SA and the ‘born free’ conundrum

Please rewind to about 15 years back. There was an interesting discourse on the political direction of the so-called born frees.

Here was the generic narrative: Once the “born frees” reached voting age, they would tilt the political balance away from ANC in favour of the DA. The reasoning then was that the “born-frees” were likely to go to model C schools. They would receive an education largely commercially oriented, and brainwashed to appreciate European and American heroes.

In the process, they would grow without colonialism, and apartheid consciousness.

Therefore they would grow up devoid of liberation and transformation consciousness. Thus, they would disregard the liberation politics of the ANC, and be more persuaded by the liberal politics of the DA. This would culminate in the “born-free” voting DA instead of ANC. Therefore, the narrative concluded, the DA stood a better chance to win elections with the “born-frees” entering the voting age.

Now, please fast forward to 21 years after democracy: there is an emergence of youth radical transformation movements, such as those that led the Rhodes Must Fall Campaign; youth individuals and groupings are defacing colonial and apartheid statues across the country; young people at Rhodes University are driving the campaign against the name of this institution; related protests are happening at the University of KwaZulu-Natal; and a young man at Wits University pronounces that he loves Adolf Hitler, and gets a largely youth-based EFF endorsing his statement.

Clearly, the misnomer of “born-frees” is simply a matter of calender positioning. It does not present a major generational ideological repositioning to the right. At least not in the manner perceived about 15 years ago.

Actually, on the contrary, the so-called born frees are proving to be ideologically leaning to the radical far left.

Here is what can be ascertained from the politically active youth today: It is very conscious of colonialism and apartheid; it is increasingly organising itself outside the mainstream traditional political homes; it is unhappy with the pace of transformation, hence it organises itself outside mainstream political parties to avoid being curtailed. It is increasingly getting radical, and it seeks tangible transformational results immediately.

In its bid for visible transformation, it uses colonial and apartheid symbols as a galvanising point. This makes their mobilisation very effective. This is the case because such symbols are not only insulting, but have come to symbolise either a poor pace of transformation, or the lack of transformation.

Once many have been mobilised, the object of transformation assumes a bigger spectrum. Typical is the battle against apartheid symbols, which has grown to be a campaign for broader issues within tertiary education.

There are interesting inferences that can be drawn here: First, this youth is unhappy with the pace of transformation. The fact that it is willing to operate outside established political formation is actually a vote of no confidence for existing political parties.

Linked to this is the possible lack of confidence in the current liberation heroes of the anti-apartheid struggle. The fact that the recently deposed Wits SRC president expressed admiration for Adolf Hitler, and he received support, raises one fundamental question: Why did he not identify a local hero that he admires? Even more importantly, why did many, through social media platforms, express their support for his admiration?

At face value, it is easy to join the mainstream commentary and dismiss Dlamini as a lunatic. But if one considers that he enjoyed support in some circles, and marries this with the growth of youth radical transformation movements, then the picture is bigger than Dlamini.

Here is the dangerous contradiction: On the one hand, there is a liberation government that is increasingly becoming very conservative.

While it talks more about radical economic transformation, it is increasingly more concerned about order, peace and a stable approach to transformation.

Therefore, apartheid statues cannot just be removed, there must be “consultation” and following “due process”. This being the case, one can imagine the “due process” in land restitution.

On the other hand, the new radical transformation formations, as symbolised by the Rhodes Must Fall movement, wants radical transformation now. The likely scenario is that these politically non-aligned youth political formations will grow.

Their series of protests are likely to increase. But they will assume various forms depending on the subject matter of transformation. Sooner or later, the liberation government will be unable to use its state power to ward off such protests.

It may run out of teargas canisters to spray at those who occupy unused land.

The police might also get fatigued at fighting its own people.

At this stage, given South Africa’s electoral democracy, the liberation government will be compelled to side with the movements for radical transformation. This is what happened in Zimbabwe. When it became apparent that President Robert Mugabe could lose power due to dissatisfaction by the war veterans over the slow, or non-existent, land redistribution, Mugabe followed suit and radically redistributed vast hectares of land over a short period.

This trend might also happen here. There is a growing threatening decline of influence of student movements aligned to the liberation movement, Sasco, and the ANCYL at several tertiary institutions.

Sooner or later, the liberation government will be compelled to yield to the demands of the non-aligned radical youth movements.

The same might apply to the growing number of people willing to face the might of the state and occupy unused land. —The Star.