adminAlexander Nepogodin
The search of the historical roots of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which culminated in Moscow’s special operation last February, usually focuses on historic events.
The Russian leadership has repeatedly emphasised that Ukraine expanded into historically Russian regions due to decisions taken by Soviet leaders, often contrary to the wishes of local residents.
Vladimir Lenin handed over the Donbass and Nikita Khrushchev did the same with Crimea.
In light of these discussions, it is often forgotten how red flags were apparent to many politicians even before the collapse of the USSR.
So why was not the Russia-Ukraine border issue settled 30 years ago?
A policy against borders
The decision to transfer the Crimean region to Ukraine in 1954 was not subject to debate for several decades. The situation changed only during the years of perestroika, when the so-called “glasnost” (openness) policy made it possible to publicly discuss problems of the Soviet Union, including national identities.
The summer of 1987 was marked by the protests of the Crimean Tatars, demanding the right to return to their homeland from Central Asia, where many were forcibly deported in 1944.
Unrest was growing. In July, 120 activists held a demonstration on Red Square near the Lenin Mausoleum. Activists held up posters: “Return our people to their homeland,” “Restore the rights of the Crimean Tatars,” “Democracy, glasnost for the Crimean Tatars.” KGB officers in civilian clothes took away their posters and tried to disperse the crowd, but they sat down on the ground and refused to leave, shouting slogans. The acts of defiance continued, brewing agitation.
Under pressure from the protesters, the politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU was eventually forced to resolve the issue of the Crimean Tatars and their return to the peninsula – and as it turned out, the bigger issue of the status of the land itself.
In July and August of that year, the politburo met twice to discuss the issue. At one of the meetings, Mikhail Gorbachev, who had already held the post of secretary general for two years, told a narrow circle: “From a historical and political point of view, it would probably be right to return Crimea to Russia. But Ukraine will rise against it.”
At a meeting in August, the secretary general outlined the political course for resolving the controversial issue as follows: “Regarding the situation in the Crimea, a new reality has developed there after Stalin’s crimes. Some propose to withdraw it [the peninsula] from Ukraine and form a ‘federal district’. The idea deserves attention. But everything cannot be done right away. We need to gradually meet the demands of the people… In a word, realism and concrete actions are the most important things right now.” With his usual caution, he added that it would not be possible to escape the problem, but it should be solved gradually.
While the deportation of the Crimean Tatars was rightly recognised by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR as illegal and criminal in November 1989, no action was taken by the central government regarding the peninsula’s status. Nevertheless, the resolution stated: “The restoration of the rights of the Crimean Tatar people cannot be carried out without the restoration of the autonomy of the Crimea through the formation of the Crimean ASSR as part of the Ukrainian SSR. This would correspond to the interests of both the Crimean Tatars and representatives of other nationalities living in the Crimea today.”
One referendum after another
The sovereignisation process of the Ukrainian SSR and the return of the Crimean Tatars served as an impetus for holding a referendum on the status of the peninsula – one of the first plebiscites of this kind in the history of the Soviet Union.
It is noteworthy that at a session of the Crimean Regional Council of People’s Deputies in November 1990, when the voting decision was made, Leonid Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, was present. He tried to convince the deputies to resolve the issue without holding a referendum.
Nevertheless, the vote took place. Over 93 percent of Crimeans (against 5 percent, with a turnout of 81 percent) spoke in favour of making the region autonomous, from Kiev. Less than a month later, on February 12, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR adopted the law “On the Restoration of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic”. Its first article stated that autonomy was being restored “within the territory of the Crimean region as part of the Ukrainian SSR”.
However, after the failed coup by the State Committee on the State of Emergency [GKChP] in August 1991, disintegration processes in the USSR abruptly accelerated. In the short period from August 20-31, many Soviet republics, including the Ukrainian SSR, adopted acts of independence.
When, during the coup, the President of the RSFSR Boris Yeltsin declared himself the “deputy” of USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and behaved like the de facto state leader, attempting to build a “strong Russia,” the Ukrainian SSR realised that it was time to act.
Events developed rapidly. On August 24, at an emergency meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, the Act of Declaration of Independence was adopted.
Nevertheless, a large part of Ukraine’s population, especially the Russian-speaking south-eastern regions, had no wish to destroy the country and break ties with the RSFSR. For example, in the All-Union Referendum in March 1991, residents of the Ukrainian SSR overwhelmingly (70.2 percent) voted for the preservation of the Soviet Union. For this reason, the republic’s elites, headed by Leonid Kravchuk, decided to hold a referendum on the independence of Ukraine, to enlist the support of the population and deprive the All-Union vote of legitimacy.
The pen stroke
On October 8, 1991, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev received a report from his assistant Georgy Shakhnazarov. “[We must] not only publicly repeat but also officially state Russia’s position regarding Crimea, Donbass, and the south of Ukraine. It is necessary to clearly and directly state that these areas are a historical part of Russia, and the country does not intend to abandon them,” the document stated.
Shakhnazarov advised the president to take urgent measures – for example, to intensify work in Crimea with the help of the chairman of the Supreme Council of the Crimean ASSR, Nikolai Bagrov. “The entire population of the republic should know that if Ukraine announces its withdrawal from the [Soviet] Union, Crimea will secede from Ukraine and become a part of Russia on the same day,” the assistant wrote. In addition, he recommended deploying systematic information through the USSR State Television and Radio, showing the inextricable economic and cultural link between Ukraine and Russia and warning against the “colossal sacrifices, suffering, and perhaps bloodshed” that the separation of the Ukrainian SSR from the USSR may bring both for the Russian and Ukrainian people.
By that time, the Supreme Council of the Crimean ASSR had already adopted a declaration on state sovereignty of the autonomous region. It ensured the right of the Crimeans to the land, subsoil, airspace, water, and other natural resources of the peninsula. According to the declaration, only the Crimean parliament could represent the interests of the Crimeans. In addition, local authorities established the right to pursue their own domestic and economic policies. According to the text of the declaration, Sevastopol, which had the status of a city of republican subordination, being under the direct supervision of central government, in the USSR, would maintain the status quo.
As a matter of fact, the peninsula was almost simultaneously claimed by three sides – in June 1991, a declaration of national sovereignty was also adopted by the protesting Crimean Tatars. But it was still part of the unified Soviet Union. Crimea’s fate was to be decided through negotiations.
The full stop
Vladislav Zubok, history professor at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences, believes that even at the end of August 1991, the USSR still had a chance. In his book “Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union”, he writes that if Gorbachev and Yeltsin had made joint efforts, they may have managed to divert the Ukrainian SSR from secession. After all, the republic did not have a unifying idea at the time, and for industrial regions such as Donbass, Kiev was not the centre of attraction. Those who lived in the southeast associated themselves mainly with Moscow, Russian history and culture. “For millions of people in these regions — people of mixed ethnic origin and a common identity — the idea of Ukrainian “sovereignty” was something vague. Something that could still imply a common statehood with the Russian Federation.”
This thesis is confirmed, among other things, by the way Leonid Kravchuk’s team campaigned for the independence of the Ukrainian SSR. For example, one of the propaganda leaflets, which was actively distributed on December 1, 1991, the eve of the referendum on the independence of the country, stated: “Only an independent Ukraine will be able to join any interstate community with its neighbours as an equal partner, and first of all with Russia that is closest to us . . . We are obliged to make the republic a good mother for all its citizens.
The plan of the republic’s authorities was successful. The overwhelming majority of Ukrainian SSR residents (90 percent) said “Yes” to an independent path, separate from the RSFSR.
The results spoke for themselves: 83.9 percent voted positively in the Donetsk region; 83.9 percent in the Luhansk region; 86.3 percent in the Kharkov region; 85.4 percent in the Odessa region. Only Crimea stood out, although even there, 54.2 percent of voters supported independence. – Russia Today.
◆ Alexander Nepogodin is an Odessa-born political journalist, expert on Russia and the former Soviet Union.
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