Online Reporter
Gibson Nyikadzino
Zimpapers Politics Hub
Today, cyber security and cybercrime are crucial topics deserving attention due to the widespread and evolving nature of online threats and the growing dependency on digital technologies.
Any cyber-attack, no matter how small, is a threat to a State’s national security and hence must be identified, managed, and shut down.
To show how serious states are placing cyber security issues at the centre of their interests, SADC nominated Zimbabwe as a leader in data protection capacity building. In this regard, Dr Gift Machengete, the director-general of Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe, was appointed by SADC member states to spearhead data protection training and share expertise in that regard.
Zimbabwe has seen an increase in cybercrime, and the relevant authorities are stepping up their efforts to educate and raise awareness about the issue.
As part of the implementation phase of the National Development Strategy 2, the Zimbabwean government is prioritising cyber security management and operational readiness by ensuring compliance with and implementation of laws and regulations governing online security and data protection to establish a robust legal framework.
At the same time, it is not only citizens who suffer from the growing threat of cyberspace crimes, despite the fact that they are more vulnerable, this poses the greatest danger to countries. In view of the deepening digitalisation of economies and public administration, disruptions, especially hacker attacks, are at the core of causing significant damage to individual enterprises or industries, and even paralyse parts of the public system, including communications, energy and aviation.
Dangerous Business
We live in a time when the era of lone enthusiasts has come to an end, and only highly organised companies, often backed by individual states, are operating in this dangerous business. For example, Israel actively uses commercial cyber-surveillance technologies, which are strictly regulated by the Israeli government.
Advanced spyware such as Pegasus and Circles from Israeli cyber-arms company NSO Group, a subsidiary entity specialising in tracking phone locations using vulnerabilities in telecommunications networks, cannot be legally sold globally without explicit export licenses from the Israeli Ministry of Defence.
Investigations by cyber security research groups like Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto in Canada mapped out the active deployment of Circles surveillance nodes within African nations, including in Zimbabwe. Rather than exploiting individual phones via phishing links, this information communication technology infrastructure manipulates the global signalling system number seven (SS7) telecommunications protocol.
This, for instance, has allowed operators, often State security apparatuses or external actors monitoring local systems, to intercept calls, text messages, and track the real-time location of any mobile phone roaming on Zimbabwean networks. Cooperation in dealing with cyber security is key. However, to have cooperation between American tech firms and security agencies affect nations that do not own platforms of mass communication.
No one is safe
Under Section 702 of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which lapsed in June but being reauthorised, the National Security Agency (NSA) is legally authorised to collect intelligence on non-US citizens located outside the United States.
Because a vast majority of Zimbabwe’s digital communications including routing for local internet service providers, international emails, and cloud storage pass through servers owned by American tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, and Meta, the NSA will utilise its legally mandated corporate partnerships to monitor Zimbabwean key targets.
Global cyber security briefs from 2024 through 2026 indicate that Western state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (APT) groups routinely compromise consumer routing hardware and local data centres within developing nations. This is not necessarily done to destroy local networks, but rather to establish stealthy proxy nodes. These nodes mask the origin of their traffic, enabling Western security and intelligence organisation to execute cyber espionage against both regional sovereign states and local security structures without alerting defence teams.
In recent years, the field of state-sponsored cyber operations, the integration of public and private sector technologies, and electronic espionage has continued to evolve. Current verifiable incidents in corporate disclosures and international judicial investigations have included episodes that describe ongoing operations by Western countries and Israel.
The Gaza Laboratory?
Following the escalation of conflict in Gaza in late 2023, investigative reports and internal intelligence disclosures detailed the Israel Defence Forces’ deployment of advanced Artificial Intelligence systems for battlefield targeting and surveillance.
In early 2024, it was confirmed that Israel’s Unit 8200 deployed an expansive, automated facial recognition programme in Gaza. The IDF utilised private technology from Corsight alongside standard consumer platforms like Google Photos to upload databases of known faces, using the integrated search and categorisation features to track, identify, and detain individuals at checkpoints.
Rather than deploying overt malware files that leave signatures, Western intelligence agencies have increasingly utilised compromised consumer routers, firewalls, and edge-computing devices globally to build obfuscated, multi-tier operational proxy networks. This infrastructure allows them to conduct deep cyber espionage into foreign critical infrastructure and state ministries without revealing the geographic origin of the traffic.
