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Konstantin Kosachev
Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council
The new concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, approved by the President of Russia on March 31, is significantly different from all the previous five editions, the first of which was adopted exactly 30 years ago, in 1993.
The world has changed, and the foreign policy attitudes of the state inevitably change along with it.
In 1993, Russia saw its main task as fully integrating into the “democratic world”.
Russia’s relations with European countries were declared to be of “priority importance for its entry into the community of democratic states.” And the development of “full-blooded relations with the United States” was considered capable of “facilitating the creation of a favourable external environment for domestic economic reforms in Russia.”
In 2023, both the EU and the US significantly found themselves in the scale of Russian regional priorities somewhere between the Caribbean and Antarctica.
This is not just a fixation of the “turn to the East” (or rather, to the East and South). But, in fact, this is an absolutely clear answer to the model of a post-conflict future that the West is currently promoting. According to it, after Russia’s defeat or voluntary surrender in the spirit of Zelensky’s “peace plan” (other options are not even considered). Under the strict supervision of Washington and Brussels, depending on its behaviour, they will gradually return to the previous scheme of relations, only with even less rights and, of course, without taking into account its interests in the security sphere and along the perimeter its boundaries.
As German Chancellor Olaf Scholz noted, for example, “we can return to the peaceful order that worked and make it safe again if Moscow also shows readiness for this.” That is, according to leading EU politicians, the previous order worked quite well and Russia just arbitrarily violated it.
The new Russian Concept ignores this scenario altogether and considers the current position of the West not as a “punishment for its wrong behaviour” and not even as a subject of discussion and diplomatic efforts, but as a kind of natural disaster to which it is necessary to adapt until the veil from the eyes of the former “our Western partners” disappears.
According to the document, Western countries have unleashed a new type of hybrid war. But Russia does not consider itself an enemy of the West, does not isolate itself from it, but counts on Western countries realising sometime in the future the futility of their confrontational policy and hegemonic ambitions.
The West’s movement down the scale of regional priorities is not a fixation of the conflict, but a reflection of a fundamentally different approach to interaction with other states, which now proceeds not from their objective “weight” in the world, but depends on their: a) importance for Russia and b) attitude towards it.
In this sense, the “near abroad” (the return of this term to official use, which I proposed last year, is indicative) is the main priority.
However, this idea has been going through all the concepts since 1993. Thirty years ago, the implementation of effective integration in this space and the settlement of conflicts still seemed quite compatible with “joining the West” (and then the topic of post-Soviet conflicts was especially acute: the previous 1992 was associated with the “Minsk process” on Nagorno-Karabakh, the signing of agreements on the Georgian-Ossetian conflict and Transnistria).
Today it is already obvious that at the same time it is impossible to comfortably equip the space closest to us and “go to the democratic world” on its terms: The West had specific views on the post-Soviet space, and what seemed to be a temporary exception in the face of growing Russophobia in the Baltic States, then fully manifested itself as a system.
We tried to build a friendship belt around us, and our opponents are a cordon of aggressive hostility, completely dependent on the West.
The new concept assigns a key role to the near abroad (and these are not only post-Soviet countries) in achieving the main goals of foreign policy, and this, as before, is ensuring the security and sovereignty of the Russian Federation, creating favourable external conditions for the development of Russia and others.
And Russia will pursue the policy that it considers appropriate to protect its interests. This is not an analogue of the American “Monroe doctrine”, but a clear indication to any external forces that their aggressive behaviour near the borders of the Russian Federation will be assessed accordingly and will receive an adequate response.
By the way, I would draw attention to the fact that, according to the concept, the mission to support Russia’s allies will be implemented “regardless of whether the allies and partners receive international recognition and their membership in international organisations.” That is, the so—called unrecognised republics and territories can be allies — encroachment on them will have the same consequences as hostile actions against UN member states.
The new alignment of priorities and the shift of emphasis in foreign policy is a consequence, perhaps, of the central thesis of the concept of the special position of Russia as an “original state-civilisation”. If interpreted simplistically, this means that Russia is not going anywhere else, into any civilisational unions and groupings. But even in the 2016 document, it was said that the strategic task in relations with the EU is the formation of a common economic and humanitarian space from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and in 2008, the creation of a system of collective security and co-operation that ensures the unity of the Euro-Atlantic region from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
Russian self-awareness as the most important global player, and in the role of a separate civilisation, is now based on its own sources of strength, resources and traditions, on “more than a thousand years of experience of independent statehood … a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power that united the Russian people and other peoples who make up the cultural and civilisational community of the Russian world” (the new term “Euro-Pacific”, I believe, will still receive its scientific justification, but it is already obvious that this is a doctrinal opposition to the logic of Euro-Atlanticism).
In this context, Russia’s main goal in the near abroad — the transformation of the region into a zone of peace, good—neighbourliness and prosperity – is not the desire to recreate the empire or the Soviet Union.
Russia looks self-sufficient in all respects, and its cultural codes will not be imposed by force on anyone outside, but at the same time they will become the object of targeted protection. Russian humanitarian policy priorities abroad serve this purpose — countering Russophobia and attempts to “abolish culture”, protecting the Russian language, Russian culture, sports, and the Russian Orthodox Church from discrimination, and fighting for historical truth.
In general, the concept, contrary to the expectations of our opponents, does not look aggressive and aimed at confrontation with anyone.
Countering the unipolar model of the world order and strengthening ties with those who are determined to co-operate is not an attempt to create a certain bloc with the participation or led by Russia.
“Strengthening co-operation between states subjected to external pressure” is only “a natural response to the crisis of the world order,” says the concept.
And this logic of the answer can be traced everywhere, including in those passages that were perceived by many as quite harsh: “in response to the unfriendly actions of the West, Russia intends to defend its right to existence and free development by all available means,” “the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can be directed … to solving the tasks of repelling and prevention of an armed attack on Russia and (or) its allies”, “in the case of foreign states committing … unfriendly actions, … The Russian Federation considers it legitimate to take symmetrical and asymmetric measures, “among others.
I would like to draw attention to the fact that the tasks of preventing the occurrence of biological threats and ensuring biological security are singled out in a separate category — and in particular, investigating cases of the alleged development, deployment and use of biological and toxin weapons on the territories of neighbouring states.
In this I see a certain tribute to the work carried out over the past year by the parliamentary commission, of which I had the honour to be co-chairman over the past year.
Another point that would be important to note is the environmental and climate agenda.
An absolutely clear emphasis is placed on preventing and countering its politicisation, attempts to use it for the purposes of unfair competition, interference in the internal affairs of States and restrictions on the sovereignty of States with respect to their natural resources.
Russia will support the right of each state to independently choose the optimal mechanisms and methods for environmental protection and adaptation to climate change. It is obvious that this approach aims at a fundamentally different logic compared to that promoted by Western countries, who saw in the “green transition” a chance to take historical revenge against new centres of economic development.
The energy crisis, which, in fact, the Western countries themselves provoked with their massive sanctions against Russia and the insane rupture of mutually beneficial economic and energy ties with our country, temporarily suspended the obviously unilateral and self-serving implementation of the climate agenda in its Western interpretation, but it is already obvious that they are not going to abandon it at all.
In general, the new concept of foreign policy is a strategic vision of the world and its role in it of an established, mature state—civilisation based on its own resources, historical and cultural achievements, inter-ethnic peace, traditional values and the desire for a democratic and harmonious structure along three main contours: the near abroad — Eurasia — the world.
Everyone who agrees with this is invited to co-operate, since this model meets the interests of the world majority. Those who disagree and try to force us and other countries to act contrary to their interests are kindly invited to abandon these attempts, because a sovereign and strong Russia has every opportunity to stop hostile actions towards it and its allies.
I am deeply convinced that if similar concepts in meaning, spirit and wording were adopted by other centres of power, including Euro-Atlantic ones, the world would definitely change for the better, less conflictual and more stable side.
Online Reporter