged and had been unable to take the position.”
In our today’s Lest We Forget Column we traced one of the heroes of that battle; Cde Enoch Dube whose pseudonym was Cde Spox Mthunzi to give us an account of that battle. Cde Dube commanded the second company in that famous battle and under his command was National Hero, Cde Cain Nkala, a platoon commander at that time. Below are excerpts of an interview with our Assistant Editor Mkhululi Sibanda (MS):
MS: Cde Dube may you please start by giving us your brief history. Who is Enoch Dube or Spox Mthunzi?
Cde Dube: I was born in Gwanda District on 25 October 1952 under Chief Mzimuni to be specific in the Dambashoko area. I went to the local primary school, Shake and for my secondary education I went to Mzilikazi High School up to Form Two. I left the country to join the armed struggle in May 1976. Like most comrades I went to Zambia via Botswana and in Zambia my first port of call was at Nampundwe Transit Camp. From the group that I was with some were taken to Angola for military training while some of us were moved to Mlungushi and that was in November. The group that went to Mlungushi had 2 000 recruits. At Mlungushi, unlike at other Zipra camps where instructors were either Russian or Cubans, those in charge of us were Zambians with a few from the Zipra ranks such as Gedi (the late Retired Colonel Richard Dube) and Cde Khupe.
MS: How was the training there and how long did it take you?
Cde Dube: We spent the whole of 1977 under-going training. Our training was a mixed bag as we started with conventional warfare before embarking on guerilla warfare; it was an intensive military schooling exercise. At the end of 1977 more than 100 comrades who had distinguished themselves were chosen to go to the Soviet Union for further training in platoon and company commander’s courses as well as in artillery and reconnaissance. I was one of the people who were chosen and I specialised in the company commander’s course. We spent six months in the Kremlin and returned to Zambia in July 1978. We went back to Mlungushi where conventional battalions were being formed. Our further training in the Soviet Union was also part of the build-up of our regular forces.
MS: So how was the building-up of the conventional forces? Take us through what was happening.
Cde Dube: It was a process of integrating forces that had been trained in different camps and countries. I am talking about comrades who had been trained in Angola, Mlungushi and CGT in Zambia, Ethiopia, Somalia and other countries. That was the construction of a well oiled military machine that was being prepared to invade Rhodesia in broad daylight and beat the hell out of the Rhodesian forces. So battalions were formed. The first battalion, which I belonged to was given to Madliwa (Retired Major-General Stanford Khumalo), the second to now Retired Brigadier-General Matiwaza, the third to Cde Clive and the fourth was under the command of Soneni who after Independence later on became a military attaché to Malawi. Other units were also being formed. However, the formation process was not all that rosy as on getting intelligence about the formation of the battalions the Rhodesians carried out numerous attacks on Mlungushi in a bid to destabilise us but that gave us the opportunity to put into practice what we were preparing to do. The attacks became rehearsals, sort of, as we waited for the final onslaught on Rhodesia. That hardened the comrades and when we were deployed to the front we had long got an appreciation of what was needed in a conventional warfare and we were no longer afraid of the sight of a military aircraft. The enemy found it difficult to penetrate Mlungushi because it was heavily fortified; all sorts of anti-aircraft weapons were there.
MS: So when did you leave Mlungushi for your deployment as part of the execution of Operation Zero Hour and how was the composition of the battalions?
Cde Dube: It is important to say that only three battalions were deployed initially along the Zambezi, the first, second and the fourth. I can only talk about the first battalion, which I was in. We left the camp just after the beginning of October but I can’t recall the exact date. We used our Kraz trucks to take us to the border.
MS: To take you back a little what was the message when you left Mlungushi?
Cde Dube: The message was clear, we were moving to Zimbabwe and were supposed to burst the Rhodesian border and destroy that racist military machine, attack, secure the ground and move until we achieve military victory. As for the command structure of the battalion, Madliwa, the now retired Major-General Stanford Khumalo was the commander while the three company commanders were Cde Jesus who was in charge of the first company while I commanded the second and Cde Lovemore the third. The companies had each 95 infantry men and in addition to that each had attachments, a commissar and his deputy, seven intelligence officers, two signals men, medics and an artillery unit. The smallest unit of the company was a section of nine soldiers. Each section had one RPK machine gun, one RPD machine gun and an RPG7 (bazooka) while the rest had AK-47s, so we were armed to the teeth. Each soldier was also armed with offensive and defensive grenades. As for the commanders we were armed with an AK-47 folded butt type. The artillery units had 82mm and 60mm mortars, amaB10, amaZegue, the double barrels. Other weapons at hand were SAM7s, a heating seeking anti-aircraft weapon (the weapon used to down the Viscounts) but we did not use them in that battle and iGrad P which we used on the last day when we made a tactical withdrawal. I must also add that the battalion also had a regimental sergeant major (RSM) for the purposes of discipline.
MS: Take us through your journey to the front.
Cde Dube: We passed through Lusaka at about 7pm and at around 12 midnight we were dropped a few kilometres from the intended position. We then moved for an hour to the area where we were supposed to deploy. It was not that far but because our movement was tactical we took such a long time. We completed the deployment, which stretched for more than a kilometre after about two hours.
We deployed around a swampy area on the foot of gorges and formed a semi-circle around the swamp to create an anvil where we would hammer the enemy, we were being tactical because we knew that they would come through the swampy area thinking that we had been foolish to leave a gap and they fell for it. Anti-air weapons were mounted while a reconnaissance unit that was a platoon crossed the Zambezi River safely to the Zimbabwean side to monitor the movement of the enemy. Communication lines were laid while the soldiers started digging defence pits and cutting down trees to get logs to fortify the trenches. Mind you, every soldier had his own small pick and shovel as part of the requirements of a conventional unit. The main headquarters to house the commander, Cde Madliwa was set up as well as the company commanders’ HQs. Although the enemy was 25km away from us, it took them a week to notice our presence and by that time we were well dug-in and fortified our positions, ready for any eventuality.
MS: What of logistics, things like food where were you getting it?
Cde Dube: This was a regular force with enough supplies in everything including a well trained medical team with all the necessities. We had ration packs for the troops while a make-shift kitchen was set-up but cooking was being done at night as part of security measures.
We were also all properly kitted with camouflage with the majority of the soldiers dressed in the Soviet rice camouflage while others had the Ethiopian military attire. Like I said we stayed there for more than a week undetected and it was only on a Sunday at around 12 noon when a Rhodesian military aircraft briefly stopped over our deployment zone and we realised they were on a reconnaissance mission.
They must have been photographing our positions. It became clear to us that they had spotted our positions and Cde Madliwa made it clear to the commanders that the war was about to start and indeed fighting, which was to go on for almost a week broke-out the following day.
The battle started with the Rhodesian Air Force prodding our positions but all along we had been ready for them. That gave us the chance to show them who we were. The troops had been itching for a fight for a long time and they grabbed the chance with all the hands. We were like dogs that had been caged for a long time as we had spent months and months preparing for this.
To be continued next week when Cde Dube gives a blow by blow account of the battle.
Online Reporter