Relaunching armed struggle after political crisis

IN our Lest We Forget Column last week we concluded a series of interviews with former Zipra deputy chief of operations Cde Stanley Nleya where he spoke about problems faced by Zapu while in exile in Zambia, transformation of Zipra, training programmes and deployments. The articles on Cde Nleya popularly known as Gagisa received a deluge of responses and today we carry one penned by former Zipra chief of military intelligence Retired Brigadier-General Abel Mazinyane. Rtd Brig-Gen Mazinyane is buttressing on what Cde Nleya spoke about. Below is his article. Read on . . .

After the resolution of the Zapu Congress held at Cold Comfort Farm in 1963, which declared the official beginning of the armed struggle, the party intensified the sending of cadres for military training. The first groups went to Ghana, China, USSR, Algeria, Egypt and Cuba. This was from 1962 to 1964. Some of the cadres were the two current VPs, Cdes Phelekezela Mphoko and Emmerson Mnangagwa, Sikhwili Khohli Moyo, M’bejelwa Moyo, Pilot Dube, Luke Mhlanga, Dumiso Dabengwa, Ackim Ndlovu, Robson Manyika, Charles Dauramanzi, Charles Chikerema, Munetsi, Musaka, Rogers Mangena, Naison Khezwana, Tinaye Chigudu, Ambrose Mutinhiri and others. The training of the above necessitated the formation of the High Command in 1965. This high command included Ackim Ndlovu, Phelekezela Mphoko, Abraham Nkiwane, Robson Manyika and others.

The above high command was tasked with strategising the execution of the armed struggle. The command came into being after some sporadic sabotage incursions into Rhodesia. This command fell under Special Affairs in the Vice-President’s office. ANC/Zapu alliance formed the Zapu Military Wing and Umkhonto WeSizwe (MK) joint command in 1967. The joint command launched the Wankie/ Sipolilo operations that shook the Rhodesia and South Africa racist regimes, forcing them to militarise their governments. Rhodesia was put on a war footing. A Ministry of Joint Military Operations was formed. This Zapu military wing was the nucleus that formed Zipra when James Chikerema left Zapu. This command soldiered on despite the demoralising political crisis that befell Zapu when Chikerema formed Front For The Liberation of Zimbabwe (Froliz). When Zipra was founded by those who had survived the political crisis that led to the formation of Froliz a new command was formed. The new command had the following; Rogers Mangena (Alfred Nikita) — chief of staff, Charles Ngwenya (JD) — chief of operations, Cephas Cele — chief of personnel and training, Tapson Sibanda (Gordon Munyanyi) — chief of military intelligence, communication and reconnaissance, Lookout Masuku (Lameck Mafela) — political commissar and Phelekezela Mphoko — chief of logistics.

The people who remained to rebuild the armed struggle after the political crisis were; JZ Moyo, TG Silundika, Edward Ndlovu, Jane Ngwenya, Nikita Mangena, Phelekezela Mphoko, Dumiso Dabengwa, Victor Mlambo, Dingani, Lazarus Mpofu, Ackim Ndlovu, Swazini Ndlovu, Steven Vuma, Tshombe, Njenjema Dube, Petros Khumalo, Lemmy, Ronnie Nkomo, Thomas Ngwenya, Nkomeni Nleya, Gordon Munyanyi, Gordon Butshe, John Dube, Cephas Cele, Maketo Ndebele (Darkie), Roger Ncube (Matshimini), Wilbis Sibanda, Artwell Bokwe, Saul Ndlovu, Jabulani Ncube, Enock Sikhumba, Mabhuku, Dan Ngwenya, Dan Vundla, Zenzo Mthethwa (Mgewu), Donki Dube, Luke Mhlanga, Aaron Ndlovu, Godfrey, Ethan Dube, S.K Moyo (Madlezibabayo), Isdo Dube, Nunu, Enock Selele, Tommy Ndebele, Gibson Mayisa, Tankwa and Josiah Ncube.

Others who remained and were from the military side were the following: Mlefu Dube psuedonym “Nathaniel Murivo” and also known as Molly, Jevan Maseko “Enock Tshangane”, Leonard Nleya, Lawrence Sibanda aka Mwana, David Dube “Ambrose Zitha aka Nzula, Christopher Sibanda “Philemon Ngayiza”, David Ndebele “Cephas Pope aka Chiboyi, Tshabalala “Absolom Ndiyani” aka Gumirendebvu, Dlodlo

“Rutendo Chigayo”, Chimwe Nyathi “James Sakupwanya”, Tshile Nleya “Ben Mathe”, John Nkomazana “Dickson Khumbula” aka Bonanza, Mata Nleya “James Kufa”, Toddy Nkomo “Billy Mzamo”, Masuku “Carlos Dube’’, Newman Nyathi aka Hwadalala, Solomon Ndlovu aka Busobenyoka, Ncube “Farai Madiro”, Masala Sibanda “Reford Mgabeli”, Chilis Bhuku “David Mangirazi” aka Black swine, Conelias Dube “Albert Mlilo”, Matswaha Ndlovu “Denis Mpande” aka Normal, Elias Ndlovu “Elias Gondo”, Stanley Nleya “Elisha Gagisa” aka Doko, Alexander Ncube aka Mate, Adam Sibanda aka Sylock, Ben Maphosa aka Dikiza, Ngwenya “Emmanuel Chanakira” aka Chief Tangwena, Nkosembi Maphosa “Eliot Mahlole”, Peter Makhonjwa “Hezekiel Manyokopo”, Ernest Magutshwa, Joshua Moyo “Lawrence Ndlangamandla” , Charles Ncube “Jerry Jaha”, Kelly Malaba “Daniel Gambiza”, Eddie Sigoge/Mlotshwa/Gumede, Aaron Gumede, Joash Ngwabi “John Sikhosana”, Alexandra Mpofu aka Try next door, Fleming Mkandla aka Skwantshane, Base, Raphael Zulu “Chief Lutunga” Tendayi, Chauke “Norman Nzima”, Richard Dube “Gedi Ndlovu”, Lemon Khumalo “Lenon Dliwayo” aka Bhubhudla, Jeffrey Ndlovu “Kenneth Mrwira”, Stulo Matiwaza “Mike”, Cleopas Jubane “Godfrey Sithole”, Emmanuel Moyo “Sam Ndlovu” aka Zwafa, Ntatshana Ncube “Gutu”, Mahango “Dongo” aka DC, Elias Dube “Makanyanga”, Mdlongwa “Msitheli Ncube” aka SekaMbonisi, Donald Ndlovu aka Siyamangongo, Sibanda “Skinny Madziba”, Themba Nyathi, Abel Mazinyane, Themba Mbambo “Tichafa Ngorima” aka Maguswini.

At the early beginning of military operations (late 1971) most of the Zipra troops were confined in Tanzania. Other than the members of the National Executive and the High Command only the following were available to kick start military operation; Jack Mpofu (Donkie), Roger Ncube (Matshinini), Njenjema Dube, Ronny Nkomo, David Ndebele, Abel Mzingwane (Chiboyi), Jowash, Lemon Khumalo (Bhubhudla, Vundla, Dan Ngwenya, Lemmy, Taffy and maybe a few more others. The rest who were in Tanzania soon joined their colleagues at the front by the end of 1972.

At this juncture there were only two Zipra operational regions, east and south. East was commanded by Ethan Dube who was still based in Dar es Salaam. However, he did not last long in that post as he had been appointed director of Zimbabwe Intelligence Service (ZIS). Southern region was commanded by James Sakupwanya. This region covered the whole of Zambia and Rhodesia. The Eastern Region covered the personnel that were not under southern region. Comrade Sakupwanya died along the Zambezi in 1974.

In 1974, a group was sent to the USSR to be trained as regional commanders. It had Jevan Maseko, Kenneth Chitambo, Christopher Sibanda, David Dube, Phinda, Nicholas Daue (Feso), Kerias Msimanga (Gadaffi). When the group returned from USSR, Détente, Henry Kisinger peace exercise confined both Zipra and Zanla to rear bases and froze the Zimbabwe armed struggle.

Despite the setback caused by DÉTENTE Zipra went ahead and restructured the Southern Region. The region was divided into seven regions that stretched along the Zambezi River from Kazungula to the confluence of the Zambezi and Luangwa rivers.

The new regions were, Pondo Land West Alpha (PWA), Pondo Land West Bravo (PWB), Group Centre Alpha (GCA), Group Centre Bravo (GCB), Bright Light One (BL1), Bright Light Two (BL2) and FEIRA/NISHIKA. Some of the commanders who commanded these regions included Rodwel Nyika, Richard Mataure, Roger Ncube (Matshimini) Chief Tangwena, Ananias Gwenzi (Lt-Gen Philip Valerio Sibanda), Toddy Mpisi, Gilbert Khumalo (Nicholas Nkomo), David Ndebele, Skinny and others whose names I cannot recall. Some of the comrades who were deployed in early 1972 were Themba Mudolomba Mbambo (Maguswini), Ernest Magutshwa, Alexander Mpofu (Trynext Door), Sibalayi, Mlefu Dube, Grutsha, Mgwewu, Situlo Matiwaza, Manyokopo, Joshua Moyo, Kelly Malaba, Daniel Gambiza and others.

Before seven regions were established, Zipra operated under southern region with several guerilla bases dotted along the Zambezi. Because there were few guerillas, operations were mine laying and small raids, mostly carried under the cover of darkness (night operations). Mine warfare was carried out so efficiently that it briefly froze the Rhodesian forces. Sometimes mines were planted between enemy bases.

The guerillas would lay two anti-tank mines that when a Rhodesian base A truck hit a landmine, soldiers from base B sent to rescue base A truck would be blown up before reaching the truck. Comrade Njenjemo would say while listening to the truck as it drove off from the base towards the land mine, “Wotshintsha kokupedzisila manje” — in Kalanga (He is changing gears for the last time). And as sure as the sun rising from the east and setting in the west, the mine obediently baptised the enemy with fire. Operational experiences forced changes in the Zipra High Command.

From 1971 to 1974 reconnaissance was under chief of military intelligence which meant that reconnaissance groups would collect information and send it to operations department which then launched an attack. This proved to be cumbersome and frustrating for our guerillas because it took time from collecting information to using it. It was then decided that reconnaissance be moved from military intelligence to operations department. One of the incidents that led to the transfer of reconnaissance to operations was when a group which had Sibatayi stumbled on Rhodesian soldiers swimming in a stream with a DA on guard, they crawled and disarmed the DA. Because they could not launch an attack as they were a reconnaissance group, they thoroughly beat him up and bent his rifle using a tree. Surprisingly the DA was persuaded by the incident to join the armed struggle.

Zipra first harassed the enemy by hit and run tactics. These were mine warfare, small raids and ambushes. This forced the enemy to limit its patrols, abandon small base camps along Zambezi and move to larger camps in the interior and rely on fire force to engage the guerrillas. This meant that the enemy could not move freely among villagers harassing them. However, the fire force concept meant that the enemy had an advantage over the guerrillas because it engaged tired guerrillas in the Zambezi escapement with rested troops delivered to battle by air. Rhodesians still ruled the skies.

Zipra had to quickly adapt to the new challenge by forming bigger units (detachments and battalions). As for the Rhodesian air threat, anti-air units were formed. Thanks to our friends, the USSR in particular, they positively responded to our training requests. This enabled Zipra to be in most times a step ahead or adapt to new threats. That is why towards the end of the war we revolutionarised our front to counter the Rhodesian demarcation of the country into operational areas such as Operation Tangent, Operation Grapple, Operation Thrasher, Operation Repulse and so forth. In response Zipra created two fronts (north and south) divided into six regions each, each region was divided into three zones which were also divided into three sectors each. Guerilla urban units were also formed to fight in the urban areas. Zipra was now aiming for the big apple, Harare, then called Salisbury.